THE IRANIAN HAND ON THE PLUNGER
(Article by Ron Ben-Yishai, 'Yediot Ahronot', July 29, 1994, pp.6-7, 26)
INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS ARE CONVINCED: ONE HAND, FROM TEHRAN, DIRECTED THE
ATTACK IN ARGENTINA, THE HIZBULLAH ATTACK IN SOUTH LEBANON AND THE
EXPLOSIONS IN LONDON. THE METHOD: IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, WITH
DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS, OPERATE IN IRANIAN EMBASSIES AROUND THE WORLD AND
RECRUIT LOCAL MUSLIMS. THE COUNTER-RESPONSE SHOULD INCLUDE INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND SEVERING OF RELATIONS, AND HITTING
THOSE RESPONSIBLE.
'The show of force by the Iranian terrorist apparatuses in the past two
weeks, could cost Tehran dearly,' a veteran senior Israeli intelligence
official said a few days ago.
'The world now understands the problem better. Whoever is capable today of
organizing such a world-wide cluster of murderous attacks, in perfect
timing from his standpoint, be successful in all of them, and then
withdraw all of his personnel safely, will tomorrow be able to overthrow
governments,' added the senior intelligence official, who specializes in
foiling terrorism. 'It is clear to us, the Americans and even Hussein that
there was one hand directing and assisting the car bomb in Buenos Aires,
the Hizbullah attack in southern Lebanon (which began the moment that
Rabin and Hussein shook hands in Washington), and the two car bombs, which
blew up the next day in central London. We also know that, compared to the
Iranian hand, the old, known international terrorism is becoming child's
play.'
The attacks in London this week are very similar in their operational
characteristics to other attacks perpetrated by Islamic terrorists linked
to Iran. These were carried out by a uniform method: a car bomb, driven by
a lone driver to the vicinity of the target and exploded near it.
It can be assumed that both attacks were planned not only to spoil the
atmosphere at the Rabin-Hussein meeting in London, but that they also
stemmed from other motives: Iranian revenge, on behalf of Hizbullah, over
the Dirani abduction and the Israeli Air Force's bombing of the Hizbullah
training base in Lebanon's Bek'a Valley.
Up till now, the State of Israel has tried with all its power to refrain
from direct conflict with the Iranians. The policy was to use all
available means to fight Hizbullah in Lebanon, but not to provoke Iran,
which supports Hizbullah; to do everything possible so that Iran itself
would not enter into an active terrorist war against Israel. True, Israel
did verbally attack the Tehran rulers, accusing them of holding Ron Arad
and of aiding fundamentalist terrorism. At the same time, however, it
sought ways to engage them in dialogue, and refrained from physically
acting against the Iranians' terrorist apparatuses.
What happened in the past two weeks raised serious doubts in Jerusalem
regarding the efficacy of this restrained approach. More and more
politicians (including the Prime Minister) and senior defense
establishment officials believe that the policy should be changed and that
'we should use full force in dealing with them, as we dealt with the
international terrorism of the PLO and Black September.'
In fact, there are clear signs that the Israeli Government's 'Iranian'
policy is about to change. It will not be an easy war, the anti-terrorism
experts believe, and Israel is not capable of conducting it by itself. If
it tries to do so, it will suffer greatly. 'The monster has grown and
developed into larger proportions which, alone, we are currently incapable
of handling. We will need active cooperation and not just intelligence
from the Americans and any other source which we can harness to the
effort,' says one of the experts.
The 'monster' began to take shape in 1983. The Iran-Iraq War was then at
its height. The West, as well as most of the rulers in the Arab world,
fearing Khomeinism more than they feared Saddam Hussein, aided Iraq.
Thousands opposed to the ayatollahs' regime, who had fled Iran, moved
throughout Europe and the U.S., harming the Iranian war effort.
At the order of the Imam Khomeini, who was then at the height of his
physical power and controlled Iran unfettered, the 'Supreme National
Defense Council of Iran' convened and decided to begin a 'nonconventional
war to the end on the enemy's territory.' This was a nice name for an
active war of terrorism in the international arena. This war had two
goals: attacking enemies of the Islamic revolution wherever they were and
toppling secular Muslim regimes, in order to impose 'true' Islam, of the
Khomeini school, across the Muslim world.
Members of that same council, which set up the Iranian terrorist empire,
then included Khomeini himself, his son Ahmad, Speaker of Parliament
Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ayatollah Khamenei, and several other ayatollahs and
senior officials, such as Mohtashemi Pur and Ali Akhbar Velayati. It was
also decided, at those same meetings of the Supreme National Defense
Council, to establish a number of organizations which would conduct the
terrorism war, the modus operandi was laid out and strategic goals were
determined.
After a short time, the results began to be seen on the ground.
Revolutionary Guards personnel, who left for Lebanon, set up Hizbullah to
act as a bridgehead for exporting the Islamic revolution. They were the
ones who sent terrorists to carry out impressive suicide car bomb attacks
against the the Embassy of the United States (the 'Great Satan') and the
Marine barracks in Beirut, and against Israel (the 'Little Satan'). In
Europe, former supporters of the late Shah were eliminated one by one, as
were exiled leaders of the Mujahiddin Khalq underground and prominent
officials of the Kurdish-Iranian underground, who had fought against the
ayatollahs' regime.
These facts did not go unnoticed by members of the American intelligence
community. Satellite photographs analyzed in the U.S. after the bombing of
the American Embassy in Beirut, clearly showed a model of the building in
the Sheikh Abdallah camp in Lebanon's Bek'a Valley. This model, which had
been built in the Revolutionary Guards' training camp, was undoubtedly use
b been built in the Revolutionary Guards' training camp, was undoubtedly
used by the Hizbullah personnel who carried out the attack.
At a meeting convened at the Pentagon at the time, the possibility that
the U.S. 'repay' the Iranians directly for the painful attacks was
considered. Several participants suggested using cruise missiles and
planes to bomb the camp. However, Pentagon officials rejected the
proposal, saying that 'it is inhuman to indiscriminately bomb a camp in
which the families of Revolutionary Guards members also live.' The
proposal was shelved.
Even Israel, which at the time still hoped to turn a new leaf in relations
with Khomeini's Iran, meticulously refrained from attacking Revolutionary
Guards personnel. France released Iranian terrorists which it had captured
one by one (and continues to do today). Many among us, and also in the
U.S., are now embarrassed over that appeasement, which enabled Iranian
terrorism to set up proxies and to build an extensive international
infrastructure, unhindered. In the 10 years since then, many things have
happened in Iran: Khomeini died; Khamenei succeeded him as Iran's
spiritual leader, Rafsanjani is now president and the country's
strong-man, and Ali Akbar Velayati is foreign minister. The extremist
Ahmad Khomeini was moved aside in the struggles over succession, and the
extremist Mohtashemi Pur, currently a parliamentarian, is not particularly
important. The Supreme National Defense Council also changed its name to
the Supreme National Security Council.
Western intelligence services, including the CIA, German intelligence and,
of course, the French, saw these changes as a sign of the victory of the
pragmatists in Iran, who seek closer ties with the West. The assumption
was that Iran, which is beset by economic distress, was about to change
its ways.
The Iranians, under the leadership of Rafsanjani, a pistachio dealer, have
tried to bolster this impression, and to this end helped, in the early
1990's, to effect the wholesale release of western hostages in Lebanon.
However, at the same time, they continued to develop and expand their
sophisticated terrorism apparatuses unhindered, and to deploy them all
over the globe.
Anti-terrorism experts claim that the Iranian terrorism empire is several
times more dangerous than what was called 'international terrorism' in the
1970's. That earlier period witnessed a shaky coalition of terrorist
organizations, most with some sort of Marxist ideology. Others, like the
IRA, were filled with a religious-nationalist fervor. They had no
ideological common denominator, despite the fact that most of them were
connected in some way to the Eastern Bloc. They received aid from Moscow,
East Berlin or Bulgaria, but their patrons did not give them instructions
on how and where to carry out attacks.
Though there were several exceptions, in general the Soviet Union and its
satellites merely supplied aid for subversive activity, which was supposed
to shake the foundations of colonialist, capitalist society. The Soviet
Union kept well away from direct involvement in terrorist activity, among
other things for fear that terrorism is a double-edged sword, which could
be directed against it.
It is different with the Iranians. For them, terrorism is used as an
active tool for carrying out policy and for fulfilling their
fundamentalist world-view. It is employed to achieve four objectives:
* The elimination of those opponents to the regime, which is usually
carried out directly by Iranian intelligence agents, with logistical
support from local collaborators.
* The defense of Islamic holy places, such as those in Saudi Arabia, where
the Iranians tried to undermine the 'corrupt' hold of the Saudi royal
house; the war against Salman Rushdie's 'The Satanic Verses,' a primarily
heretical book; and the war against Israel, which captured the holy places
in Jerusalem from the Muslims.
* Spreading the Islamic revolution, through terrorism, aided and carried
out by fundamentalist movements, such as Hizbullah in Lebanon, Hamas in
Israel and the territories, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad factions, the
Jama al-Islamiyah in Egypt, and others.
* War against the Western infidels, the various 'messengers of Satan,' who
spread their heresy, corrupt the Muslims through an unbridled, hedonistic,
worthless culture of consumerism, and prevent them from maintaining a pure
way of life according to the Koran's precepts, [as in] the United States,
for example.
Despite the secrecy surrounding what goes on in Iran in general, and the
terrorist organizations in particular, it is already clear to western
intelligence services that the central organization currently running
Iranian terrorism is the Supreme National Security Council, controlled by
President Rafsanjani. This is the same Rafsanjani who poses as a moderate
and pragmatist, trying to enjoy the best of all worlds.
The National Security Council makes decisions about terrorist attacks or
liquidations. After the decision is made in principle to carry out an
attack, it is sent to one of the operational apparatuses for an opinion.
There are four such apparatuses:
* The Quds (Jerusalem) apparatus, in the framework of the Revolutionary
Guard. It is usually responsible for attacks by the Lebanese Hizbullah,
the Turkish Hizbullah and other Islamic terrorist organizations. The
person generally responsible for this apparatus is the commander of the
Revolutionary Guards, Muhsein Rafiq Duset.
* The Iranian intelligence apparatus, the SAVAMA and the VAK (the
successor to the SAVAK, which operated in the days of the Shah and was
trained, according to foreign sources, by Israel). They are headed by Ali
Falahian, and are primarily responsible for liquidating opponents of the
regime abroad. The U.S. State Department's report on international
terrorism states that members of these apparatuses carry out widespread
intelligence gathering on foreign embassies, primarily those of the United
States and Israel. They were also apparently responsible for collecting
the operational intelligence on the Jewish institutions and the embassies
which were attacked in Argentina, London, Bangkok, Istanbul and other
places.
* Another apparatus, which apparently functions within the framework of
the 'Islamic Leadership Ministry,' struggles primarily to protect
everything holy to Islam.
Iranian government ministries extend assistance to these apparatuses as
required. Thus, for example, Iranian deputy foreign minister Hussein
Shekih al-Aslam a former University of California student is
responsible for positioning intelligence agents and Revolutionary Guards
in diplomatic posts at Iranian embassies around the world. He also
supervises the transfer of funds and weapons for carrying out attacks.
Recruitment within Iran is mostly done at Imam Ali University in the holy
city of Qom. Foreign Muslim students, who volunteer or are volunteered for
such work, receive their training at secret camps in western Iran (between
Qom and Tehran). Other training camps were constructed, by the
Revolutionary Guards, in Sudan and Lebanon (the Sheikh Abdallah camp).
The approach to building an international terrorist infrastructure, which
has become more extensive over the years, was grounded in a basic
principle the integration of a small number of intelligence officers
and trained Iranian terrorists, together with incited Muslim citizens of
Europe, the United States, South Africa and Asia. Most of the intelligence
officers and the Iranian terrorism experts were posted as diplomats at
Iranian embassies in the target countries. Others, also carrying
diplomatic passports, were sent to staff the 'Islamic Cultural Centers'
which Iran has established world-wide.
These 'diplomats' made contact with Muslim population centers in the
countries where they operated. They located the devout, the disgruntled,
the motivated and slowly recruited them into tight groups and squads,
ready to act and take risks in the name of Islam. The contact, the
meetings and sometimes the training were mainly effected in mosques and
within the confines of local Muslim charitable/aid associations.
The creation of the Iranian terror infrastructure received a serious push
with the 1989 publication of Salman Rushdie's 'The Satanic Verses.'
Muslims the world over without any connection to Iran viewed the
book as a direct assault and a secular Western plot against everything
held holy by Muslims.
The 'fatwa' (religious ruling) issued by Khomeini, which calls on all
Muslims able to do so, to kill Rushdie, fell on attentive ears. Thousands
of Muslims around the world joined the Iranian terrorist corps,
enthusiastic to carry out the mission. Afterward, the 'fatwa' was expanded
to include those circulating Rushdie's book, and even those who did not
disclaim it. At least four journalists and publishers were murdered in
Turkey as a direct result of the local response to this ruling a
further proof of the capability gained, in the interim, by the Iranian
terror machine.
It is very possible that the terrorist infrastructure established in
England by the Iranians, with the intent of assaulting Rushdie, was
exploited this week to attack the Israeli embassy and the Jewish Agency
offices in London. Still, most of the groups recruited by the Iranian
terrorist and intelligence agents did not operate immediately. The
diplomats who activate the groups prefer to keep them dormant until the
appropriate time for them act.
The Iranians view attacks on their emissaries around the world as part of
the war that the heretics have waged against the Islamic revolution of
which they are the spearhead. Accordingly, attacks against Hizbullah (in
Lebanon, for instance) are compensated by activating one of the dormant
terror networks, in Turkey or South America. The perpetrators are not
necessarily Hizbullah members, but are locals activated by Iranian
diplomats.
This is the fate of the reconciliation process between Israel and the
Arabs. Whoever assists or is party to this process, anywhere in the world,
can expect an attack. The Iranian modus operandi prefers to utilize simple
means which require more proximity that sophistication. Car-bombs are a
hit. Explosives can be made at home, and their installation in a vehicle -
- with a detonator is simple. At the same time, the Iranians take pains
to ensure that their emissaries are not apprehended, and that no direct
Iranian link to the attack can be proven.
Thus, the activation and recruitment are not always simple. The Iranians
frequently avail themselves of intermediaries mainly 'graduates' of the
war in Afghanistan who, from the Iranian perspective, possess three golden
qualities: they are full of religious fervor, and enjoy prestige and hero
status among Muslim zealots; they have experience in battle, and know how
to manufacture home-made weapons, and; they are unemployed.
These 'graduates of Afghanistan,' citizens of the target countries, are
the ones who maintain contact with the Iranian controllers who send
them funds, and sometimes weapons, from Europe or the Middle East.
Therefore, for example, the network that blew up New York's Twin Towers in
1993 was activated by the blind Egyptian sheikh Abdul Rahman, who had
filled a key role in recruiting and dispatching fighters to the
Afghanistan war.
'Afghanistan graduates' also head the Islamic rescue movement in Algeria
today, where they maintain contact with their Iranian operators in Europe.
And a zealous Muslim network, whose members planned acts of terror against
the king and the kingdom, is now on trial in Jordan. All of these network
members fought in Afghanistan and were in contact with Iran.
Iranian intelligence agents take advantage of every spot where there are
Muslim populations, and where the authorities only enforce perfunctory
security measures. Not long ago, during a visit to South America, I was
told by an Israeli living in the area that there is an active center of
radical Muslims who operate with the assistance and inspiration of Iran
at the point where the Brazilian, Argentine and Paraguayan borders
meet. In that same area, around the Iguacu Falls which attract millions of
tourists from around the world, there also lives a population of German
descent (many of whom are members of neo-Nazi organizations) which
cooperates with the Muslim groups. It is suspected that the squad whose
members detonated the car-bomb near the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires
two years ago set out from this area.
I travelled to the area and indeed encountered devout, thick-bearded
Muslims and blond, blue-eyed youths who did not conceal their neo-
Nazi views. During my trip around the Falls, I noted that it is possible
to pass between the three countries without difficulty or inspection. Only
once was my passport inspected. It is therefore no wonder that such 'hot'
areas for illegal activity are exploited by Iranian terrorist operators.
The question now is how can Iranian terror be fought under the current
conditions?
First, with a pin-pointed assault against terror operators and their
collaborators. The difficulty mainly involves the political and moral
problem of using fighters to combat terrorism in third countries.
Second, via deterrence. A massive presence by local security forces at
sites which are prone to attack, like Jewish institutions and embassies,
acts as a deterrent and complicates carrying out attacks. But there must
also be vigilance at our embassies in those same countries and a
constant requirement that security measures be maintained, and remain
effective.
Third, Embassy and Jewish organization buildings (and their environs) must
be properly protected and reinforced to prevent the infiltration or
collapse of the structures in the event of an explosion. It must be
ensured that vehicles cannot approach vulnerable building.
Fourth, there must be active international cooperation in the intelligence
area including information exchanges and operations to penetrate the
populations from among which the perpetrators of attacks are liable to
come.
Fifth, international sanctions against Iran should be imposed, including
the severing of diplomatic ties and the deportation of Iranian
ambassadors. Spain did this a number of years ago, Venezuela did this a
couple of days ago, and Argentina has just declared its intention to do
so. This is difficult, because Iranian terrorism functions on the
principle that it is almost always impossible to directly connect the
terrorists with the Iranians who control them. This is in addition to the
difficulty in persuading countries, like Germany and France, to give up
their profitable trade with Iran. Even in the United States, which
frequently condemns Iran, the administration in Washington has not
demonstrated a great willingness to sever economic relations.