THE HAMAS POLICY OF STAGES Commentary by Danny Rubinstein
'HA'ARETZ' (p.B1), Apr. 25, 1994
The conciliation agreement, signed over the weekend between Fatah and
HAMAS in Gaza which, according to Palestinian reports, is 'historic'
poses a problem for the Government of Israel. On the one hand, the
agreement strengthens Yasser Arafat's position and will make it easier
for him to organize his administration in Gaza. Moreover, from Israel's
perspective, a firm PLO grip in Gaza is likely to lead to a more
successful continuation of the peace process.
However, on the other hand, HAMAS spokesmen have declared that they are
not 'surrendering' their views in all matters relating to the struggle
against Israel. It may not be conincidental that, immediately following
the Saturday release of the agreement's details, Islamic Jihad extremists
carried out the attack in Neve Dekalim (in Gush Katif).
In order to understand what is happening, one would have had to track the
recent debate within the ranks of HAMAS. With the signing of the
implementation agreement appraoching, it is clear to HAMAS members that
they must find a way to cooperate with Fatah which is about to receive
power in Gaza.
The great fear in the Palestinian camp is of an eruption of blood-letting
between rival organizations in Gaza. There have been many indications of
this in recent weeks. As the Israeli military administration loosened its
control and the IDF presence in the heart of the camps and cities was
reduced, clashes between the Fatah Hawks and the Iz a-Din al-Kassam
squads of HAMAS mounted, with many casualties resulting.
Consequently, representatives of the rival factions in Gaza convened last
week, at the direction of Dr. Haidar Abd al-Shafi, to conduct a dialogue.
The conciliation agreement they reached has a local character and relates
to the internal problems of Gaza residents. Its stipulations are binding
on both parties: to stop murdering collaborators (for only one month); to
refrain from clashes and slandering; to reduce the number of strike days,
and; not to intervene in disputes between families and clans all
matters that address problems troubling Gaza residents daily. The fact
that the agreement contains nothing about attacks in Israel is like a
'thundering silence.' Also conspicuously missing from the agreement are
sections on political issues. These two factors are inter-connected, and
they attest to the reality that this is a partial and temporary
agreement.
HAMAS spokesmen continue to emphasize that their political stance is
grounded in the principles of Islam. What does this mean? 'HAMAS adheres
to its goals, will not concede any piece of the land of Palestine and
will not recognize the right of any Zionist entity to exist on the land,'
said Musa Abu-Marzuk, who is prominent among HAMAS members in Syria and
Jordan, last week. But Abu-Marzuk and his comrades have also been
conspicuous of late in their willingness for a temporary ceasefire with
Israel which is also permitted by the law of Islam. Their condition
for a ceasefire is a full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza,
and the removal of the settlements.
This HAMAS formula is generally similar to the position taken by the PLO
in the 1970s, when it first adopted the 'phases plan,' and before it
decided to recognize Israel. Given the significant political-ideological
gap between them, Fatah and HAMAS in Gaza decided to publicize and
implement what has been agreed between them and to refrain from
mentioning the points of disagreement. Accordingly, one primary question
remains open: will the PLO adminsitration in the territories forcefully
stop attacks against Israel by Moslem zealots, or will they be allowed to
continue their activities? Nobody can clearly answer this, not even PLO
leaders or Moslem radicals.
Fatah activists in the territories who are constantly asked about this
evade the question. Even if they should eventually resolve to decisively
block HAMAS, it is almost certain that they will not publicly announce
it. HAMAS members, such as Sheikhs Bassam Jarrar and Jamil Hamami of
Ramallah, have hinted in press interviews that they will not engage in
any military activity that will cause embarrassment to the new
administration. At least not within the jurisdiction of the PLO
adminsitration, i.e. Gaza and Jericho.
But what about the rest of the West Bank, Jerusalem, the settlements and
Israeli territory? Here, the answer is clear: the terrorist attacks will
continue. It can even be assumed that Arafat will not use all available
means to stop them. He and his people will be asked to prove that law and
order, and not violent terrorism, reign within the borders of their
administration but other places are not under their authority. It may
even be comfortable for Arafat that HAMAS continue their attacks,
demonstrating the need to intensively continue the negotiations, in order
to bring about an Israeli withdrawal and the removal of the settlements.
Meanwhile, the matter does not bother the Palestinians. At this stage,
their only desire is to ensure the establishment of the new
administration in the Gaza Strip. The conciliation agreement in Gaza was
signed to this end.