Mr. Peres explained the reasons for the need to resume negotiations and said that the "price of peace is almost set. So we have to concentrate more on the nature of peace " He saw the final status, at the conclusion of the transition period, the creation of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. He felt that at this stage Israel should negotiate only an interim solution and refrain from talks on the nature of the permanent settlement, since time was required for the adjustment to the new realities which will be created. An interim solution avoids the need to draw up borders at this stage. The principle he espoused for Israelis and Palestinians was to work together but live apart. Text:
Q: A lot of things have changed since last December, when the Israelis and Arabs last held talks. The new-Clinton Administration is talking about becoming a "full partner" in the peace process There's greater Palestinian dissent in the territories.
The Likud now has a spokesman, with the election of Binyamin Netanyahu. How might all this have affected the talks?
A: Today the situation is more complicated than it was a few months ago. Undoubtedly. And yet the occasion is here. And I think as far as Israel is concerned, we have to tell our public some facts of life: In these negotiations, Israel has unavoidably been more on the giving side than the Palestinians, for the simple reason that the Palestinians have very little to offer.
Q: It's an asymmetrical negotiation?
A: It's an asymmetrical negotiation. There is no sense in creating false expectations ... You cannot come to the Palestinians and say we will give you part of the West Bank if you give us part of the West Bank. The West Bank is in our hands, not their hands. By definition, that is an asymmetrical situation.
Secondly, much depends upon us. And we should not look around to others to solve our problems courageously and realistically. The price of peace is almost set. So, we have to concentrate more on the nature of peace. That's where the real opportunities are.
Q: Where should the public look for progress? In your view, what would be a realistic goal for this round?
A: To conclude an agreement on autonomy.
Q: In this round?
A: Yes. [We can clear up] at least most of the disputed issues.
Q: You think that's possible?
A: I think it is needed. And I don't exclude that this can be attained.
Q: You're saying that you think that by the end of this round the basic outlines of autonomy will be agreed upon?
A: Yes.
Q: Do the negotiations have to be accelerated because of the recent violence?
A: Not only the violence, the opposition ... Timing here is crucial. That's been my feeling about it from the very beginning. Not just to advance, but to advance quickly is a must.
Q: Have you gotten any indication from the Americans and the Palestinians that things are ripe enough for that sort of progress in this round?
A: I am not going to speak on their behalf. I am speaking on our behalf. I think as far as we are concerned, we have decided really to try our best to reach an agreement.
Q: What about the U.S. role? How would that make a difference?
A: The Americans themselves said this time they are a facilitator and bridge builder, not a mediator or a conciliator. You know, every time you start the negotiations, you don't have to return to Mount Sinai and come back with the Ten Commandments. You have to be pragmatic about it... You have to see where you want to arrive and act accordingly. But every time to issue a list of rules and conditions seems childish to me.
Q: There was a special debate in the Knesset yesterday, with the Likud complaining that Israel is not making any demands on the Palestinians to stop the violence. How do you respond? Perhaps Faisal Husseini can't stop Hamas, but why can't he stop the Fatah Hawks?
A: The problem is that the people we are negotiating with cannot stop the shooting. We don't negotiate with the ones who shoot. If you make a condition that those who are shooting will stop shooting, you will make them the real partners and you hand over the negotiations to the terrorists.
Q: You have reportedly met Husseini several times. What is your measure of the man? Can he make difficult decisions?
A: I would not like to make any personal remarks. To be a leader in war is one thing, to be a leader in peace is another thing. When you are a leader at war, people applaud you if you win and curse you if you lose. But when you are negotiating, people never applaud you when you make concessions. They may applaud you [only] when you reach peace. So I appreciate the delicate situations of all the leaders in the negotiations.
Q: You said earlier that the price of peace is set, meaning everyone knows what the final status talks will be about.
A: Yes, more or less.
Q: Do you mean a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation?
A: In my judgment, yes.
Q: So if the final outcome is basically agreed upon, why don't we get to the crux of it already?
Q: Because then we will marry two negotiations under the same huppa.
Q: What's wrong with that?
A: If we should start to negotiate today the nature of the permanent solution while we are negotiating the interim solution, we shall discover that we have two very tough negotiations without a chance to agree on them.
I say that in order to deal with the permanent solution, we have to create another climate. I see the interim solution as a voyage from a cold climate to a Mediterranean climate. For that reason I took upon the interim solution not in terms of geography but in terms of time. The necessary time that is really needed.
Q: But wouldn't you agree that the recent waves of violence have shown that facts on the ground can overwhelm what happens at the table? Isn't it better to start planning where this voyage is going to end up?
A: Planning, yes. But agreeing is impossible because under the present climate we cannot reach an agreement about the map. Let's face it, If we start with the shores we want to arrive at, we shall discover that we cannot agree on the voyage. In order to agree on the map we will need time.
Q: I think you've said publicly that the economic realities are such that the current closure cannot last. It's going to have to be lifted. Can you envision establishing a link between the restrictions and the violence? For example, decide that the workers will be let back in, but announce that if an Israeli is killed, say, 10,000 workers will be cut back. That would make it clear they'll have to pay an economic price for violence.
A: Well, I don't think that whenever there was an act of violence all two million people in the territories were asked permission first. So I don't adopt the idea of the collective punishment. Furthermore, as long as we are responsible for the territories, we are responsible not only for the being but for the well-being of the people, and we shouldn't push them at this stage to a state of starvation, of unemployment or horror.
I am less concerned about the Israeli economy ... Today 93%, 94% of the workers are Israeli. The people that are coming from the territories represent not more than 6-7% at best,
I cannot imagine we should tell them that your workers don't have the right to come to our side and yet we shall remain the policemen on your side. It is either-or. Either the responsibility is divided or the responsibility is shared. But you cannot have it half and half, I look on [the closure] as a temporary measure. It wasn't planned. It was taken as a reaction to an impossible situation and it was an understandable reaction.
We have to play it by ear. It has had some side effects which are important. For example, the Israeli public today does now sense what it means to work together but live separately, to have the Palestinians run their life in their places with us running our lives in our places. That's a great advantage.
Q: So do you mean that you want to lift this pretty soon"
A: I think gradually this will be lifted.
Q: Over the next month?
A: I dont know. I dont want to predict.
Q: Lets turn to Syria for a second. The prime minister has made it clear that he would prefer movement on the Syrian front, which he believes would promote movement on the Palestinian front. How likely is progress with the Syrians?
A: Difficulties you have on both fronts. The difference is the nature of the difficulties, not in their existence. And I think whereever we can move, we have to. We shouldnt link progress on one to progress on the other because then you will end up linking the lack of progress to the other. And if you can move ahead with the Palestinians, fine, lets move ahead. If you can move ahead with Syrians, fine lets move ahead
Generally, what is interesting is that the Arabs are discovering their main problem is not what comes from the outside, namely from Israel, but what happens within each of their countries. And apart from Egypt, most of the countries are being governed by minorities and by brutal authoritarians. The ones whoendanger them are fundamentalists, not Israelis.
Q: How do you explain that the Palestinians are so good in reading the Israeli domestic situation, but the Syrians are not?
A: The Syrians are keen on reading their own situation. The Palestinians dont have a situation in their own state as the Syrians do. Lets not forget that Assad is from a minority [group] that he rules single handedly.
There may be some changes in Syria. By having tension with Israel, he justifies his own rule. I think he realizes the time has come for peace. He wants an impossible negotiation. Namely, Israel first of all, hand over everything he requests and then [he] will negotiate about what Israel gets in return. This is really illogical.