HAMAS- DILEMMAS - 14-Nov-94

14 Nov 1994
 
  HAMAS' DILEMMAS

(Article by Guy Bechor, Ha'aretz, Nov 14, 1994 p. 3)

Despite the fact that in recent weeks, it seems as if HAMAS has been growing stronger, has received a boost in its popularity among the Palestinians, and has gained an international reputation, due to the recent attacks on Israeli targets, the organization is now at the height of a difficult period. This is a period of soul-searching and discussions regarding the path that the organization will take in the near future in light of the threats against it that mainly originate from three sources: Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and more militant Islamic factions such as Islamic Jihad.

The main question to which HAMAS has yet to find a clear answer is how to relate to Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority. HAMAS' members completely deny Israel's existence. How can they accept a Palestinian agreement with Israel? Is it at all possible to adopt a settlement in stages, and to adapt them to the movement's unyielding ideology? And how is it possible to participate in processes that stem from this agreement, such as general elections? HAMAS is interested in 'having its cake and eating it too', i.e. to continue opposing the agreement, but not to close the door to participating in Palestinian Authority apparatuses, perhaps even in elections.

Even so, HAMAS leaders know that they must be careful, because Arafat has a clear interest in following the path taken by King Hussein, burying them in the ranks of his police force, and in neutralizing the organization's status as a fighting opposition. The real confrontation between HAMAS and Arafat is being postponed, at the current time, for three main reasons: First, HAMAS' basic guiding principle is to refrain from 'fitne', an internal Palestinian war. Second, because each party is convinced that time is on its side: Arafat hopes to get stronger, while HAMAS estimates that the Authority's structure will crumble. And third, because even HAMAS understands that Arafat is basically serving the Palestinian interest, and there is currently no reason to sabotage his efforts.

HAMAS is continuing its attacks against Israel, in order to 'make its presence known,' out of the fear that after a comprehensive peace which is approaching its operations will be much more restricted, and due to the competition developing on the street between it and Islamic Jihad. An analysis done in Israel of the recent attacks indicates that HAMAS' political echelon has a good basic control of the organization's military wings, and that the orders to carry out major attacks arrive from outside the country, mainly from the HAMAS office in Damascus.

Figures such as Musa Abu Marzouk, Imad Al-Alami, Ibrahim Rusha, and Muhammad Nazal members of the exiled political leadership pass on general instructions. An attack against settlers or soldiers does not require explicit approval. Attacks on Jewish civilians inside the Green Line requires an explicit order. The Syrian regime whose capital is home to HAMAS' most important and dominant office is aware of the operations' existence, but is not involved with the decision-making.

Thanks to the suicide attacks, Islamic Jihad has gained in popularity today on the Palestinian street despite the fact that it is a very small organization. This fact is putting pressure on the HAMAS' military arm. It is reasonable to assume that the matter of suicide attacks is arousing unease among HAMAS' mainstream religious leadership, just as it did in Hizbullah after the suicide attacks by Shi'ite terrorists. Then, religious leaders in Lebanon, such as Sheikh Muhammad Fadlallah, said that suicide attacks should be used only in special cases, and that the attack needs to have a significant effect. In the end, the practice was almost completely halted by the Shi'ite religious leadership.