THE IDF VS HIZBULLAH- THE UNFINISHED BATTLE - 08-Jul-94

(Article by Naomi Levitzky, 'Yediot Ahronot', 8.7.94, pp. B4,22)

THE HIZBULLAH ATTACK ON THE REIHAN OUTPOST THIS WEEK WAS 'A STEP UP': A GENUINE MILITARY OPERATION, WITH LARGE FORCES, INTELLIGENCE, AND LOOK-OUTS. Hizbullah HAS TURNED INTO A REGULAR GUERILLA ORGANIZATION, THAT INVESTS IN EDUCATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE, AND WINS THE VILLAGES' SUPPORT. ASSAD IS ITS PATRON AND USES IT AS A BARGAINING CARD IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. FORMER OC NORTHERN COMMAND, YOSSI PELED: 'INITIATED ATTACKS BY SMALL FORCES ARE NEEDED; WE CAN NOT LET THEM REST, EVEN FOR A MOMENT.'

The war of attrition going on without let-up in the Lebanese security zone has already claimed another bloody price this week. Two soldiers fell in the IDF's continuous battle with Hizbullah. First Sergeant Avihai Shmaya Danoch, 19, and First Lieutennant Yehuda (Uri) Algrabli, 21, paid with their lives.

It was last Monday afternoon. A mid-afternoon laziness had taken hold of Reihan, an IDF outpost at Fahi in the security zone, which sits astride a main route leading from Marjayoun to Jezzine. It is located very close to a group of pro-Hizbullah villages.

The Golani Brigade was on that sector of the line. The heat was oppressive, the gear was heavy, and the troops were dreaming of home, their friends, and the beach. The Brigade had been sitting on the line for several months.

Suddenly, heavy fire opened from all directions: mortars, Sagger anti-tank missiles, recoilless cannon, machine guns, light and heavy artillery, and light weapons. It came from every directions; it was difficult to identify the source of fire. Approximately 40 Hizbullah fighters had penetrated the security zone and attacked the position from three different directions. For a moment, it seemed as if they were closing on the position, trying to occupy it.

From Hizbullah's point of view, this was another step up: a genuine military operation with large forces, intelligence, lookouts, and the transportation of war material. It was an integrated, well-planned, new type of attack. They came from every direction. They prepared positions in advance which covered the outposts they attacked. A distance of only a few hundred meters separated the outpost from its attackers. A barrage of fire killed First Seargent Avihai Shmaya Danoch.

None of the outpost's soldiers saw or heard them coming. The territory was tangled and difficult and the Hizbullah personnel made their way quietly, apparently by night. Heavy equipment was carried by mules. They passed through the rocky area on goatpaths on the rims of wadis. It seems that they spent more than one night in the vicinity of the outposts.

By the time the outpost organized itself, identified the source of the fire, and evacuated the wounded, the attackers had withdrawn, dispersed, and vanished back the way they came.

A mortar shell landed on Reihan outpost. Again Reihan, the 'outpost of death'. First Lieutenant Algrabli, a young paratroop officer, the company deputy communications officer, was wounded and killed. Today, Friday, July 8, would have been his 22nd birthday. An additional casualty, this time from the paratroop unit.

IDF forces, as usual, returned fire in the direction of the shooting. But, go find a single gunman in southern Lebanon, between the rocks and the villages. It is Hizbullah. Hizbullah is a guerilla organization whose strength lies in its ability to pounce, like a poisonous snake, from out of nowhere, hidden and unseen; it strikes and vanishes.

Two casualties in one week. 'A war of attrition is going on in southern Lebanon, far from the limelight,' Deputy Chief of Staff Amnon Shahak said to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Hardly a day goes by without an incident in the security zone. Regular operations, Northern Command says. Even so, in a week in which two soldiers were killed, a certain soul-searching must be made.

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin spoke about this, this week in Paris. 'The latest Hizbullah attacks in Lebanon will obligate us to examine our deployment in the area. Similarly, we will need to check the IDF's operational methods against Hizbullah.'

Yossi Peled, a former OC Northern Command, claims that many initiated operations need to be carried out by small forces outside the security zone. This is not being done today, but needs to be the operational routine there.

'As long as Hizbullah has the ability to operate along the edge of the security zone, by shooting from a long range or by launching operations against us, this situation will continue,' predicts Peled. 'If we want to put a halt to this, we need to push Hizbullah away from the edge of the security zone. This requires initiated operations by small forces, around the clock, against commanding ground, access routes, and training areas. They can not be allowed to rest, even for a moment.'

'The question that must be asked is whether, given the existing circumstances, it is possible to lower Hizbullah's professional profile. In 1986, they carried out attacks with dozens of men and artillery forces, and occupied 12 SLA positions in one night. They captured APC's and equipment. We, the IDF, strengthened the SLA and provided operational support for its positions. This passed. Today, the problem is different. Now, Hizbullah attacks IDF positions. It is true that there is no magic, 100% solution, but it is also possible, with the right operations on our part, to lower their operational profile.'

Hizbullah's main headquarters is in Beirut. It is an orderly headquarters, with departments and sub-departments, and a real general staff, called the 'Ashura Council'. Subordinate to it are regional commands. One is in the Jibshet area of southern Lebanon, a second is in Baalbek, in the Bek'a valley. There are also sub-regional commands.

The organization's chain of command is clearly defined and discipline is very strict, despite the fact that commanders do not wear insignia. They take regular military training courses. Over the years, they have built a well-developed training network. Several months ago, they had a large infantry and artillery training exercise. They stopped being a terrorist organization, in the conventional sense of the term, some time ago. Over the years, they have turned into a state-within-a-state inside Lebanon. The Lebanese war put Hizbullah on the map in the Middle East. Over ten years ago, in the chaos of that stupid war, Iran singled out Lebanon as a target-state for revolutionary Islam. Since then, Teheran has channeled resources, money, equipment, war materiel, etc. into Lebanon. The military aid that has been sent to Hizbullah and the civilian aid that has been given to southern Lebanon's Shi'ites is impressive. In the early years, when Nabi Beri's Amal Shi'ite movement controlled Lebanon's wild south, the strengthening of Hizbullah was prevented. Then, it was merely a relatively small terrorist organization, one among many that had sprung up in that divided country.

Most of the militias were disarmed after the Gulf War, including Amal which had become part of the Lebanese central authority. This was Hizbullah's big day; it was not disarmed. Southern Lebanon, an area prone to disturbances, fell into Hizbullah's hands like a ripe fruit.

The Iranians sent vast amounts of money and the Syrians closed their eyes. The structure began to coalesce: a military arm on one hand, a civilian one on the other. Hizbullah established a social organization and began carrying out social welfare activities in the Shi'ite villages in the south. Education was at the top of their agenda. Schools received considerable grants from them. In the medical field, it is difficult to find a village in southern Lebanon that does not have a Hizbullah clinic.

Today, they operate a television station that features religious programming, questions and answers, and local culture, something like Israel's Channel 7 radio station. Occasionally, they show Hizbullah's military operations against Israel. They habitually photograph themselves in action. It is reasonable to assume that they also photographed the attack on the Reihan outpost.

All of this endears them to the southern villagers. Hizbullah has begun to mobilize helpers in the villages in order to build communications centers. When a Hizbullah gang infiltrates into the security zone, it immediately contacts one of these 'communications centers' and aid, lodging, food and a hideout are provided. The gang would make its attack and flee the security zone. In this fashion, simple terrorist acts and the occasional suicide operation would be carried out; also, the planting of roadside charges, car bombs, as well as the setting of ambushes.

The months have taken their toll. Gangs were sent to Iran and trained by the Revolutionary Guards. Over time, Hizbullah personnel have developed their own training network. Meanwhile, they have continued to improve their positions in the Shi'ite villages in the south. They have established village militias that serve their will and have built permanent positions in the villages, which have turned into military areas and from which the units that carry out operations depart.

There are Hizbullah military officials in the southern villages who have their own troops. When the senior echelons decide on an operation, the local military officials summon their men. They also operate an intelligence network of agents and helpers that circulate on the ground. Hizbullah agents have even been uncovered in the SLA's ranks. When they intend to operate in the security zone, lookouts are sent to to the target area.

Hizbullah has carried out these types of activities over the last three years. There is a new OC Northern Command and a new strategy. Hizbullah has continued to grow stronger. It is organized, trained, orderly, and disciplined; today, it is a guerilla organization in the fullest sense of the term and has well-established support in the villages of the region in which it operates.

Hizbullah operates with Iranian financing and inspiration, but lives under the shadow of Syrian patronage. Without Syria's agreement, or at least its tacit agreement, Hizbullah could not have operated in such a manner. Hizbullah's military center is located close to the Syrian border. A large portion of its equipment arrives by way of flights from Iran to Syria, and from there to Lebanon. Syria has control and oversight, and its hand is on the tap. Syrian intelligence is well-deployed in the Bek'a Valley and knows everything. If it were Assad's wish, Hizbullah could operate without hindrance. If it were also his wish, the organization's powerbase would collapse within a short time.

Assad is playing a sophisticated game here. He simultaneously restricts Hizbullah and uses it to serve his needs. He knows that Hizbullah, a militant and especially extremist organization, is liable to slip out of control easily. What does he want? Limited unrest.

He gives the Iranians a fairly free hand. The funds, weapons, equipment, etc. are transferred to Hizbullah under Syrian patronage. Syria has an interesting network of relations with Iran. A strategic alliance on one hand, as a hidden threat to the United States and Israel, in case the peace process does not work out well. A tactical alliance on the other hand, out of the fear that Iran is capable of causing domestic unrest within Syria itself, and of threatening the regime.

The resulting agreement is as follows: Iran renounces any revolutionary intent within Syria. Assad, in exchange, allows it to have free access to Hizbullah in Lebanon. Assad winks at Clinton with one eye and at Teheran with the other.

American Secretary of State Warren Christopher is scheduled to arrive here in about 10 days. He is coming to engage in shuttle diplomacy in the region, in an attempt to advance the peace [process] between Israel and Syria. Before such visits, Assad usually tends to moderate Hizbullah operations. Give me what I want, the Golan Heights for instance, Assad hints to Clinton and Rabin, and I will arrange a quiet Israeli-Lebanese border for you. Hizbullah is not only a bank for Assad, it is also an insurance company and an investment company. The arrangement in Lebanon, the withdrawal from the security zone, and a cessation of Hizbullah operations on the Lebanese border are, for Assad, part of the overall arrangement with Syria.

At the end of 1991, when Hizbullah had begun to strengthen itself in southern Lebanon, it improved its abilities, and increased its level of sophistication. It began to carry out suicide attacks. It soon began to show increasing professionalism in its attacks; its goal was to inflict maximum casualties on Israel and the SLA, without leading to a direct confrontation with the IDF. It preferred to set roadside bombs and withdraw, to lay in ambush for convoys and then escape. In October, it ambushed a Golani unit. In February, a paratroop unit. In June, it fired anti-tank missiles at a convoy on the way to Beaufort.

Recently, Hizbullah has begun to eliminate personnel of the SLA's security apparatus. This requires very precise intelligence and the ability for units to quietly infiltrate an area and carry out commando-style operations. In short, reconnaissance-type operations. Since mid-1992, they have used Sagger anti-tank missiles and SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles.

Operation Accountability and the understandings reached as a result of it, limited Hizbullah's operations inside Israeli territory. Syria tightened the tap: no Katyushas in the Galilee, no infiltrations into Israeli territory. These are the new rules of the game. But these rules left the SLA open to attack and Hizbullah has launched its Katyushas against population centers in the security zone.

Kiryat Shemona was protected but Marjayoun became a target. Severe grumbling was heard in the SLA. They spoke about blood against blood, that Jewish children were more equal than Lebanese children, that Israel had abandoned them and worries only about itself, and that they, the SLA's soldiers were suckers. Morale in the SLA plummeted. A wave of defections began and the SLA threatened to collapse.

The IDF's line units took up the slack in the face of the SLA's feeling of helplessness. Greater and greater burdens were placed on their shoulders and what the SLA would do in the past, IDF soldiers are currently obliged to do. At the time, Israel appealed to the Americans with the demand to widen the circle of understandings with Syria and prevent Katyushas from being launched at population centers in southern Lebanon as well, not just at those in Israel.

Uri Lubrani, the Government's Coordinator of Activities in Lebanon, met in his office with Ed Djerejian, the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, and made these points clear to him. The message was passed on to Syria, and since then no Katyushas have been launched at Marjayoun, additional proof of Syria's control over Hizbullah's operations.

The Israeli Air Force's attack on the Hizbullah training base at Ein Dardara in the Bek'a Valley, a number of weeks ago, dealt a hard blow to Hizbullah. Approximately 30 newly mobilized recruits, most of them very young 18-19 were killed in the bombing. Foreign sources report that there was an outbreak of grave unrest. The parents of those killed and wounded were outraged at Hizbullah.

The abduction of Mustafa Dirani also threw Hizbullah activists into a certain confusion. It is not that Dirani interests them so much. He was not one of them. What disturbed them was the IDF's infiltration deep into their territory and the precision of the operation.