(Commentary by Ron Ben-Yishai, "Yediot Ahronot", 25.10.98, p. A13)
On paper, the section of the Wye agreement dealing with security is very
impressive and promising.
The Palestinian Authority signed a commitment to conduct a comprehensive,
thorough and continuous war against all terrorist elements and
infrastructures, and this time the United States will be the one to
supervise and confirm that Arafat upholds his commitments according to a
detailed timetable.
The details of the Palestinian security commitments, the timetable
established for their implementation, which promises reciprocity between
them and the Israeli withdrawals, and the American involvement in all
stages of security implementation are, from an Israeli standpoint, the
main innovations and advantages of the agreement that was achieved.
There are more than a few people who claim that the American involvement
is undesirable, since it prevents real dialogue and coexistence between
us and the Palestinians, and since it makes us even more dependent on the
United States. However, when the issue is security, necessity cannot be
condemned. The bus bombings of 1995 and 1996 showed that trust between
Arafat and Israeli leaders it not enough. There was a need for secret
intervention by President Clinton so that Peres could sign a security
memorandum with Arafat in April 1996, and only afterward did Dahlan and
Jibril Rajoub begin to act with determination against Hamas and Islamic
Jihad.
The involvement of CIA personnel will be necessary for Israel, primarily
after the withdrawal is completed. When Arafat has no clear interest in
carrying out the security commitments, someone with influence will have
to remind him about what he signed. It is therefore possible to say that
Netanyahu was right in insisting on a new, very detailed text of the
security component in the Oslo agreements and on American involvement
their implementation.
However, a good paper is no guarantee that implementation of the security
commitments will be successful -- especially when talking about the
Palestinian Authority and its apparatuses, which are not exactly a symbol
of efficiency. Even CIA personnel cannot eliminate overnight the
organizational chaos and the internal rivalries in Arafat's camp, which
will certainly cause considerable delays to the tight, tough timetable
that was established for implementing the agreement. Therefore, in order
for the agreement to be implemented, trust between the parties and a lot
of goodwill and flexibility are necessary. These are in short supply just
now, on both the Palestinian and the Israeli sides, and that already is a
good reason to be concerned that delays in implementing the Palestinian
commitments or a few attacks will cause the agreement to be derailed or
to be suspended with the active encouragement of extremists on both
sides.
A further shortcoming of the new security arrangement is that Arafat has
a real interest in fulfilling it for only three months, until Israel
completes its withdrawals. Afterwards, especially if there are
difficulties with the negotiations on the final status agreement, he is
liable to become evasive, and this could enable a new wave of violence.
Israel would turn to the Americans and if they do not stand at its side,
a confrontation could development between Israel and the American
administration, which in any case has more trust in Arafat than
Netanyahu. Even if the Americans support Israel's demands, it is doubtful
if they could, or would want to, completely impose their will on Arafat,
with the entire Arab world standing united behind him.
Furthermore, there are a number of mines, any one of which is liable to
give Arafat or Israel a pretext to derail implementation of the
agreement. Following are three of the main ones:
- There is no Israel commitment to halt the settlers' race to take
control of land. This race is liable to lead to violent clashes on the
ground.
- There is no clear commitment by Arafat not to declare a Palestinian
state on 4 May 1999, if he sees that there is no progress in final status
negotiations. There is only a superficial commitment by both parties not
to take unilateral steps.
- There is a tremendous gap between the sides regarding the third
redeployment.
On the other hand, there is a great benefit, from the Israeli standpoint,
to the agreement signed at Wye: it establishes a model and a precedent
for a possible agreement between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights
and in Lebanon. Assad will find it difficult to ignore the three
fundamental principles determined at Wye: territorial compromise, a
strict acceptance of Israel's security demands and economic incentives to
both sides to carry out the agreement in word and deed. It is no wonder
than Damascus is already loudly condemning the agreement.