DESPITE THE SWORD - 26-Apr-94

(Analysis by Yossi Torpstein, 'Ha'aretz', 26.4.94, p. B2)

THE HAMAS' LEADERS HAVE RECENTLY BEGUN TO UNDERSTAND THAT ISRAEL'S DESTRUCTION IS NOT A PRACTICAL [GOAL] FOR THE NEAR FUTURE, AND THAT IN ORDER TO WIN [THE SUPPORT OF] THE PALESTINIAN STREET, THEY MUST CHANGE THEIR TACTICS AND STATEMENTS.

The statements made by Hamas representatives recently, regarding their readiness to come to an arrangement with Israel, are nothing new. Despite the terrible attacks on Israeli targets committed by the Iz A-Din al-Kassam squads the Hamas' attack apparatus over the past year there has been a noticeable moderation of tone in the organization's declared political positions.

This trend has been more pronounced since the signing of the Oslo Agreement. After the signing, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the Hamas leader imprisoned in Israel, sent a letter to organization leaders abroad, in which he expressed readiness to agree to a cease-fire with Israel, as well as Hamas' participation in elections for the Palestinian Self-Governing Authority in the territories. At the same time, Sheikh Ahmad Bahar, an Islamic Movement activist in the Gaza Strip, said that if Israel, withdrew its army and settlements completely from the territories, the reasons for continuing Hamas' campaign of attacks against Israel would be removed.

Sheikh Bahar, who recently retracted his statements, said at the time: 'Israel must stop thinking that it can view Hamas only by way of positions of fighting and struggle.' Another activist, Majdi Aqil, a lecturer at the Islamic University in Gaza, said: 'The Islamic Movement is characterized by the fact that it adjusts its tactics to all situation, and what is currently required of it is to act in the political sphere in order to achieve its objectives.'

Several days ago, an official declaration by the organization's leaders added weight to this trend. Musa Abu Marzuq, the head of Hamas' political wing, stated that his organization is prepared to reach an arrangement with Israel, on the basis of the 1967 borders. In other words, he indirectly recognized UN Security Council Resolution 242. Abu Marzuq also noted that Hamas would participate in elections to the Palestinian Self-Governing Authority.

Has Hamas changed its spots? An examination of these political positions, in contrast with its basic principles, indeed reveals signs of moderation, but these focus on the practical sphere, not on the ideological. Hamas has still not retreated from its over-arching ideological goal the establishment of a state based on Islamic religious law in all of Palestine, which is considered to be a Muslim trust ('which no mortal has the authority to give up any part of'). Recognition of the State of Israel's right to exist does not fit in with this goal, which Hamas activists view as their organization's raison d'etre, and therefore according to organization members they cannot change it. This is also true regarding the other basic principles which guide the organization, and which are anchored in Islamic faith, first and foremost Jihad ('holy war').

Therefore, the recent change is, in effect, on the tactical level Hamas is now prepared to reach a temporary arrangement with Israel, if the latter agrees to the specific terms which Hamas is presenting: a halt to the 'policy of killing, repression and exploitation', the release of all Palestinian prisoners, withdrawal from all the territories, removal of the settlements, and resolving the problem of the Palestinian refugees.

Halting the attacks against Israeli targets, say Hamas leaders, is conditional on [Israel] fulfilling these demands. Khaled Amira, a Hebron journalist who is close to Islamic circles, believes that it is even now possible to begin contacts between Hamas and Israel, in an effort to achieve a cease-fire as a first stage towards a more comprehensive arrangement.

Hamas' tactical flexibility is also being expressed in another sphere the internal struggle to change the face of Palestinian-Muslim society, which is a central tenet of the fundamentalist world view which Hamas expresses. During the years of the intifada, Hamas activists clashed with the secular [Palestinian] organizations, of the left and the right, in order to achieve dominance in the Palestinian street, which Hamas ultimately seeks to use to establish a rigid Muslim society. In this sphere, too, Hamas has halted the violent struggle, but it still sees itself as an alternative to the PLO in leading the Palestinian People. Its leaders believe that they can currently realize their objective through a non-violent political struggle with the PLO, which they believe is destined to fail terribly in running the Self-Governing Authority in the territories. The agreement signed in Gaza several days ago between the Fatah Hawks and Iz A-Din al-Kassam illustrates this trend.

What stands, then, at the basis of the change in Hamas' positions? It appears that the organization is undergoing processes similar to those which the PLO underwent in its approach to the conflict with Israel: moving from a total, armed struggle to destroy Israel, by way of the 'strategy of stages', up to finally including adopting a political path to reach an arrangement. Hamas is currently at the beginning of a limited process, which can be compared with the 'strategy of stages' which the PLO adopted in 1974. Like the PLO then, Hamas is now trying to search for a way out of the labyrinth of total conflict. This exit, for Hamas, is found in the Islamic political tradition of responding to the constraints of the hour, built up on the principle of 'sabar' (patience), which was adopted by the Muslim Brothers organization the spiritual father of Hamas. The meaning of this principle is that one must be patient until the hour arrives to fulfill one's strategic goals.

Sheikh Hamad Bitawi of Nablus who was one of the Hamas deportees to southern Lebanon, and who serves as head of the 'Association of Religious Scholars in Palestine', a sort of Hamas council of religious lawmakers, explained, several days ago, the change in the organization's approach. 'The Islamic stream has reached the conclusion,' he said, 'that it is not yet possible to stop the negotiations, since the United States, which rules our region, is pressing for their completion. However, the negotiations with Israel must grant the Palestinians their minimum rights, such as the 1967 borders, and for now they will be satisfied with this. The continuation of the resolution of the Palestinian problem will be in the hands of future generations.'

Hamas activists have therefore reached the conclusion that PLO leaders reached previously, that statements about destroying Israel are not practical for the foreseeable future, and that the weary Palestinian public is incapable of living by the sword in the long term. From this, it can be concluded that if Hamas is interested in preserving, and perhaps even in strengthening its political power in the Palestinian arena, it must take into account the prevailing preference in the territories to end the occupation through negotiations. To this must be added the emotional and organizational burnout of the activists, which stems from the continuous and prolonged clash with Israeli rule. This clash also damages the organization's political ability to organize, before the establishment of the Self-Government Authority.

In recent years, there has also been an organizational coalescence of the Hamas leadership abroad. Offices have been opened in Arab and other countries, and more institutionalized methods have been adopted. Such a process serves to moderate extremist revolutionary trends. Moreover, Hamas seeks to shed its demonic image and present itself as a legitimate organization in the Arab arena. Declarations adopting the Arab consensus on the need for a regional political arrangement also appears to be a good way to ease the American and Israeli pressure being brought to bear on Arab countries, in which Hamas operates quite freely.