Benjamin Netanyahu was elected prime minister in May 1996 and presented his government to the Knesset on 18 June 1996. He won a vote of confidence by a majority of 62 to 50. Mr. Netanyahu ran his campaign on the slogan of accepting the Oslo process but at a slower pace and insisting on Palestinian reciprocity and perhaps even amending some of its contents. He promised his voters that there will be no negotiations over the status of Jerusalem; the municipal area of Jerusalem will be expanded. Israel will not uproot Jewish settlements in the territories. It will oppose the Palestinian demand for the "right of return." It will strengthen the Jewish settlement in Hebron. These points were included in the guidelines of the Netanyahu government approved in June 1996. The prime minister also committed himself to uphold the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, to promote the special relations with the United States and to work for the improvement of ties with all countries so desiring.
One of his first moves upon becoming prime minister was to travel to the United States for a meeting with President Clinton. On the agenda was the next phase of implementing the September 1995 Oslo II (Interim Agreement) signed by the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Mr. Netanyahu stressed the fact that since the signing of the Oslo agreements Israel withdrew from six major cities in the West Bank in early 1996. What remained open was the future withdrawal from Hebron, one of Judaisms holiest cities.
This became the major focus of negotiations that lasted until the signing of the January 1997 Hebron Accord, under which Israeli forces withdrew from 80% of Hebron. The Hebron Accord was achieved with the active involvement of the United States and Jordan and was accompanied by a series of American assurances to both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The major assurance to Israel was contained in a letter from Secretary of State Christopher that stated that in future redeployment, Israel will be the one to determine the depth of the withdrawal according to its security considerations. Indeed, most of 1997 was devoted to the issue of FRD (Further Redeployment) in the West Bank. On 6 March 1997 the cabinet approved the first phase of the FRD consisting of 9.1% of the territory. This included 7% of territory that was then Area B under Israeli security control and Palestinian civilian control and 2.1% of Area C (exclusive Israeli control). The PA rejected this proposal and demanded a far greater withdrawal.
On 5 March 1997 the prime minister announced that Israel was prepared to enter into final status negotiations with the Palestinian Authority immediately, offering an accelerated timetable under which the negotiations would be completed within six to nine months. The PA rejected this proposal as well. On 30 November 1997 the cabinet approved in principle the second stage of FRD in the West Bank. It took a year to work out the details. An agreement to redeploy was not yet signed with the PLO by the end of 1997. by that time more than 95% of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip lived under Palestinian administration.
Throughout the period under review Israel insisted on full Palestinian compliance with agreements they signed since 1993, including the final elimination of offending articles in the PLO Covenant calling for Israels destruction. This was not achieved by the end of 1997. Israel demanded strong action to uproot terrorist infrastructure, but the few terrorists arrested by the PA were usually released shortly thereafter. The PA did not extradite fugitive terrorists with blood on their hands and Israels requests for 33 fugitives were ignored. None of the major terror groups were disbanded. Few weapons were confiscated. Anti Israeli incitement never ceased and in some cases intensified. The PA continued some of its activities in Jerusalem contrary to agreements it undertook.
In other areas, ties with the United States remained strong and enabled the negotiations and signing the Hebron Accords. Attempts to inject some warmth into Israel-Egypt relations were not very successful in spite of meetings between Netanyahu and Mubarak. Similarly, a number of meetings between the prime minister and the Jordanian monarch were helpful, but relations soured briefly after a failed Israeli operation in Amman against a major Hamas leader.
The Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs traveled extensively to various countries and maintained close ties with the Jewish communities abroad. The thrust was to explain the foreign policy of the Netanyahu government which put the main focus on reciprocity rather than Israel making concrete territorial concessions in return for vague and usually unfulfilled Palestinian commitments to fight terror.
There was no visible progress in negotiations with either Syria or Lebanon. Israel began to consider its position in southern Lebanon in view of some calls from within the country for a review of its policy in the security zone that has been in existence since 1985. The Netanyahu government pursued the same policy supported by all previous governments defending Northern Galilee and allowing its inhabitants to live a normal life. On a number of occasions Israel offered withdrawal from the security zone in the framework of an Israel- Lebanon peace treaty or short of that a Lebanese and indirectly a Syrian undertaking to halt all terrorist activities from Lebanese territory against Israel. Both Syria and Lebanon rejected the feelers and insisted on unilateral withdrawal with no guarantees attached.
Throughout the year and a half covered in this volume there was a delicate balance in the cabinet between those who stressed the need to retain all of Golan Heights and those who could never accept any territorial change in the West Bank. The prime minister had to maintain a very delicate policy in order to maintain Israels international obligations, maintain Israels special ties with the United States and keep the cabinet intact. This in fact marked Israels policy in the second half of 1996 and all of 1997.