EGYPT was the first Arab State to enter into armistice negotiations with Israel. United Nations auspices. Negotiations began on 12 January 1949, on the island of Rhodes, under the chairmanship of the Acting Mediator, Ralph Bunche. After lengthy and difficult parleys, most differences were resolved and an agreement was signed on 24 February. The Egyptian example paved the way for negotiations with the other Arab belligerents, with the exception of Iraq (see below), and those with Lebanon and Jordan started on 1 March. An agreement with Lebanon was signed on 23 March on the Lebanese-Israel border, and one with Jordan on 3 April. Negotiations with Syria started on 5 April and the agreement was signed on the Syrian-Israel border on 20 July.
That with Egypt set the pattern of principles, procedure and machinery for all the agreements. The basic assumption was that the agreements were intended to eliminate the threat to peace in Palestine and facilitate the transition to permanent peace (Document 1). Consequently, each agreement stipulates in Article I the basic aim of returning to permanent peace and emphasises that no aggressive acts shall be undertaken, planned or threatened by one party against the other. It is further emphasised that the armistice lines are purely military lines and not to be construed in any sense as political or territorial boundaries. They are to remain in force until a peaceful settlement is achieved between the parties, and either party, after the agreement has been in force at least one year, may ask for its amendment or revision. In the absence of mutual accord, either party may call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to call a conference for the purpose of reviewing, revising or suspending any of the provisions; participation in the conferences would be obligatory. The execution of each agreement would be supervised by a Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) composed of an equal number of representatives of the parties to it and of the Chief of Staff of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), or his representative, as Chairman. Decisions of the MAC would be adopted by majority vote.
The armistice lines followed, in general, the previous cease-fire lines, with some changes due to military or economic considerations. Egypt consented to withdraw its forces from the Faluja area; it retained control of the Gaza Strip but elsewhere withdrew behind the former boundary between Palestine and Egypt; the area of El-Auja and its vicinity was to be demilitarised.
In the agreement with Lebanon, Israel consented to withdraw from the area which it occupied in southern Lebanon, and the armistice line was to follow the former international boundary between Lebanon and Palestine.
More difficult was the demarcation of the armistice line with Jordan. Ultimately, after secret meetings between Israeli negotiators and King Abdullah, a line was accepted which coincided roughly with the former cease-fire line, slightly modified in favour of Israel to prevent disruption of lines of communication. Problems arising out of the division of Jerusalem were to be settled by a Special Committee (Article VIII): they included free movement on vital roads, including the Bethlehem and Latrun-Jerusalem roads, resumption of the normal functioning of the cultural and humanitarian institutions on Mount Scopus, free access to the Jewish Holy Places, including the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives and, above all, the Western Wall. The ancillary agreements arrived at earlier on the demilitarisation of Mount Scopus and of the area between the lines, including the Government House area, were incorporated.
Iraq did not enter into an armistice agreement with Israel but evacuated its forces from Palestine, and Jordanian forces took their place (Article V).
The most arduous talks were with Syria, the only Arab State that held a strategically important area in the territory allotted to Israel. After three and a half months of argument, Syria agreed to withdraw from Mishmar Ha-yarden in return for Israel's consent to the establishment of several demilitarised zones (Article V).
The four agreements were hailed as the decisive step toward restoration of peace, and Dr. Bunche was subsequently awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Hopes were soon dashed when it became apparent that the Arab States were not ready to enter into peace negotiations and insisted on belligerent rights - a claim explicitly repudiated by the United Nations in Security Council Resolution S/2322 of 1 September 1951 (see Section VIII, Document 5). The demilitarised zones, agreed upon to ease the solution of difficulties that had arisen during the negotiations, proved to be a major source of friction.
In the course of the Sinai Campaign of 1956 (see Section IX), Israel declared the armistice agreement with Egypt null and void and withdrew from participation in the MAC. The agreements with Jordan and Syria had become ineffective and largely inoperative. The only agreement fully operative by the time the Six-Day War broke out in 1967 was with Lebanon. The consequence of the Six-Day War was to bring about the collapse of the entire armistice system (see Section XI).