TAKE BACK THE INITIATIVE - 23-Aug-95

(Article by Ze'ev Schiff, "Ha'aretz", Aug 23, 1995, p. B1)

A LACK OF SECURITY WHEN USING PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IS LIABLE TO DEMORALIZE US - SOMETHING WHICH HAS NEVER HAPPENED IN THE HISTORY OF OUR CONFLICT WITH THE ARABS.

Suicide terrorism is beginning to be a regular item in the Islamic terrorist organizations' war against Israel. Just as the Japanese had kamikaze pilots in World War II, HAMAS and Islamic Jihad are focusing on a type of warfare for which there is still no real response.

There is no doubt that the war in Lebanon during which many suicide terrorists were used influenced HAMAS and Islamic Jihad in their decision to use suicide terrorists. Among the Palestinians and other Arabs, the opinion prevails that it was this tactic which drove Israel out of Lebanon. The Americans and the French as well, decided to get out of Lebanon after they were struck by suicide attacks.

In Lebanon, the IDF had a partial response to this tactic. We used firepower without taking Lebanese civilians into account in order to prevent potential suicide attackers from getting close.

Our situation vis-a-vis the Palestinians is completely different. We are intermingled. We must take care not to hurt innocent Palestinians, to whom we have a responsibility, since they reside in territories under Israel's control. Some of the territory from which the suicide terrorists and those who send them operate is controlled by the Palestinian entity, with whom we are negotiating peace.

When the enemy is mostly located in areas under our control, it is difficult to use the old retaliatory method, or to bomb targets in Lebanon, as we did many times when the PLO engaged in terrorism. From an operational standpoint, we have practically no answer to suicide terrorism. It is not that nothing can be done against this tactic, it is just that the response is complicated and limited from the outset.

The result is that the initiative in the terrorism war today is almost entirely in the hands of the enemy. This is a situation that we have not known in the past. The bombing of buses continues, and it is not inconceivable that the other side will try to undertake more daring actions. While we zealously declare that we will not let the Arab countries who demand that Israel close its nuclear reactor in Dimona impair our deterrent ability, we are liable to lose if we have not lost it already our ability to deter HAMAS and Islamic Jihad terrorism.

This development is liable to have severe consequences. After the bombing of the #20 bus in Ramat Gan, there were those who toyed with the idea that Israeli society has matured and, this time, did not react hysterically or try to lynch Arab passers-by thus implying that we should relate to the victims of the bus explosion like they were victims of a traffic accident. Just as we have become somewhat indifferent to traffic accidents, so must we become to severe acts of terrorism directed against us. This is an impractical expectation.

Whoever follows the history of the wars in which Israel has fought, will find that it decided on hard retaliatory measures and even went to war, even when the number of terrorist victims did not total 0.5% of the number of traffic accident victims. This is because the influence on the public is not measured in numbers alone, but, first of all, in psychological shock and the feelings of insecurity that terrorism causes.

This is what happens when a bus is blown up by Palestinian terrorists. The evidence of this is in the reactions that occurr ed after the explosion in Jerusalem. The danger is that many citizens are liable to reach the conclusion that the Government is losing control over what is happening. When there is no security in using public transportation, this is much more serious than knife attacks. It is a formula which is liable to lead to a demoralization, something which never happened in the history of our conflict with the Arabs and the Palestinians.

The bus explosions and suicide terrorism should be seen as a well-planned offensive by HAMAS and the Islamic Jihad. This is not another act of revenge for what Israel has done to one Palestinian or the other. The goals of these two organizations, despite the differences in their approach, are much broader than derailing the peace process. Even when we complete all the agreements with the Palestinian entity, these organizations, or at least some of them, will not stop their terrorist activities against Israel. Therefore, we must prepare emotionally, as well as plan in accordance with the war against them accordingly.

It is clear that Israel is far from losing control over events. On the other hand, it is difficult to shake the feeling that we do not genuinely understand everything about HAMAS terror, particularly with regard to suicide attackers and their preparation in advance of an attack. Despite the theological argument among the Arabs over the suicide attack method, it appears that the other side does not view the act as suicide, but rather as a sacrifice of one's life while killing the enemy, along the lines of Samson and the Philistines. Judaism also opposes suicide in principle, yet still considers Samson a hero. The HAMAS suicide attacker is apparently certain that he will attain something important through this sacrifice, and he himself will live alongside God.

The mistake that we are likely to make now is that the methods used in the war against HAMAS terrorism will be dictated by public panic. When the other side enjoys the initiative, the tendency is generally to put the main focus on defensive means. It is impossible to fight this type of terrorism while the emphasis is put on thousands of security personnel and roadblocks. This is what happened when it was thought that Israel could supress the Palestinian civil uprising with gravel-shooting vehicles.