November 27, 1997
Beit Sokolov, Tel Aviv
THE FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION OF EXCERPTS OF THE ADDRESS BY PRIME MINISTER BENJAMIN NETANYAHU BEFORE THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ISRAELI EDITORS' ASSOCIATION:
(Communicated by the Office of the Prime Minister)
One of the things I frequently hear said about me is that I do not know where I want to lead the country. And if I do know, I am hiding the fact from the public.
In fact, I remember that the same criticism was leveled at my predecessor, the late Yitzhak Rabin. Just a few weeks before his assassination, he told a friend of mine that only he knew in which direction he was taking the Oslo Accords, and that he was keeping it a secret. Keeping such a secret is natural, though I will shortly explain why I believe the time for doing so has passed. It is natural because once you draw lines on the map, they may be considered an opening position which can be eroded. And if you say that this your final position, that there is none other, you are likely to be accused of not wanting to negotiate, but to present a diktat.
I am quite sure that if I were to adopt what has been called the Beilin-Abu Mazen Plan, I would have been subjected to a concerted campaign of praise both at home and abroad. I would have instantly become the most trust-worthy man in the world. But this government thinks differently. We believe that this formula is dangerous to the existence of the State of Israel, and that it would also increase the Palestinian appetite regarding the "right of return" and partition plans. I was not elected to continue the rush to the 1967 lines in a Likud wrapping. This is not our objective.
That I hold a different concept of the Middle East -- a far more realistic Middle East, where we insist on reciprocity and Palestinian fulfillment of Oslo Accord commitments, and not only Israeli fulfillment -- has not endeared me to certain governments and local groups. But I think that the time has come to speak clearly about the permanent settlement. I am not talking about negotiating principles, such as the honoring of commitments by the Palestinians, but about the type of settlement we are seeking.
To begin with, some facts:
First, the Oslo Accord and its consequences on the ground are fait accompli. I do not think there is any point in crying over what Yitzhak Rabin described as the Oslo Accord's black holes, because nothing can turn the wheel back.
Second, the main achievement of the peace process that began in Madrid in 1991, is the peace treaty with Jordan. It has proven itself, and has proven its strength and durability.
Third, the Oslo Accords have also promoted relations with Arab countries, which is laudable. Fourth, the cessation of the Arab boycott has caused foreign investors to begin to consider openly investing in Israel, from which there is no going back.
These, then, are the agreement's advantages. For the sake of balance, its disadvantages must also be stated:
First, terrorism has not ended. The implementation of the formula land for peace, which motivated Oslo's architects, was supposed to eliminate terrorism, or at least radically reduce it. The exact opposite has occurred. Before Rabin agreed to sign the Oslo Accords, he demanded from Arafat a clear commitment for an all-out fight against terrorism, and he got it. But except for superficial and isolated actions, the [Palestinian] Authority has done nothing in this regard, despite its repeated commitments.
Second, the [Palestinian] Covenant has not been annulled. The second commitment that Rabin demanded before he signed the accord, was to change the Covenant, most of whose articles call for the delegitimization of Zionism and the destruction of the State of Israel. As of today, not a single article of the Covenant has been specifically annulled.
Third, the long sought for reconciliation between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples, and between Israel and the Arab world, has not occurred. The Palestinians teach their children from kindergarten through university to hate Israel and to delegitimize the state. Palestinian Authority maps include all of the land from the river Jordan to the sea as part of the Palestinian state, and to my regret, so do all the maps and instruction materials in the Arab countries. This is accompanied by systematic incitement in all the Palestinian media, and not only there.
Fourth, negotiations with Syria have achieved no results. The extensive concessions the Labor government was willing to make did not advance the negotiations, and the Syrian struggle against Israel through Hizballah has not ceased.
Fifth, the external circle of threat against Israel remains in place, and in a certain sense has even intensified. I refer in particular to the Iranian effort, and to a lesser extent the Iraqi effort, which has received international attention. As a result of our actions, this Iranian effort has recently received world attention.
Thus the balance is mixed. But, this is the real balance. Four years have passed, and this is the Middle East as we see it. There have been positive developments alongside negative ones, things that have not changed. Our main effort must be to improve this balance and extract the most out of the Oslo processes with extreme care, so as not to add dangers to the State of Israel.
The present picture is not simple. Eleven months ago, we signed the Hebron Agreement, in which both sides accepted a number of commitments. Israel has fulfilled all of its commitments in accordance with this agreement, including redeployment in Hebron, releasing detainees and entering negotiations on a series of issues. These negotiations have indeed made progress and several committees are close to concluding their work. Despite this, the Palestinian Authority has fulfilled none of its commitments, almost without exception. These commitments include completing the revisions to the Palestinian Covenant, strengthening security cooperation us, preventing incitement and hostile propaganda, an all-out war against terrorists and their infrastructures, arresting and punishing terrorists, extraditing suspects in accordance with the Oslo Accords, reducing the size of the Palestinian police to that which was agreed to in the Interim Agreement, confiscating illegal weapons and avoiding political and governmental activity outside the Authority's areas, meaning Jerusalem.
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright rightly said that the war against terrorism is the sine qua non of the entire process, and I regret that I am unable to state today that the Palestinians Authority is indeed fighting against the terrorist infrastructure or that it is fulfilling any of the conditions mentioned in the Hebron agreements.
The next agreement has value only if there is value to the previous agreement and if we are required to fulfill our side of the agreement, we say to the other side: You have not fulfilled your commitments for four years; fulfill your commitments.
What is becoming increasingly clear is that as we move forward in this process, the interim agreement, which was supposed to build trust between the parties, is not fulfilling its purpose. That is why, beyond fulfilling our commitments, and demanding reciprocity, I embarked on a proposal to advance and accelerate the negotiations for a permanent settlement, in order to reach an agreed framework within six to nine months.
The permanent settlement is synonym of peace. It is the key to resolving the serious and difficult problems, the test of the parties' will to reach a modus vivendi, coexistence. In other words, peace. The Palestinians have also expressed their agreement to enter into such negotiations on the permanent settlement, but made entering into them conditional on the fulfillment of the articles concerning the interim agreement. I said please, take the Hebron agreement and fulfill it.
It is clear to me that if we continue to dance around the interim agreement we will get further and further away from peace, we will bring more and more instability and perhaps worse than that. After all, there is almost nothing that we are doing within the agreement that is not considered by others to be a provocation. We build in Jerusalem -- it is a provocation. What is the connection between this and the agreement? Nothing. It runs counter to the spirit of the agreement, they tell us. We build apartments for young couples in Ariel or in Beit El -- it runs counter to the spirit of the agreement. It does not run counter to the spirit of the agreement, it does not contravene the articles of the agreement, but it does serve as a pretext for not fulfilling articles in the agreement by the other side. As time passes, this claim, this argument, this polemic, will be used more frequently. We will not bridge the gap.
This is why we need to make a special effort today to reach an agreed formula in order to close the book on the interim agreement and move forward to a permanent settlement. This is the effort that Foreign Minister David Levy, Defense Minister Mordechai and other ministers, including the Infrastructure Minister, and I have been making in recent weeks. We are trying to reach an agreed framework that will enable us to bring together all the issues of the interim agreement, reach agreement on them, put them behind us and move forward to a permanent settlement. I believe that is the only way to move this process along in a positive manner and avoid the bickering and water-treading we have experienced as a result of the non-fulfillment of the agreements by the Palestinian side.
I propose that all of the redeployments be merged into one. This redeployment will be carried out within five months, on the condition that there will be serious Palestinian activity against terrorism and a fulfillment of their commitments. We can begin the talks on the permanent settlement immediately, and any discussion on handing over additional territory will take place in the framework of the negotiations on the permanent settlement.
On the subject of the permanent settlement, there are two kinds of issues: one is where security is under our responsibility; another is where security is under the Palestinian side's responsibility. In all of the subjects discussed in the interim committees -- the airport, the seaport, safe passage, the industrial park -- the issue is exercising our right to assume responsibility for security according to the Oslo agreements. The moment the Palestinian side agrees to transfer this authority to us, it will be possible to move forward.
Redeployment is another matter. At the moment we are responsible for security on the ground. When we hand over territory we hand security authority to the Palestinian side, which until now has not lived up to its security commitments in the territories already handed over to it. We need some time -- several months -- to see that a change has occurred. This is the basis for the proposal we are now discussing in the cabinet; we will discuss it with the Palestinians as well, and of course with the United States. I am determined to pass a proposal in this spirit through the cabinet. I do not downplay the difficulties, concerns and opposition, but I believe that we will succeed.
What will be the nature of the permanent agreement?
First, the Palestinians will possess a self-governing entity, offering them maximum self-government in the areas that will be under their control in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.
The negotiations will concentrate on two central subjects: territorial issues, and functional issues.
On the territorial issue, we espouse the idea of broad, contiguous security zones for the State of Israel. The areas under Palestinian control consist even now of those areas in which the Palestinian population is concentrated. As you know they already have administrative responsibility over 98% of the Palestinian population. The majority of the security zones are only sparsely populated by Palestinians, and have a relatively high Jewish population. There is a connection between these two facts, since settlements were usually built in areas considered important for security. So we envisage a settlement which would include security arrangements. First of all, a large and broad security strip in the Jordan Valley, which will defend the State of Israel against military invasion, against a sudden attack from the east, and a narrower security zone in the west, along the coastal plain, which would defend Israel against terrorist attack, and a number of broad axes linking the two. This is not a full outline of the security zones, it does not rule out security-related alterations, but it does give a relatively clear picture, I would say a general impression, a draught in broad strokes, of the security zones. This would of course be combined with a united Jerusalem, including its periphery, such as Gush Etzion and similar areas.
As for the functional aspect, we wish to allow the Palestinians to run their own lives without our involvement or interference. It is incumbent on us to make it possible for them to manage their own affairs to the maximum, while ensuring that this does not affect our lives adversely. This means that there must be a functional division of authority. It is not a question of all or nothing, but rather a division. What this means is that all matters relating to the administration of the Palestinian entity and the lives of the Palestinians will be the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority. Certain issues, such as the environment, know no borders. These will be administered jointly by the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
At the same time, issues relating to the essential security of the State of Israel will remain in the hands of Israel. We cannot allow ourselves to take the risk of foreign control of Israeli airspace, or water sources, and we certainly cannot allow alliances with Saddam Hussein or Iran, or with any other element which may threaten our existence.
I am sure that an arrangement of this kind is achievable. It would be good for the Palestinians, and good for us. This is the weaving of genuine peace, not illusory peace. I have no doubt that the Palestinians will demand more, that they will say that
they cannot accept this, and I have no doubt that we will have to argue with the Palestinians over the precise details. But, we must live in this country. We have to make firm the bases of our existence, and the foundation of our existence, not only for ourselves or for the next five years, but also for our children and grandchildren, for the entire twenty-first century. What is being settled now must survive the test of time. We must have the resolve to hold what we must, and compromise on what we can. We know how to do this, and I believe that on this issue we will be able to build a broad national consensus.
But I do not see the signing of a permanent agreement as the end of the matter. Ultimately, the life of nations is not determined by agreements. I hope that relations between us and the Palestinians will draw closer. I hope that one day they will even be characterized as fraternal. The Palestinian people have suffered greatly, and are currently feeling much frustration and despair. We must understand this frustration, and also their sufferings, and we must try to find a solution. It is incumbent upon us, and not only on us, but also on all the enlightened world, to do everything we can to advance the Palestinians economic welfare. I hope we will soon sign a permanent agreement with the Palestinians. But also hope that the agreement will be just a beginning, the beginning of the development of human and natural resources, of work together, of the good life, a better life together, of mutual respect between Judaism and Islam. If we succeed, over the next year in beginning this process, then the generations to come will remember us with gratitude, for we will have begun the commencement of true peace. Question: Mr. Prime Minister, what is the place of the refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria in the achievement of the plan which you have outlined before us today?
First of all, I hope that the Palestinian Authority, which is now responsible for the administration of the Palestinian population, will do the maximum to find permanent dwellings for the refugees in its areas. There is no reason why these people should be refugees after fifty years. I believe that once the political motivation behind their remaining refugees is abandoned, it should be possible to find them permanent dwellings fairly quickly, as has been done in Jordan. If there is a political intention to continue the refugee problem, then it will continue, also in the areas under P.A. jurisdiction. And if for example, hundreds of thousands of refugees are brought in from dispersion, you must ask yourselves where they will be absorbed in the P.A. areas. Is the economic situation there so booming?
There is a terrible injustice in the demand that is made of us that we retrospectively adopt U.N. decisions of more than fifty years ago which were not honored by the other side. There was a partition plan which was rejected by the Arabs, they declared war on us. From the same war, which was caused by the total Arab rejection of the U.N. decision, a second refugee problem was created. Not Arab refugees who left or were expelled from the state of Israel, but eight hundred thousand Jewish refugees who were expelled from the Arab states. So two refugee problems were created. We, in the last fifty years, in a tiny area of land -- the territory of the State of Israel is a little more than a thousandth that of the Arab world -- have solved the problem of the Jewish refugees. There are no Jewish refugees. They have kept the refugee problem going for fifty years, and now they say, let us turn back the historical clock, you solve our problem too. If anyone on the Palestinian side thinks that a single individual in the State of Israel will be willing to accept the return of the refugees of 1948, he is mistaken. No-one will agree to this, and rightly so.