THE INFORMATION WAS TOO LATE
(Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff, "Ha'aretz" Aug 24, 1995, p. 1)
What happened between last Saturday night, two days before the attack on the #26 bus in Jerusalem, when the person responsible for the explosion was arrested by the GSS, and his confession regarding the action, three days later? Would it have been possible to extract the information from him in time, and thereby prevent the terrible attack in Jerusalem? These are the questions that the security services and legal officials will deal with in the coming days.
The head of the GSS and his people were angry and bitter yesterday over the restrictions that have recently been placed on the organization in in its war on Hamas and Islamic Jihad terrorism. The feeling that it might have been possible to prevent the bombing of the bus in Jerusalem, apparently led the head of the GSS to say that he permitted the tough interrogation of Hamas members, even without consulting legal advisors. The question now is whether and how the legal system will react in the wake of the latest revelations. Will they claim that the head of the GSS acted illegally, and in contravention of the recent understandings with the Attorney-General?
The central figure in the Ramat Gan and Jerusalem bus-bombings, Abdel Nasser Shaker Issa, was arrested on the basis of routine intelligence information, on Saturday night. Several other people were arrested with him. At that stage, the GSS did not know the extent of Issa's involvement in suicide-attacks. His interrogation was standard because the GSS had neither requested nor received permission from the Attorney-General to question him in accordance with the special permits. According to the new arrangement, the head of the GSS himself must request permission to operate on the basis of the special permits, and as result of this, the number of these permits has been greatly reduced. Two days later, the explosion occurred on the bus in Jerusalem.
The severe attack led the head of the GSS to allow the investigators to conduct their questioning according to the special permits, without consulting with the legal officials this time. The head of the GSS said this in reply to a question that was asked at the press conference that he held yesterday with military correspondents.
Issa was completely isolated in a detention cell, and did not know that the explosion had occurred in Jerusalem, aided by a device that he had handed over to his assistant, who in turn passed it on to the suicide terrorist. Approximately 24 hours after his questioning in accordance with the special permit began, Issa broke and told his investigators to expect a bombing in Jerusalem. He did not know that the explosion had already occurred.
During his questioning, he told how he had also been involved in the Ramat Gan attack on July 24. He also told, during the questioning, that he had set up an explosives laboratory in an apartment in Nablus, which had been rented under a fictitious name. In this apartment, the GSS agents found three bombs that were ready for use in future operations.
The latest case, in which the GSS succeeded in solving two serious terrorist attacks, but not in foiling one of them before it occurred, will rekindle the debate about the special permits, and the need to pass soon the GSS law, which will contain clear guidelines on how to interrogate terrorists who carry out large-scale attacks.