HAMAS TERRORISM AND HOW TO STOP IT
(Analysis by Ron Ben-Yishai, 'Yediot Ahronot', October 20, 1994, p.5)
HAMAS HAS ESCALATED TERRORIST ACTIVITY, AND IS ACTING WITH MURDEROUS PROFESSIONALISM AND AT A FREQUENCY PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN. THE ORGANIZATION IS PROCLAIMING THAT IT INTENDS TO CONTINUE [THIS ACTIVITY], AND EXPERIENCE TELLS US THAT WE SHOULD TAKE THIS STATEMENT LITERALLY.
It is quite reasonable to assume that the success of yesterday's bombing will encourage attempts to imitate it. Therefore the State of Israel also needs to step up the level of measures which it employs against HAMAS and those who assist it. This would be a combination of measures which would deal with the problem, even if HAMAS which will be blocked on its way to the Green Line returns (as in the past) to actions against Jewish settlers in the territories.
These measures will be taken, of course, without violating the law or basic moral laws, but while exercising of the right of self-defense. The peace process must also not be stopped so that HAMAS is not granted a victory and encouraged to continue.
A Violent and Premeditated Campaign We are no longer dealing with sporadic knifings as an emotional outburst. We are dealing with a violent and premeditated campaign whose goal is political: to stop the peace process before it reaches the point of no return, and to force Arafat to accept HAMAS on its terms as a senior partner in controlling all areas from which IDF forces will withdraw.
The method: a closely linked chain of attacks in the heart of Israel's population centers, carried out professionally and demonstrating planning and operational ability which have been unknown thus far. We are seeing a sophisticated choice of targets and weapons, a meticulous maintaining of secrecy and compartmentalization, precise preparations and a selection of operations in the field, during which they are prepared to die.
In contrast to the PLO in the past, HAMAS and the Islamic Jihad do not care what international public opinion of them is. There is no direct and continuous link between HAMAS' political leadership, which is situated primarily in Gaza and abroad, and the Iz A-Din al-Kassam squads in the field. However, this leadership is responsible for giving the terrorists, through various means, the signal to act, and is responsible for conducting the propaganda campaign intended to exploit their successes for political needs. This leadership also succeeds in transferring to the terrorists a considerable part of the funding which it receives from Iran and other sources in Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
HAMAS' ability to act with relative freedom within the Gaza Strip, and fairly openly in Jericho as well, enables the members of Iz a-Din al-Kassam, through collaborators and liaisons, to receive operational and propaganda assistance which they did not have when Israel controlled those areas. It was in this way, one may suppose, that the terrorists received military-issue explosives, like those which were used in blowing up the bus, and weapons which until now were difficult for them to obtain.
There is no doubt that the loss of preventive and deterrence capability by the GSS and the IDF in the territories, which were transferred to the authority of Arafat and his people, contributes enormously to the murderous efficiency of the Islamic extremists, even those who are residents of Judea and Samaria.
What can the State of Israel do in order to stop the current wave of terrorism immediately? Imposing a closure on the territories is a relatively effective measure. It may also be necessary to stop, for a while, the free passage of Palestinians from Gaza and Jericho to the West Bank, though in order to prevent a lone suicide terrorist, this closure must be enforced more vigorously than in the past.
This is war, and we have to behave as we do in war. Therefore, the IDF should mobilize reserve units, including those in which men are not specifically fighters. This is in order to conduct many more ambushes and patrols than in the past along the seam between Judea and Samaria and the State of Israel, and to set up mobile roadblocks on the roads leading out of the territories. We should also call up reservists from non-combat units, in order to reinforce police patrols and the police presence in areas and places likely to be attacked.
These reservists would move about in streets and areas packed with people, travel on buses, and would be stationed next to kindergartens and schools. They would be alert and could serve as the address for civilians who see a suspicious person or object they would question any suspicious person. Their very presence could deter, and even prevent, attacks. Such a mobilization would constitute a way to divide the reserve duty burden in a more equitable manner, despite the fact that it could damage economic activity.
The police must more vigorously enforce the removal of residents of the territories who are residing in Israel illegally. In the territories, the GSS, aided by the IDF, could carry out a broad wave of arrests. Even before there is legislation, if it does come about, permitting more than moderate physical force, the GSS could, with full justification, employ the principle of the 'ticking bomb' and investigate, without too many niceties, anyone whom they believe could lead to those who carry out attacks.
The Negotiations Must Continue In the political sphere, Israel must continue the negotiations on holding elections and on the IDF's withdrawal from the population centers in Judea and Samaria. HAMAS must not be allowed to feel even for one moment that it has succeeded in halting the peace process. However, it must be made clear to Arafat that the continued implementation of the agreements is conditional on an improvement in the security situation within a reasonable amount of time.
Israel also must demand that Arafat and his security services prevent HAMAS from being free to carry out a propaganda campaign in Gaza. The Palestinian security service must prove that it really is doing everything in its ability to prevent aid from reaching Islamic Jihad and HAMAS terrorists in the West Bank from Gaza.
All of this is for the immediate future. In the long-term, the GSS and IDF Intelligence must improve their intelligence gathering capability in the Gaza Strip. The IDF must prepare modus operandi and units which will operate within the Gaza Strip and Jericho, in the event that things get completely out of Arafat's control. If all of these measures are implemented simultaneously, there is a good chance of tracking down the terrorists, and even of halting the current wave of terrorism.