A Question of Goodwill

The ink on the agreements signed at the White House has not even dried, and already both sides are arming themselves with opposing and and contradictory interpretations of the text. In the best case, we are witnessing the attempts of both parties to take credit for their accomplishments and to distort their concessions. In the worst case, this will be a giant source of trouble.

One of the more prominent examples of this difference of opinion between Israel and the Palestinians involves the section on the amendment of the Palestinian Charter by the Palestine National Council.

One can dispute the logic behind Israel's insistence that Arafat artificially resuscitate, for the second time in 30 months, this clumsy and antiquated entity to "complete the nullification of those provisions calling for the destruction of Israel." But from the moment that the decision was made, what happens next must be examined well.

The Israeli interpretation of the Wye River Memorandum's section on the Palestinian Charter maintains that Arafat will, in a matter of weeks, again convene all 600 PNC members, who will unequivocally vote for the nullification of the relevant articles. Meanwhile, the Palestinians interpret this section in a more convoluted manner -- it states that Arafat will "invite the members of the PNC" and members of other organizations, including the Palestinian Legislative Council, to come listen to President Clinton and "reaffirm" the nullification of the charter provisions.

To be clear: No "get-together" is required for the sake of nullifying or amending the Palestinian Charter. No additional members or guests in the grandstand are necessary. Only PNC members need be present -- just those who support the Oslo Accords, those who oppose them and, of course, those who are independently- minded delegates.

Even more essential is to convene a two-thirds majority of PNC members authorized to alter the charter. In other words, if there are currently about 600 PNC members around the world, 400 of them must vote to change the charter. And, if Arafat already has 400 such delegates to vote for the change, why does he need Clinton or any other participants? If he cannot guarantee a majority, no cast of external guests will help.

And this is only one example of the sections in the Wye agreement which are sufficiently vague to allow both parties to evade compliance. Such is also the case concerning the war on terrorism and the third redeployment. No inspection can ensure that the Palestinian Authority will collect weapons, and no power can force Arafat to genuinely combat terrorism if he does not detect a serious Israeli approach to to the final status negotiations. Without the good will of both parties, the Wye River Memorandum will remain nothing more than an ink signature on a piece of paper.