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94 Briefing to the Press by Uri Lubrani- Coordiantor of Israel Government Activities in Lebanon- 28 July 1993

28 Jun 1993
 VOLUME 13-14: 1992-1994
 
 

94. Briefing to the Press by Uri Lubrani, Coordiantor of Israel Government Activities in Lebanon, 28 July 1993.

Mr. Lubrani provided the background for Operation Accountability which by then was in its fourth day and brought about the flight of a large number of civilians and the halting of Hizballah attacks on Israel. He explained the impasse in the talks with the Lebanese delegates in Washington. They insisted first and foremost on the implementation of the March 1978 Security Council Resolution 425 which created UNIFIL and called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanese territory. He argued that Lebanon was unable to exercise its authority in its own territory and thus Hizballah was able to operate against Israel with impunity. The objectives of the operation were to separate the population from Hizballah and to bring pressure on the Lebanese government to exercise its authority on its area. Mr. Lubrani outlined the many proposals Israel made to Lebanon in the past in an effort to pacify Southern Lebanon. Excerpts from his opening remarks follow:

(...) Firstly, let me refer you to the prime minister's statement of this afternoon in the Knesset. This is a basic policy statement and I trust that you have read it - and understand that what I am going to say is based [thereon].

I would like to open with a general statement and then I will be open to questions. I think what has to be said is that the original sin of [events] in Lebanon is the submission of the Lebanese government to Syrian will. In fact, the government of Lebanon lost its independence and freedom of action. From day one of the peace process, we expressed our readiness to negotiate a full-fledged peace agreement with Lebanon - having insisted that this be done within the framework of the Madrid peace conference (...) and to proceed forthwith in making any kind of arrangement that would lessen the tensions between the countries.

On their part, the Lebanese have insisted (first and foremost) that we deal with one Security Council Resolution (425) - the implementation of which is going to bring about the beginning of a process which may or may not lead to a peace agreement. They have never gone further than this. You must realize (and these very days prove this) that the 425 agreement is a recipe for something I would consider a worse disaster than that which has [recently] beset Lebanon, because 425 [accounts] for the implementation of a Security Council resolution which does not lay down any kind of arrangement to guarantee Israel (...) peace along our northern border. It is a one-sided attempt to say, "You go back to the international borders and we will take care of the rest." We see now that Lebanon has not been able to "take care of the rest." Lebanon is unable to exercise its authority over the most lethal militia in Lebanon - a militia which is guided, financed, trained and [directed] by Iran (and permitted to do its mischief by Syria). Nobody in the Lebanese government has any authority or ability to change this. And, therefore, what we have sought is a much more comprehensive arrangement with Lebanon. We have said that if we - [Israel and Lebanon] - have security problems, let us sit down and discuss them; you explain what you can do in the way of security for Israel, we will tell you what we expect you to do [in order] to lay our minds at rest about security on the northern border. This has not materialized.

I must refer you to a quotation by Hizballah secretary-general Sheikh Nasrallah, a venerable gentleman who gave an interview to a Lebanese paper a few weeks ago and said, "We shall not bestow legality and legitimacy upon the Zionist entity, even if it cedes land to the Arabs and will retain any piece of land in Palestine. We shall adhere to the strategy of wiping Israel off the map." These are the words of Sheikh Nasrallah and we take him very seriously. This is the gentleman who commands Hizballah and, therefore, to expect us to unilaterally leave southern Lebanon and the Security Zone to its own devices - with these words by the leader of Hizballah - means that something much more catastrophic will emerge.

Of late, we have been subjected to a much more trigger-happy Hizballah within Israeli territory and in the Security Zone. You may have noticed that, since February, the Israeli Government has [bent over] backward trying to contain and restrain itself without massive retaliation - [confining] its retaliation to strictly military targets, in the hope that this will avoid loss of innocent life.

What you have seen in the last 80 hours is, in fact, [a result of things being brought to a head and of us reaching a point where we had to say "enough is enough." We had to drive the point home that we will not countenance a situation where we are exposed to attacks in the Security Zone and within Israel - with our security being jeopardized, while security across the border is almost total. Therefore, we came to the conclusion that something had to be done in this respect.

In fact, we have two objectives in this present campaign. The first is to separate Hizballah from the masses of the population. What has happened during the past month is that Hizballah has encamped itself within population centers, believing that these centers can serve as their human shield - and [they are] shooting Katyushas and other weapons, and launching attacks, from these [places] against the Security Zone with impunity (knowing that Israel is very sensitive to the loss of civilian lives, and hoping that we will not feel free to retaliate). For a period of time, we felt that we were not free to retaliate. [Thus,] the way Hizballah is being dealt with is to try and see that we deal with Dust] Hizballah, if possible - [while] getting the population out of the area.

The other objective is to exert pressure on the Lebanese government [in order that it] exercise its responsibilities toward the population; the Lebanese government is responsible for the welfare of this population. And, if the Lebanese government is unable to contain Hizballah terrorist attacks from the area, then something has to be done (...) They know the aggressors very well. (...)

I would like to emphasize (as we always say) that we have no quarrel with any peace-loving Lebanese. From my experience with the Lebanese delegation to the peace talks in Washington, I can tell you with great conviction thathad Lebanon been free to make its own decisions - (...) [its delegates] would have immediately gone into a practical, substantive negotiation and it would not have taken us long to reach an agreement. (...) They were convinced that we mean business, but they were [bound] by non-Lebanese constraints - and to a policy which meant that they could not and would not budge by one inch, with the position being dictated to them by extraneous forces. That is a tragedy. (...)

Nevertheless, we tried to find ways to deal with [this phenomenon]. For almost two years now, we have sought ways to circumvent this veto which comes from Syria. (...) We have suggested that, quite apart from anything else, we would like to show this present Lebanese government that we want to extend its authority even into the Security Zone - and to make its civilian presence more substantive [therein]. We said, "Come and do more health and education, more roads and telecommunications; it is your responsibility."(...) It was rejected and the rejection did not come from Beirut; it came from somewhere north of Beirut.

I can give you a list of other suggestions that we have proposed - time and time again - in order to find a way to circumvent this veto against making any progress on this peace track.

The last attempt was a suggestion, on our part, that we forget about the positions of the two delegations - without prejudice to the Lebanese "425" position or to our position that we need a comprehensive peace treaty - and that we discuss security, because we saw that there was a storm brewing in Lebanon. Hizballah is trying to frustrate all possible efforts to keep this area quiet, at the behest of Iran (which has unequivocally declared [its opposition] to the peace process). (...) Therefore, we said, "Let us forget these positions; let us see how you envisage your security problems with us and [vice versa]. It is a meeting between non-political experts to try and see if we can work out a workable arrangement which could serve as a basis for progress once the political atmosphere lends itself [thereto]."

We presented four different versions of the same proposal and they were all rejected - except for the last one which was [only] handed over on the last day of the tenth round in Washington. We hope (when we get a [response] to this latest proposal) that this will serve as a basis for negotiation toward a fruitful dialogue on matters of security, which is the only real and basic problem between our two countries. There are no other problems. We have declared that we have no territorial claims to any inch of Lebanese territory. We would like the Lebanese government to fully exert its authority over the [entire] 10,552 square kilometers of Lebanon. We have no claim to any kind of natural resources; we only have one salient, important and vital [necessity]: security. (...) The rest we could settle very quickly, and I must reiterate this - because this is a basic position that we have taken and will consistently continue to take.

I would like to end by saying that, as a result of this latest operation, we hope to reach a point where we can discuss our problems with Lebanon without having Katyusha rockets lobbed into territories inside Israel and the Security Zone. When we deal dispassionately with the problems at hand (particularly the security problem), this is not the wish of Iran and of people who support subversive mischief in the south - [but] I am fully convinced that this is the wish of 99% of the Lebanese people. And it is this wish that we want to bring to the fore when we come to phases which will succeed this operation.

(...) I have not heard about any "scorched earth" policy; it may [have been used] by someone outside the circle of people who make decisions in Israel. (...) As a general policy, the prime minister and the [entire] [General] Staff are trying to avoid human [casualties]; this is why you have not noticed any premeditated attempt to hit civilian areas. (...)

Lebanon has ways to [make it clear] to the forces that dictate its policy that, if these forces wish the [current] government to still be considered responsible in Lebanon, [Beirut] must be permitted to do what is necessary to ensure the peace of the south. (...) This is the best option [available] to save the lives of innocent people. We have no easy options in Lebanon. (...)

In Washington, we have always (made it abundantly clear) that we will continue to do our utmost in order to make progress. (...) By the same token, we have said that we shall [also] continue to deal with matters on the ground, terrorist attacks and subversion as if there are no peace talks. (...)

I think that, in one way or another, Syria is using its capabilities in Lebanon in order to "needle" Israel - because this is a "commandment," and because it may get them a prize for "un-needling" Israel. This has happened before, and we have to try and contend with it in these circumstances.

 
 
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