Securing the Skies

In the wake of September 11th, many members of the worldwide airline industry have turned to Israel for advice.

By Simon Griver

Although it is impossible to claim that September 11th-style attacks could not be perpetrated against Israel, the kind of security measures taken by Israel's airline industry greatly minimizes the risk of such an attack.

One such measure is the very close watch that air traffic controllers keep on all planes in the region, explains Dr. Reuven Pedatzur, a defense analyst based at Tel Aviv University and a former Israel Air Force pilot. "These planes are tracked from transceivers' in the pilot's cockpit, which send a digital signal to the air controllers on the ground. If these transceivers are switched off, as happened in the planes which were hijacked in September, it is considered highly suspicious." Such an occurrence would be a reason to send jet fighters up to intercept threatening aircraft, adds Lt. General Dan Shomron, a former Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). He points out that in addition to the transceivers, the IDF has its own sophisticated radar equipment. "Our radar picks up planes at a great distance," explains Shomron. "If suspicious planes begin to close in on a target, we can quickly take appropriate action."

Such an incident occurred in 1973, when a Libyan passenger airline inexplicably got lost over Egypt and started heading towards Israel. The plane was shot down over the Negev desert just as it was approaching the heavily populated center of the country. And more recently, just a few months before the September 11th attacks, a light aircraft illegally flown into Israel from Lebanon was shot down by the Air Force over the Mediterranean coast.

However, shooting down planes is a last resort. Ideally, terrorists should be prevented from even trying to hijack planes. This can be achieved by the comprehensive screening of passengers, as is routine practice for El Al. This security philosophy was introduced in the aftermath of the hijacking of one of El Al's planes in 1968. Since then there have been no known attempts to hijack any of its aircraft. Amiram Maor, Director of the Business and Marketing Division - ISS Group of Israel Military Industries, is also Managing Director of IMI's Academy for Advanced Security and Anti-Terror Training. The academy provides training for anti-terror units as well as air marshals similar to those used by El Al. "It seems that the response to the attacks in the US will be two-phased," comments Maor. "In the first phase, it looks as if there will be a lot of high-profile security and conspicuous activity in response to the panic of passengers and staff. But this will not provide effective security. We assume that what is needed in America is a security concept', similar to the adaptations made by Israel, but to suit their circumstances. This is the second phase."

This concept will most likely consist of thorough screening of passengers and their luggage, and increased security in the airports and on the planes. It will be binding on all airlines wishing to land and take off from US airports and will become a mandatory international standard, rather like existing rigorous mechanical safety regulations. However, Maor fears that the concept eventually adopted by US authorities will be different and less stringent than the one currently implemented by El Al and Israel's Airport Authority. "People have short memories," he observes. "The painful tragedy of September 11th will be soothed by time, and the needs of business and profit and loss will erode some of the aspects of the Israeli concept, which makes many costly and inconvenient demands on both the airlines and the travelers." Until now air travel in the US has been likened to traveling by bus, with the few baggage checkers often casual laborers with almost no training.

"It is the airline's or airports authority's responsibility to screen passengers from the moment they arrive at the airport," explains Maor. The Israeli model is stringent: passengers are requested to arrive at airports several hours before their flight and are subjected to meticulous searches of their baggage and personal questions about themselves and the purpose of their trip. In addition, airlines and airports must train personnel and invest in expensive high-tech detector equipment. Well-trained security personnel who greet the passenger on arrival at the airport or pre-flight check-in are first and foremost checking the passengers themselves. Typically they check that tickets and passports are in order and, using a lot of eye contact, ask important questions such as whether their baggage has been within their care the entire time, who packed the suitcases and whether anybody has asked them to carry packages with them for delivery at their destination.

Which passengers are suspicious and which are not is not always evident at first. In 1986, an innocent-looking young pregnant Irish woman passed through the baggage check made by the British Airport Authority at London's Heathrow Airport. But before boarding her El Al flight to Israel she was subjected to a second security check by El Al staff. One alert security officer quickly became suspicious of her when she told him that her Palestinian boyfriend, who said he would be meeting her in Israel a few days later, had helped her pack the suitcase. The security officer suspected that her suitcase contained explosives before it was actually opened. The woman was oblivious of the fact that she was carrying a bomb timed to go off during the flight to Tel Aviv.

Airports in Israel have a security fence, equipped with electronic sensors, to prevent infiltrators. In addition, the airport authorities are vigilant about screening civilian staff, particularly maintenance professionals, and cleaning and catering staff, who board aircraft between flights. On board the plane itself, El Al does not allow passengers to carry weapons, including knives. There is always at least one plain-clothed armed guard on all flights, and the flight crew is trained to discern anything suspicious and report it immediately. Also, unlike most other airlines, the pilot's cockpit is always securely locked, with access provided only to those with appropriate clearance.

IMI is negotiating with many airlines, airports and airline authorities to provide advice, professional assistance and training on some or all of these issues, explains business and marketing director Maor. "Though some of our clients are in a hurry, we would rather wait to see what kind of international standards the US authorities will demand. But the idea is to work out a comprehensive concept for planning and implementation." To this effect, IMI provides design and project management, installation and integration of systems, and training of personnel from operator up to command level. Ideally IMI prefers to train professionals at its own college in Israel, but for the convenience of clients the company is presently planning to set up training facilities in the US and possibly in other locations worldwide with whom Israel has diplomatic relations. In addition, IMI offers expertise in combating non-conventional warfare as well as threats to shipping and other forms of transportation, infrastructure and strategic sites such as oil refineries and fuel depots. Maor points out that all deals must be approved by both the Israeli government and the overseas government of the country in which a potential customer is located.

The principle aim, he explains, is to deter attacks or prevent them by catching perpetrators before they can act. But in the event of an attack, security, emergency and rescue networks must be trained to provide fast threat containment and minimize damage through the flexible deployment of emergency forces relying on existing private and public services.

For decades the Israeli public has lived with the threat of terrorism, but by patiently submitting itself to the financial and personal inconvenience that security measures demand, there is no question that countless lives have been saved.