TERRORIST ATTACK IN JERUSALEM - SELECTED ARTICLES
Jerusalem, 11 October 1994
'MA'ARIV', (p.2) Analysis by Oded Granot
If it proves to be true
that one of the terrorists from the attack in Jerusalem was active among
the extremist Muslims in Egypt, then it would appear that he succeeded in
getting through three security nets.
Firstly, the Egyptian security net, which is operating a wide-spread hunt
of Muslim extremists who are trying to overthrow the Mubarak government.
If the terrorist was dismissed from the Egyptian army, or from the
Palestinian Ein Jalut brigade, as was claimed yesterday, for his extremist
tendencies, the Egyptians must have known this.
Secondly, the Israeli security net, which permitted the terrorist to be
granted an entry permit into Israel at the embassy in Cairo.
And the Palestinian GSS net in Gaza, which must have known that the
terrorist entered the Gaza Strip and joined the Az-a-Din al-Kassem gang.
Palestinians have operated through Egyptian Muslim Fundamentalist groups
before. But this is the first time, apparently, that there was open
cooperation between the 'Muslim Brotherhood' and Hamas in the territories.
One of the lessons from this occurrence is that there is a need to
increase intelligence cooperation between Israel and Egypt in order to
prevent future infiltrations of this type in the future. And we must find
out what the Palestinian GSS knew about the Egyptian 'tourist.'
And it is legitimate to demand that Arafat not just condemn the attack,
but to move to the active stage. Instead of arresting Islamic Jihad and
Hamas activists and releasing them a few days later, he must take away
their weapons, which later could be used in terrorist attacks in Israel.
'YEDIOT AHRONOT', (p.7) Analysis by Roni Shaked
The GSS and the IDF
are conducting comprehensive investigations in order to come up with the
conclusions necessary to fill the holes which were discovered in the
security network, and to provide appropriate answers to questions which
are as yet unclear:
WHAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE ATTACK? The Security Establishment has two
versions: mass murder, or a hostage-bargaining attack. The assessment is
not certain because of the large number of grenades and other weapons
found, which point towards mass murder, and the note which was found in
the pocket of one of the terrorists which had instructions on how to
contact the Egyptian ambassador in Israel which points towards
negotiations.
DID THE TWO OPERATE BY THEMSELVES? No. According to witnesses, they had
assistants, who provided weapons and a hiding place.
HOW DID THEY ARRIVE IN JERUSALEM? By infiltration. With fake documents,
hidden in cars, or by crossing over the Green Line from Gaza in a place
where the border fence is not in place.
DO THE CHECKS AT EREZ CHECKPOINT PROVIDE ENOUGH SECURITY? No. It is
difficult to check 20,000 Palestinians in three hours, from 3:00 until
6:00 a.m. It is absolutely possible to cross with fake documents.
DID TERRORIST ALJAHARI JOIN THE PALESTINIAN POLICE? Sources on the ground
claim this is so. He is not on the IDF list of those who entered as part
of the Ein Jalud brigade.
IS THE RELEASE OF TERRORISTS DANGEROUS? Yes. He was released one month
before the end of his sentence and signed the obligatory statement not to
engage in terrorism. This shows that the signing of this statement is
worthless.
CAN WE PREVENT FUTURE SUCH ATTACKS? Yes. We are talking about a well-
planned attack, involving many elements. Good intelligence could have
prevented such an attack.
IS THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY DOING ENOUGH TO FIGHT AGAINST HAMAS'
TERRORISM? No. Israel is by no means satisfied with the preventative steps
the Palestinians have taken.
'HA'ARETZ', (p.1) Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff
Statistical data does
confirm a significant drop in the number of attacks, mainly in the areas
of Gaza and Jericho, but Israelis continue to be killed by Palestinian
terrorists (as they were two nights ago in Jerusalem). Since the signing
of the Oslo accord in September 1993, 68 Israelis have been killed by
Palestinians in the territories and within the Green Line. And since
Palestinian forces entered Gaza and Jericho, following the signing of the
Cairo agreement in May, 14 Israelis have been killed.
Given the intensification of Hamas terror, it is clear that Israel will
now present the Palestinian entity with more vigorous demands that it
employ a stronger hand in dealing with terrorists from radical Islamic
organizations. Israel will not be satisfied with partial answers, or with
the fictitious arrest of Hamas members who are released a short time later
on the order of Yasser Arafat. Israel will also take a tougher position
with respect to Arafat's request that Hamas members be unconditionally
released from incarceration in Israel.
For now, there is no proof that one of the Hamas murderers involved in the
attack on the Nachalat Shiva neighborhood of Jerusalem (and who was killed
there) was a Palestinian policeman. Heads of the Palestinian police have
yet to answer the question of whether the man, Isam Muhana al-Juhari, was
connected to the police in any way. In any event, they have stated that
his name is not included on the list of those receiving salaries.
Israel has also approached Egypt with a request for information regarding
al-Juhari, on whose person an Egyptian passport was found. The passport
bore an Israeli stamp which attested to the fact that the man entered the
Gaza Strip via the Rafiah crossing on 14 July 1994. No official response
has yet been received from the Egyptians either.
The two murderers came to Jerusalem from the Gaza Strip, which is under
Palestinian control. Security personnel, meanwhile, are faced with the
reasonable possibility that the terrorists did not bring their weapons and
numerous hand-grenades from the Gaza Strip but that they were received
in Jerusalem.
According to assessments, the weapons were concealed in a place whose
location was disclosed to the terrorists upon their departure from the
Gaza Strip or the terrorists received the weapons from a Hamas liaison
in eastern Jerusalem. The results of ballistics tests conducted by the
Israel Police CID laboratory have not yet been received.
The attack in central Jerusalem has given rise to many operational
questions. There is no certainty about the identity of the terrorist
holding the Egyptian passport Was he an Egyptian, or a Palestinian with
an Egyptian passport? Was he affiliated with the Palestinian police, or
was he connected to the Egyptian police and recruited by Hamas? It is
clear that, when he received an Israeli visa from the embassy in Egypt, no
details were known about his past or business.
Nor is there any information about the route that the murderers took from
the Gaza Strip to Jerusalem, or about who transported them or gave them
their weapons. Despite the fact that inspections are carried out at border
crossings, it is easy to slip into Israeli territory in places where no
fence has yet been erected. There is also information concerning forged
documents and other devices used by those who do not have entry permits.
'MA'ARIV', (p.2) Analysis by Alex Fishman
The main lesson from the
attack in Jerusalem should be directed at the Israeli Government: even
with the awareness of Arafat's internal constraints, the time has arrived
to stop letting him off the hook. It is inconceivable to have a situation
in which two sides who are partners in a political process, when only one
side is actually struggling against the violent groups which threaten to
disrupt the process.
Following the disturbances at the Erez Checkpoint a few months ago, Israel
succeeded in making clear to the Palestinians, through economic pressure,
that they too are responsible for checking those going to work through the
Checkpoint. Following the incident in Jerusalem, Israel must make it clear
to them that their responsibility for checking those who are leaving the
Gaza Strip does not end at the a police checkpoint.
The type of checking which is called for now, is a tough struggle against
the opposition groups something which Arafat is trying to get out of
doing. He must at least fulfill one of Israel's basic demands: to disarm
Hamas of their weapons.
Israel needs to make it clear to him that there will be a price for his
continuing to evade the issue, including economic and other sanctions, or
otherwise Arafat will have no reason to change his ways.
One of the terrorists, who was questionably identified as either a
Palestinian policeman or a tourist who had arrived in Gaza from Egypt,
brings Israel back to the claim which Maj.-Gen. Shahak made during talks
with the Palestinians, a claim which has still not been answered, namely
that the Palestinians present Israel with a list of the policemen enlisted
from the local population. On the list of policemen raised outside the
territories which was handed over to Israel, the name of the terrorist
does not appear. If indeed we are dealing with a policeman, then this
teaches us that the anti-Arafat elements are also present in the forces
which are loyal to him.
The Israel Police invested its best resources and personnel in Jerusalem.
A program introduced by Police Minister Shahal to close off Jerusalem
which is now being discussed has run into budgetary problems. The
program is meant to provide improved control over those entering and
leaving Jerusalem.
One of its most striking components is the handing over of the checkpoints
on the roads leading into Jerusalem from the IDF to the police, a move
which would require an additional 300 positions.
In any case, even the addition of more soldiers cannot take the place of
citizens' awareness.
It is both possible and necessary to increase the efficiency of security
operations around the Gaza Strip, including completing the construction of
the security fence. But any methods and tactics which are implemented
without Palestinian assistance will not prevent those same few individuals
who are determined to reach Jerusalem, or some other place, in order to
carry out a suicide attack.
The Palestinians themselves must prevent the border infiltrations. The
Israeli Government can and must require them to do so.