Interview with Acting Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami
on Newshour with Jim Lehrer, PBS TV
Interviewer: Ray Suarez
Wednesday, November 1, 2000
MR. SUAREZ: Joining me now is Israel's acting Foreign Minister,
Shlomo Ben-Ami.
In the last few months, we were told that Israel had made some of
its most far-reaching offers for a comprehensive peace to the
Palestinian people, and just these few weeks and months later,
we're seeing some of the worst turmoil in this part of the world
that we've seen in years. How did this happen?
MIN. BEN-AMI: Many of us are at a loss in trying to understand
how and why the response to such far-reaching, indeed, proposals
should have been countered by such a wave of violence. My
understanding is this, that Arafat felt that he was being
portrayed by President Clinton -- indeed, by international
opinion -- in the wake of the Camp David summit, as a peace
rejectionist. And he saw how Israel was gaining ground, thanks to
its peace policy, in the international arena. He felt his
international legitimacy was being seriously undermined by
Israel's peace proposals, proposals which he thought he could not
accept, for whatever reason.
And in a way, he has used this wave of violence, continues to use
it, in order improve his international standing and sort of
corner Israel and put Israel under pressure, internationalize the
conflict -- that is, undermine the centrality of the American
role. He doesn't want to see America leading the process, being
the honest broker, and he wants to internationalize it -- to
bring in the Russians, the Europeans, the U.N. -- on the
understanding that if such an internationalization is brought
about, he will have the kind of deal that he wants, because in
such an international forum, Israel will be isolated. This is the
strategy of Arafat. He is in fact trading with the blood of his
people in order to reach this political objective which I just
described.
MR. SUAREZ: The months following Camp David had been tense, but
you didn't see that sudden spasm of violence that you saw after
the visit of General Sharon to the Temple Mount. Was this a
crystallizing moment? Did the confrontation turn a corner at this
time?
MIN. BEN-AMI: Not at that precise time. You may remember that the
visit of Ariel Sharon to Temple Mount went peacefully. Nothing
happened. During that day nothing at all happened.
I myself was in Washington then in peace talks, incidentally, and
I happened to exchange a few words over the telephone with one of
the chief security personnel -- guys in the Palestinian system,
Jabril Rajoub, and he told me, if Ariel Sharon doesn't go into
the mosques, but just visits the surface, nothing will happen.
So that day -- that precise day -- was of no special
significance. What happened was that a day or a couple of days
later, groups of people were organized to come on the Temple
Mount and stage these outbursts of violence. So I think that the
whole thing was prepared in advance.
MR. SUAREZ: In your previous answer, you appeared to question
Chairman Arafat's commitment to peace with Israel. Is he still a
partner that you can continue to do business with? Can there be a
peace process with Yasser Arafat?
MR. BEN-AMI: The answer needs to be elaborated, not in terms of
yes or no.
You see, what happened here is this: In 1993, through the Oslo
Agreement, Arafat got a series of advantages. He got a
quasi-Palestinian state, personal authority as a
quasi-Palestinian state, a government, a parliament, an enormous
amount of international aid. He got money from the European
Union, from this country, and a military sort of establishment;
he has his own kind of military power. And all these were
supposed to lead gradually to negotiations on the final status.
But negotiations, whose result is not known in advance - because
this is an open-ended negotiation.
Now, what we see is that the moment Arafat doesn't reach the
precise result of the negotiations that he wants, he breaks the
rules of the game.
He got international aid, he got a dramatic shift in his
strategic position, thanks to the Oslo Agreement. Seven years
ago, he could not get a visa to America, now he's a frequent
flyer to the White House -- only thanks to Oslo. Now, he breaks
the rules of the game just because he did not get the deal he
thinks he should get. Which means a diktat -- Israel should
accept all these terms. And once he doesn't get it, he breaks the
rules of the game.
So, the question of whether of not he's a partner needs to be
answered in terms of whether or not he is ready to accept that
this is an open negotiation, leading to a reasonable deal.
Camp David was a reasonable deal. Two days after the visit of
Ariel Sharon, two, three days, maybe even a week, we were
supposed to come to America once again to discuss an American
peace package, which the Palestinians knew was about to be
presented, we knew it was about to be presented. So my suspicion
is that Arafat orchestrated this wave of violence, rather surfed
on it, because he wanted to avoid the American peace package and
be exposed by the President once again as a peace rejectionist.
And this is why you see him now driving the whole process, the
whole situation to internationalization, so that he can get a
deal, in his view, better than the deal that he presumed was
inherent in the package the Americans were about to put a week
after the visit of Sharon.
MR. SUAREZ: Has, in your view, the action on the ground in
Israel proper, in the occupied territories, gone so far that now
it's difficult to discuss an ongoing peace process, one that
really exists?
MR. BEN-AMI: Well, it is indeed very difficult in such a state
of affairs to move immediately and abruptly to peace talks. This
is why we went to Sharm el-Sheikh, and President Clinton came
there, and the Europeans and the U.N. And we subscribed to a
memorandum that those who should know - namely, the Americans,
the Egyptians - those who should know, know very well that Arafat
has not abided by the understandings of Sharm el-Sheikh. So what
we need now is to impress upon Arafat -- because he has
humiliated all those who were witnesses to the memorandum -- the
Americans, the Europeans, the U.N, the Egyptians -- to impress
upon him the necessity to abide by the memorandum, bring an end
to violence.
And then, after a short period of healing, we need to understand,
where do we stand now, after seven years of peace process?
Because to some of us it means the collapse of the work of a
lifetime. The peace camp in Israel is shattered to pieces - those
who believe in generosity, flexibility, the creation of the
Palestinian state - what is due to the Palestinians, because the
Arab world, when they occupied these territories, never gave to
the Palestinians any rights, let alone self-determination. Israel
is ready for the creation of a Palestinian state friendly to
Israel, not hostile. And now we see that the work of our life is
under question.
So we say, bring an end to violence, abide by the Sharm el-Sheikh
agreement, and then we can proceed to the resumption of peace
talks. Because we Israelis know very well -- and I hope this is
the case with the Palestinians also -- that there is no
alternative to the peace process. We do not want to conceive a
military solution to the problem because we don't believe there
is a military solution. We believe only in a political solution.
At the end of the day, we need to go back to the table of
negotiations. It is very, very sad that we should go back to the
table of negotiations only after having crossed rivers of blood.
It is totally unnecessary.
MR. SUAREZ: Can Israel disengage at this point so that for its
part the fighting and the dying can slow down, can stop?
MIN. BEN-AMI: It can stop now, immediately. In an hour. It can
stop if Arafat gives to his people clear-cut instructions. And to
tell you the truth, I don't really know if he is unwilling to
give instructions, or if he is unable to control the situation.
In either case, we have a problem with his partnership in the
peace process. What would be the future if we strike a peace deal
with him? What guarantees do we have that he can fulfill, meet
his commitments if he's unable to control the situation of armed
militias?
By way, the Tanzim, the armed militia of the Tanzim, which is the
main military force in the West Bank operating against Israel
today - and in the last three, four days they assassinated four,
five citizens in the streets of Jerusalem - these people are
armed contrary to the agreement of Oslo. According to Oslo, they
should have been disarmed and disciplined. In the streets of
Israel today, you have Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorists running
free, and we are today on high alert against possible acts of
terrorism, because these people were released from Arafat's
jails, which means that he is violating the Oslo agreement under
which he got this quasi-Palestinian state, this military
establishment, these strategic relations, or good relations, with
America.
So he needs to decide. And America and the world needs to tell
him, "Are you a partner in this difficult process, or you want to
turn your back to a peaceful solution?" in which case the
international community needs to react accordingly.