HAMAS' VIOLENT PEACE
(Article by Ehud Ya'ari, "Davar", 25.8.95, p.5)
Oslo-2 is like a square that must be circled. Two of its sides want it to succeed, and they control the armed forces to work toward this end. The other two sides which also have their own weapons would prefer that the agreement not be implemented, but (without any choice) will try to influence its appearance in the field; these are the settlers and, on the other hand, HAMAS. Alongside their efforts to bring about the failure of the process, these two strange bedfellows will continue injecting new strains into the picture of reality that is gradually taking shape. Others will analyze the mainstream of Jewish opinion in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, but following is a series of possible answers to the question of HAMAS policy:
* What do they actually want?
It would be grossly mistaken to assume that HAMAS wants to completely prevent any agreement on the West Bank from being achieved. On the contrary, an intensive study of the documents written by HAMAS leaders demonstrates an understanding beneath the ideological rhetoric that not only are they incapable of foiling an agreement, but that this is not what they even desire. To a greater extent, they do not want to appear as having tried to derail an Israeli withdrawal from population centers. HAMAS has taken pains to emphasize that it neither agrees to the price that Yasser Arafat has paid Israel, nor does it honor the commitments that the Palestinian Authority has taken upon itself, but it still welcomes the achievements that the negotiations have produced. Accordingly, there is no truth in the popular statement that HAMAS is striving, as it were, to halt the peace process. Their real interest is in removing the elements concerning "ceasefire" and "abandoning the armed struggle" as much as possible; in other words, to create a dynamic where Arafat does his thing, and HAMAS continues on its way. Or, in the words of Lebanese intellectual George Karam, "peace without peace."
* Why do they not attack the Palestinian Authority?
Except for two or three clashes in the Gaza Strip and maybe the desire for a stray bullet to find Military Intelligence head Musa Arafat HAMAS' firm policy is to refrain from confrontations with either Yasser Arafat, or the military and administrative bodies which he has established. Not only has the fear of "nights of long knives" at the hands of the Fatah Hawks who have become detectives deterred them, but the lack of desire to cause a bloodbath among the population (should the situation deteriorate into an all-out civil war) has also played a role. Moreover, with all the criticism and mockery, and with all the insults and threats concerning Arafat's tendencies toward "individualist democracy," HAMAS views the independent Palestinian regime as a target to conquer, not as an irrelevant institution. Thus, there are HAMAS members who have accepted posts and taken respected positions, and it is repeatedly emphasized that they will not act against the Authority. Consequently, while there have been HAMAS- initiated shootings and exchanges of fire, there has yet to be a serious attempt at reprisals over arrests. They seek a protected space alongside Arafat and, at least for in the meantime, not in place of him.
* Is there a PLO-HAMAS agreement?
There is unequivocally no agreement, certainly not in writing. There are certain verbal "understandings" and Arafat has not severed his dialogue with them. After the Ramat Gan attack, the Prime Minister rejected the existed but many of Arafat's close aides, most recently Sahar Habash
(head of Fatah's organization department), have fully affirmed the "understandings" according to which terror will cease within Gaza, and neither terror nor post-attack statements will emanate directly from there. That is to say, HAMAS has adopted (if not fully) a policy of relative "restraint" in Gaza, while adhering to the aggressive line in other sectors. There are also those within Fatah who believe, contrary to the statement of Israeli figures, that the continuing terrorism will accelerate the peace process, not threaten to kill it. In fact, despite all the schedule delays and the toughening of Israel's security-related demands, the negotiations continue in high-gear.
* Why particularly suicide attacks?
Not only because of the high number of victims that this method has caused in Israel, in the heart of the country, but also because this manner of attack gives HAMAS the ability to rely on a small and efficient, underground cadre the attack in Jerusalem came three days after the capture of two suicide attackers who sought to set out from the Gaza Strip instead of a larger number of terrorists using means such as explosives and ambushes. The suicide method has met with clear opposition among large sections of the Palestinian public and, in my opinion, it will be replaced with approach as soon as the appropriate moment (from their perspective) arrives. At the same time, no senior member of the Muslim clergy has yet publicly condemned as they did in Lebanon sending recruits to their deaths.
* How, if at all, has Abu Marzook's arrest had an effect?
There are signs not unequivocal evidence not only of a serious internal debate within HAMAS, but also of clashes between rival factions over the question of short-term tactics. The general impression is that "internal" members of the political wing are more inclined to consider a pause, while the leadership across the border (and its extensions in the territories) holds the opposite view. The leadership has been severely undercut by the arrest of Musa Abu Marzook in New York, and by the deportation of Imad al-Alami from Jordan. It is not always clear whether one hand has pulled the strings since then or where the power center is located. There are obvious differences between HAMAS members from the West Bank and their colleagues from Gaza, as well as the existence of some tension with their Muslim Brotherhood patrons in Jordan. It is, or should be, entirely clear that non-Palestinians have made a contribution to the direction of HAMAS.
* How does HAMAS read the Taba Accord?
From HAMAS' standpoint, the IDF redeployment will lead to a "Gazan situation" in Nablus and the other cities (except, possibly, for Hebron), but in the 450 villages without any permanent Palestinian police station, or IDF presence a new situation will be created. They know that Arafat will deploy branches of his intelligence apparatus in the places where he does not maintain "blue" police officers. Still, gaps where they may be able to take hold are likely to be created within the wide gaps between the IDF and the Palestinian national security forces for example, in Kabatiya, a large city in Samaria where Israel has not allowed a Palestinian police station to be situated, is known as a HAMAS stronghold. If they perceive a chance of bringing about a clash between Arafat's soldiers and the IDF, on the joint routes or in the Area B villages, they will certainly try. And the settlements may irritate them. Remember, HAMAS does not require a high level of activity rather first of all, to continue, occasionally, its aggressive line.
* What about the elections?
The regional elections format concluded in Eilat is likely to deter HAMAS from submitting an "Islamic list" and it is still not clear what they will decide but they will, at any rate, cast their significant weight behind the candidates which they prefer. In other words, even if they boycott the elections, HAMAS will play a role similar to that played by the Islamic Movement with regard to the voting patterns of Israeli Arabs. They will, therefore, participate in the elections, even if not "directly."
* Is it possible to speak to them? If so, about what?
HAMAS has no interest in doing business with Israel, certainly not now. They want to profit from the deals made by others. All the experts recommending an initiative to talk with HAMAS simply do not understand the new rules of the game.
* What can be done?
The Government's current answer is to leave Arafat to deal with HAMAS by giving him more powers and territory and there is a logic in assuming that the Palestinian security service will do better, obviously on the condition that they are given unequivocal political instructions by the highest echelon. What is now lacking is a major piece of the puzzle convincing Palestinian public opinion to develop a public climate which condemns terrorism. HAMAS is very sensitive to public sentiment, a quality which was well proven throughout the intifada. But among the public in the territories meaning the working and lower-middle classes there is a belief that Arafat and HAMAS are capable of co-existing, and that Israel will not pay the full price for peace and accept that terror will continue. The knee-jerk reaction closures imposed by Israel anger the residents, more than they turn them against HAMAS. And a final thought until there is a strong sense there that the benefits to be achieved as a result of Oslo-2 are in danger, HAMAS propagandists will not encounter any hostility from their audience. Those who would rely on Jibril Rajoub and Abu Firas must create an appropriate atmosphere around them. HAMAS does not have to change its position in order to change its conduct.