Yes, it is aimed at what we said it is aimed at: solving the security problem of southern Lebanon, and implementing resolution 425 in its totality.
As I'm sure you are all aware, we have no real quarrel with Lebanon. There are no territorial disputes. We don't seek any square inch of the territory. The international boundary is well accepted, well demarcated. Besides the security problems of which you are all aware, there are no real issues. And if we could have been allowed to negotiate seriously, in a business-like way, a peace treaty with Lebanon, I'm sure we could have reached an agreement within a short time. But the peace is not yet here for reasons we all know, and we felt that rather than wait for peace - we would love to have peace tomorrow if possible - but rather than wait for it - although we aspire for peace with Lebanon as we aspire to peace with Syria - we should at least solve the security problems of southern Lebanon, to the benefit of the Israelis living in northern Israel and to the Lebanese living in southern Lebanon, in a way that will meet the interests of both countries.
This is why, although we still hope to have a peace treaty with Lebanon as soon as possible, we are aiming now at implementing 425 as an interim security arrangement, which will enable the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. I want to clarify that our call for the implementation of Security Council resolution 425 doesn't entail, as was suggested by some interested parties, any preconditions or additional conditions. We just want implementation of 425, yes, in its totality, in its entirety.
resolution 425 specified three important factors, complements: one, indeed, the withdrawal of Israeli forces; the second is the return of effective Lebanese authority; and the third, the restoration of international peace and security. International peace and security - "international" meaning at least two.
International security means restoring security to Lebanon and to Israel alike. This is why it is only natural, it's only logical, I would say almost automatic, that we expect serious business-like security arrangements to enable the implementation of resolution 425. There has been a precedent for this. We're not asking for something new. I wish to remind you that between November 1984 and January 1985, under the auspices and with the encouragement of the United Nations, there had already been an attempt to implement resolution 425 through, indeed, the same method of trying to work out security arrangements between Israel and Lebanon. And under the auspices of the United Nations, Israeli and Lebanese senior military officers met in Naqura. Regrettably, at that time, they failed. So our expectation, our request of security arrangements, as part and parcel of the implementation of resolution 425, is nothing new. We have tried it before. Let's try it again, and I hope this time, more successfully.
Security arrangements are vital, not just because they are part and parcel of resolution 425, but also because the absence of security arrangements is the best prescription, not of a solution, but of continued troubles, difficulties, and aggression. Because Israeli withdrawal without the security arrangements called for in resolution 425 means unilateral Israeli withdrawal, creating a situation in which there are no effective credible arrangements and renewing a situation which will be, by its very nature, vulnerable and volatile, and which may create a situation in which Israel will have to consider taking action to solve the difficulty that's created.
We won't leave Lebanon in order to come back to it. We don't want to have a partial implementation of resolution 425 without making sure that indeed it will restore security and stability. We want to solve the problem, not to make it worse. This is why we call for Security Council resolution 425 and its implementation in its entirety.
I would like to make it very clear. The Israeli initiative is on the table. It's there and we will continue to encourage our Lebanese neighbors to consider it seriously and positively. We will continue to encourage their friends to allow the Lebanese to decide what's best for them and to act according to their interests, rather than external interests. And we will continue to encourage the international community, which has already shown some very welcome signs of accepting and supporting it, to continue and help all of us: Lebanese, Israelis, Syrians, and all the Middle East, in implementing resolution 425, in solving the security problems in southern Lebanon, and in lending an element of stability and security to the region.
Although this initiative, as I said, is not connected, nor is it a substitute for, the peace process - which is important in itself - we hope and believe that the successful implementation of resolution 425 will not only solve the security problem, important enough, but also serve as, if you like, a CBM, a confidence-building measure, in creating a better atmosphere, better trust between us and our neighbors, and therefore, also helping all of us to find a way to resume the peace negotiations between Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon, and bring about a comprehensive lasting peace.
Question: You said before that you believe that Lebanon, the Lebanese army is perfectly capable of taking over the Security Zone, provided that the terrorist infrastructure will be taken down. Who should carry out the job of demolishing the terrorist infrastructure?
Mr. Biran: I want to make it clear. You won't get operational answers from me, not because I don't want to share with you, but because we keep an open mind about it. Any serious proposal, any credible measures, will be accepted by us. We don't come and say, "Just a moment, we will accept it only if it is done this or that way." We are ready to discuss ways and means to implement it.
We suggest that it is obvious that part and parcel of implementation of resolution 425 is the dismantling of the terrorist infrastructure. Who does it? Provided it's done, and done effectively and credibly, that's good enough.
Question: And you have some idea about who can do it?
Mr. Biran: When we are asked, I'm sure we'll have some ideas, but I don't think
we should discuss it now at this stage and through the media. We want a serious discussion, that's all.
Question: It is not clear what you mean by security measures. You mentioned dismantling infrastructure. But Hizbullah is a hit and run outfit with no infrastructure, unlike the PLO which preceded it. So what exactly do you mean by security measures? You are talking about the Naqura agreement; you are dealing with tens of pages of detailed negotiations on a situation that basically no longer exists. So can you give us in general terms what you mean by security measures?
Mr. Biran: I mean something very simple. I mean that if there is a political will on the part of the Lebanese and the Israelis to implement resolution 425, and if it's understood, as it was understood at the beginning of Naqura in 1984 that in order to implement it - and as part and parcel of the resolution and its clauses, you have to work out security arrangements - then we will ask the Lebanese military officers and our officers to sit down together and work out a plan. And if our military people come to the political level, to the government, and tell them these arrangements are satisfactory from, let's call it, a purely professional military point of view, that's fine.
Question: Are you willing to work through a third party so you don't have face-to-face negotiations with the Lebanese?
Mr. Biran: We are not worried about seeing them face-to-face. We have been face-to- face with them. If in 1984, in Naqura, we did it, why should we regress? We sit with the Lebanese, for example, in a different framework, in the monitoring group, which has other aims and other goals and other needs. We don't want to mix the two. I am giving it just as an example of a place in which Israelis and Lebanese and Syrians meet, together with the Americans and the French, of course.
Question: So is this a condition, a prior condition, that all parties sit down together?
Mr. Biran: I am talking now about the Lebanese and the Israelis. I think the way to do it, as was tried in Naqura, is for Israelis and Lebanese to do it. Again, I am not putting any preconditions at the moment. If we find that there is serious response and readiness to work it out, this detail, although important, will be looked at very seriously. I am not throwing out any options, providing it brings about the necessary result. I am suggesting that what you asked me was already done, and I won't think that we have to, therefore, discard it altogether. We did it in 1984, let's do it again.