Press Briefing by MajGen Giora Eiland- Head of the IDF Operation Branch- on the Tenet cease-fire agreement - 14-Jun-2001

Jerusalem, June 14, 2001

Gen. Giora Eiland: This agreement was formally accepted by both sides, the Israeli and the Palestinian, on both levels - political and security. It was accepted by the political level by our Prime Minister on Tuesday morning and it was accepted by the Palestinian Chairman Arafat on Tuesday night. This is the political level.

As far as the security level is concerned, yesterday there was a meeting that lasted three hours between the Israelis, the Palestinians and the American delegation where we spoke about all the details of this agreement. George Tenet tried to clarify whatever needed clarification, and all misunderstandings that may have existed before that meeting were eliminated. So at 3:00 PM when we finished this meeting, everything was clear enough and both sides expressed their commitments to implement what was written in this document -- not only according to what is said in this document, but also according to the spirit that we tried to understand.

Speaking about the spirit of this document, the first paragraph of this document begins with the words, "It is premised that the cease-fire between both parties will be kept and both sides will take any necessary measures to enforce this-cease fire." So this is the most fundamental thing; all other things are actually details of this essential thing.

The timeline of implementation is divided into three phases:

The first phase is everything that is to begin immediately. It includes, first, a beginning of security cooperation between both sides. Number two is, of course, complete cessation of any violence. As far as we were concerned, we were supposed to immediately enable Palestinian security personnel to move in a secure way from one place to another in the territory of the West Bank and in the territory of the Gaza Strip, and the Palestinians were expected to begin fighting terrorism -- not only in order to stop terrorist incidents but also to prevent further terrorist threats. So this is the first stage. Of course, there are some other details but this is the most basic thing.

The second phase is what we are expected to do within the first 48 hours of this agreement. According to the agreement, we were supposed to "begin" - this is the word, to "begin" - two things. The first, is to move back our forces, and number two, to ease the closures around the Palestinian cities and to remove checkpoints and some other obstacles that we imposed on the Palestinians in the past few weeks. As I said, we were supposed to begin these two activities within the first 48 hours. We decided to begin some of these activities not in the second day of this period but actually to begin it today and to do some other things beyond what we were expected - like, for example, to open the international passages in Allenby Bridge from the Jordan River and in Rafah between Israel and Egypt.

The third phase is not limited in time, but in content, and it is said that both parties should take all necessary measures. So finally we will be in the same security situation as we were before this crisis began at the end of September. We are expected to work on a timeline or timetable next week and to try to reach an understanding what is this complete plan and what will be the timeline for the next steps. We didn't discuss it because it was too early and we are going to discuss it the beginning of next week.

We expect that this agreement will be fulfilled according to the spirit that was exercised by George Tenet. There are a lot of questions whether this agreement will be more successful than the previous ones. In the past nine months, we tried to reach similar agreements Palestinians. To mention only a few, there was the first attempt in Paris a few days after this crisis began. Then there was much more formal understanding and summit in Sharm el-Sheikh, and later on there were some other meetings between Chairman Arafat and Shimon Peres and some others. All of these initiatives failed to last more than a few hours.

There are two reasons to believe that now there is a greater sense that this initiative will succeed, although there is no guarantee, of course, and it is too early to anticipate whether it will work or

not. But at least there are two reasons to believe that the chances are a little bit better now.

The first is the international involvement in the attempt to persuade the Palestinians to stop violence. This attempt, or this international pressure, began two weeks ago after the terrorist attack in the Dolphinarium in Tel Aviv and it lasted during this week. We understand that this international pressure is effective and is one of the reasons why the Palestinians finally accepted this agreement.

The second reason is the presence of George Tenet here during almost a week, where he made every possible effort to deliver an agreement that is fair - it is balanced, it is very professional. And he made personal attempts, not only to convince the political levels on both sides that they should accept it, but also spoke to all the security leaders, specially on the Palestinian side. I think that if he didn't make this kind of effort, maybe this agreement wouldn't have been achieved.

Both parties are not completely satisfied with this document. There are some things that we don't like in this document; there are some things that we are concerned about; there are some details that we would prefer to eliminate from this document. The Palestinians have more or less the same set of complaints or things that they don't like about this document. But the real question is whether both sides are really committed to fulfill what is written in this document or not.

And as I said, since Tuesday morning when our Prime Minister decided to accept it as it is, we are fully committed to carry out and to implement whatever is written in this document. I hope that the Palestinians will adopt the same approach.

Twenty-six hours after the beginning of this new beginning, I can't say that we are satisfied with the results. So far we can count at least 16 violent incidents, including 13 shooting incidents in the West Bank and Gaza and at least three incidents of mortar shelling in the Gaza Strip. So this is not exactly what we expected to have under the definition of cease-fire. These statistics are not very much different from the regular statistics in the past two weeks. We are not completely sure that the Palestinians are making all the necessary effort in order to enforce the cessation of the violence. I have been told now there is another mortar shelling incident in the Gaza Strip. As I said, some of the messages that they transfer do not completely fit the spirit and the atmosphere to which we committed ourselves only yesterday.

There are some Palestinian leaders, whether they are leaders of the Tanzim or whether they are leaders of the Hamas or even leaders that belong to the Palestinian Administration, who try to give different interpretations to this document, to speak about some conditions that should be fulfilled before they can cease fire. For example, some of them understand that they have to stop shooting, but only from Area A or other such explanations. There is no room for any kind of different interpretations other than the interpretation that was cleared, clarified and explained yesterday.

But we know we are only after 24 hours and it is too early to judge the situation. We said that we would do whatever we need to do with the goodwill and with the deliberate attempt to succeed, and we hope that the Palestinians will do similar things in the next days.

Our next meeting is going to take place tomorrow (15 June). All three delegations are going to meet tomorrow afternoon and we are going to judge the situation, to evaluate the situation, to try to bring to the committee requests or complaints. I hope that the situation on the ground tomorrow will be better than today so there will be some basis for further progress according to the document.

This is more or less what I can tell you so far, and I understand that you have a lot of questions, so please.

Q: Is it clear that this part of the agreement is that the IDF has to reinstitute military investigations in cases of Palestinian [fatalities? (poor audio)] ... Related to that, can you tell us a bit about why the IDF was using artillery shells [employing 'flachettes'? (poor audio)]... in the Gaza Strip?

Gen. Eiland: First, it is quite correct what you said, we are told to reinvestigate where Palestinians were not killed as a result of violence or terrorism, that is correct. We do use this kind of artillery shell because this kind of shell is effective when they are shot at the right targets. There was an incident that happened a few days ago in Gaza and I guess that you are referring to that incident. The mistake was not the use of a certain kind of shell or other. But there was a different mistake, in that the tank commander didn't adjust the right range, so he didn't shoot at the right target and he shot at other targets. Of course when you talk about the results there is nothing to do with the type of shells.

Q: The gut feeling is that firing shells in a populated area is not --

Gen. Eiland: No, it is not in a populated area the place that he shot. Any time that a tank or any other responses are required, it is required because there is shooting from some specific place, and we always try to find the right answer. Sometimes when there is fire from a populated area, like Beit Jala for, example, which happens every day, or Khan Yunis which happens every day, or in Rafah which happens a few times every day, then of course we return fire to where the fire comes from, and sometimes it is a populated area.

Q: Why was it used then?

Gen. Eiland: We use the same kind of shells during the 18 years of presence in Lebanon for example.

Q: You said you agreed that after (audio break)

Gen. Eiland: Of course not. I said in the beginning of my presentation that the first paragraph of this understanding is that there is a premise that the cease-fire will be kept, and if there is no cease-fire then it might be too dangerous and too difficult to proceed. Just to give you an example, we anticipate to limit or to remove a lot of the checkpoints and to enable more and more of the Palestinians to move freely from one place to another. Now let us see what is going on. Until yesterday in the West Bank, there are thousands of kilometers of roads, on both sides, which the Israelis and the Palestinians have shared and use simultaneously. There are tens of thousands of Israeli vehicles passing every day on these roads. There are hundreds of Palestinians who carry weapons, whether legally or illegally, who are willing to carry out attacks on Israeli traffic. One of the easiest things in the world is to ride a Palestinian cab and to choose randomly any Israeli car and to bypass this car and to shoot from a range of five meters.

So, of course, if the other side doesn't take real measures to prevent these kind of attacks, then it might be too risky to open all the roads to let free movement of the Palestinians, because the results might be a tremendous increase in the number of Israeli casualties. So of course, the cessation of violence and specifically the cease-fire, as it was said in the document, is the basis for everything.

Of course, we have to judge the situation every day, not only according to the previous day, which is important, but also according to two other factors: namely, the intent and the effort. The intent is expressed in the way that the leaders say what should be done and what shouldn't be done, and the effort is something that we can see according to the operations of the Palestinian security forces on the ground.

But we said that we are not only committed to do what we are told, we are even ready to take some calculated risks in order to create a better atmosphere in order to achieve what is for us, at least, very important. But of course, we have to evaluate the situation every

day, every 48 hours, before the meeting tomorrow and the next meetings to see what will be the speed of our implementation of this agreement.

Q: Lt. Col. Edri of Intelligence was deliberately shot today. How serious a blow is that to the cease-fire?

Gen. Eiland: There is no real difference between this incident and the other 16 incidents. The only difference is that there was a fatality in this case and not in the others. So, we don't judge every specific case and we said that we would not judge the situation only after a few hours. Of course we regret this incident, but it is not something that changes our decision to continue, at least for the next 24 hours.

Q: Can you just refresh our memories, is this the second cease-fire after Sharm el-Sheikh or were there other cease-fires in between? Can you tell us why those didn't work and why this is supposed to work? And is it true that Yasser Arafat only agreed to this on the basis that he wouldn't have to tell his people and the Tanzim what the basic cease-fire means, and also, what is the obligation on Mr. Sharon?

Gen. Eiland: I will begin from your last question. There are no secret obligations of either side to the Americans or from the Americans to anyone else. Everything is exposed, everything is known perfectly to both sides. So whatever is written in this paper is known to both sides and whatever is written in this paper, of course requires both sides to do what they should do and there are no conditions like some of them you have just mentioned.

Now, I didn't say that the success of this initiative is guaranteed. Actually the situation is very severe. We know that both sides miss the fundamental trust, because we lost this trust, and one of the first things we have to do is to try to rebuild this trust, because this is the basis for any security cooperation. But I said that this time there are more chances that this initiative will succeed because of the two factors I mentioned. One is the international pressure or awareness of the situation. Pressure is being exerted on both sides to accept what is written there. The second thing, I think this time, contrary to the others, it was not done in some kind of a hasty way and it was not a kind of document that was negotiated and didn't find a way to bridge the gaps. The Tenet document was made in a very professional and balanced way, maybe by the best person in the world that could do it, and that is why I think we can implement what is written there, because the requirements make sense.

Q: What are the others?

Gen. Eiland: There have been at least three or four previous promises, not all of them were agreements.

Q: The murder of Lt. Col. Yehuda Edri of the Israeli intelligence, do you think this killing was a revenge or is there a possibility that such an agent might have been turned and can you suspect other similar incidents? The second question is referring to the use of shells - whether the field command has the right or not the for ordering their use?

Gen. Eiland: We do not know details and there is an investigation about this incident that happened today so I can't give you any specific details according to what you asked. Speaking about orders, who is authorized to give orders to do certain things, maybe I should emphasize that. We changed yesterday two things. Number one is the rules of engagement - now they are much more restricted and we will try to avoid any possible state or any possible misunderstanding, and we are going to be very strict about that.

The second thing, some of the authorities that were given to low levels, the brigade commanders, for example, are now concentrated in upper levels - the commander himself or the general staff - in order to control the use of force in a better way. Of course it limits to a certain degree the capability of forces to respond or to react. But we prefer to take these steps in the beginning of the initiative, hopefully that the other side will take similar steps.

Q: I have two questions. First you said in the meeting yesterday ... that Tenet was taking the ambiguity out of the stuff. If you describe the process for example, the issues distinguishing between shooting from Area A and Area B ....

Gen. Eiland: Speaking specifically about the example that you gave yourself, the words are clear. It is written in the clearest possible way that there shall be no violence and no shooting from any area by anyone under any circumstances. So there is not much room for different interpretation. But there were some other details in the document on which clarification was needed. Everything was said and explained yesterday - and there was even a chance for both parties to try to persuade a little bit, not about the content of the document but about the way that they are going to implement - everything that was discussed yesterday was concluded in a very clear way by Tenet, so there is no room for any kind of a misunderstanding.

Q: The second question, at the start of this round of discussions, how did you prepare for a rapid transition? For example what happens about humanitarian things...

Gen. Eiland: I guess you know more or less that Tenet is a very practical man and doesn't speak so much about the background of his mission. His mission basically was one thing: to start again security cooperation between both sides and to try to bring about a situation that is as similar as possible to the security situation as it existed before this crisis began. So this was quite a clear mission and he stuck to this mission. He didn't refer to any other aspect of the conflict - humanitarian, political or anything else. It was only a security agreement and everything that was said and discussed was under military security professional aspects.

Q: According to your comments, Israel will see that the agreements are implemented when Arafat starts stopping the effects of the terrorism, is happening in the field? That is the first question. Second question, there has been a lot of discussion about this, who are the people that Arafat should put in jail? The ones that he put out at the beginning of the intifada or only the ones who according to the Palestinians thinking, the ones that are preparing now terrorist attacks?

Gen. Eiland: Palestinians are expected to prevent terrorism of all kinds and to make all efforts, not only to prevent a specific attack, but also to create a situation where terrorist attacks will be less and less possible, because some of the capabilities that exist now will not exist after they take the necessary steps. Now, both sides understand very well what exactly the Palestinians are expected to do and what not. I don't think it is the right place and the right time to discuss details like names of people. There is full understanding of what is expected. Of course, if the operations against terrorism are not taken, then it will be very hard for us to proceed and return to the situation as it was before, because that is similar to what I tried to explain about the situation in the West Bank roads. If we take all our measures, and remove them and we will enable the people from the Hamas or the Islamic Jihad to move freely and to carry out attacks, like the attack that happened in Tel Aviv two weeks ago, then of course this is not our interest and of course we will not go in this direction. So we hope that real measures are taken.

Q: One question on the incitement to violence (audio break).

Gen. Eiland: As I said, I don't want to speak in detail about this clause of counter-terrorism activities that both sides should take. I just want to mention, since you spoke about the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. These two organizations, in order to carry out terrorist attacks, need three things: Number one capability - they do have operational capability; number two is motivation - they do have motivation; number three is the permission from the formal authority to operate. Until eight or nine months ago they did not have the last, or really the first thing - they did not have the permission. So that is why there were very few terrorist attacks. But when the Palestinians changed their strategy gave their permission, gave what we call the 'green light' for these organizations to operate, of course we could see the results.

Q: Two questions. The first one, you gave a general description, but was the killing of the army officer in a random ambush by a gang - how would you describe it? The second question deals with the killing of a Palestinian last night. Was this by vigilantes who carried out this horrendous shooting, or by Palestinians?

Gen. Eiland: To your second question, we don't know. There was a Palestinian who was killed and three others that were wounded. It was at night, it was on a road that both sides used, so it could be very reasonable that it was a mistake made by the Palestinians who attacked them, very similar to the way in which one or two nights before the Greek priest was killed a few kilometers from this specific place, and I guess they didn't intend to kill specifically that Greek priest. So it makes much more sense that it was made by the Palestinians, although the Israeli police are investigating other possibilities. Speaking about the Lt. Col., I said I can't give you any further details.

Q: Two questions. Is there anything about the length of a cooling-off period in this regard? You are specifically saying within six weeks.

Gen. Eiland: The cooling-off period is not part of this agreement. Sometimes we confuse between different documents. The cooling-off period is mentioned in the Mitchell report and we speak about a period of six weeks, of a cooling-off period that will begin after a real cease-fire exists. So we are not in the stage that we can start counting these six weeks.

Q: What do you want the PA Authority to do to passing gunmen, people who are shooting in areas, area B or C, that are fully under your control?

Gen. Eiland: All places without exception. Those carrying out these attacks leave Palestinian control area and after they attack, go back to the Palestinian controlled area. Some of them belong to the Palestinian security organizations. So, the first thing which is required is to stop activities of people like this. But of course, they have the full responsibility to stop any kind of violent activity that leaves their area and goes back to their area. It is just like the terrorist attack in Tel Aviv two weeks ago. It is true that was carried out in Tel Aviv, but that doesn't mean that it was only our responsibility to prevent it, because those who carried it out left Kalkilya, which is a fully Palestinian controlled area, and returned there.

Q: Is there any clause in the Tenet paper that says that after this cooling-off period the two sides have to perceive the implementation of the political measures in the Mitchell Report?

Gen. Eiland: Not at all. As I said, this agreement is purely a professional security agreement. It doesn't mention the next steps that should be fulfilled, if and when there is a cease-fire. It mentions the Mitchell Report, but this document doesn't deal with the other measures that should be accomplished according to the Mitchell Report.

The Mitchell Report, like any other understandings and existing agreements, are mentioned in the beginning - namely, that all parties are committed to all previous agreements, including the agreements of understanding of Sharm el-Sheikh and some other understanding and the Mitchell Report, and that is it. There is nothing in the content of the Tenet report has anything to do with the political part of the Mitchell Report.

Q: Do you know when the DCOs (District Coordination Offices) will be working again?

Gen. Eiland: Eight out of the nine DCOs are operating now. The only DCO that doesn't operate is the DCO in the southern brigade in Gaza. This DCO stopped operating about a month or two months after the beginning of this crisis, when a bomb was put in a room where the Israeli officer was and he was killed. The building was destroyed, and of course there is no minimum level of trust between both sides after that incident that could enable working together in any way. But all other DCOs continued working, not only from yesterday - they have continued working in some level throughout the entire crisis. But of course we tried to strengthen that and we tried to put much more content into their mutual activities.

Q: There seems to be an argument on when the cease-fire takes effect. You say yesterday at 3:00 and the Palestinians say no to that. At yesterday's meeting did you leave this meeting without this matter being cleared up? Did Tenet say nothing?

Gen. Eiland: Tenet said in the clearest possible words that the cease-fire begins just as we left that meeting yesterday at 3:00 PM in Tel Aviv, and there is no room for any kind of misunderstanding, at least about this point.

Q: (inaudible)

Gen. Eiland: This agreement was not signed. So in a way you can say it is not a formal agreement, but it is more an understanding of both sides. But both parties of course, when they had this document in their hands and they said to Tenet that they fully accepted it and they are committed to fulfill what is written in this document, it is almost like a signed agreement.

Q: Did you shake hands.

Gen. Eiland: Much more, we kissed each other.

Q: Seriously?

Gen. Eiland: Yes, this is the Middle East, you forgot.

Q: What happens if the Palestinians want to (poor audio)

Gen. Eiland: The atmosphere expressed in this entire document is that both sides should go forward and not back. This is our intent and this is our approach and if the situation allows and permits - and it depends very much on the will of the other side - then there is no reason why this kind of question will arise. But I can't be fully optimistic about that, and if the situation stays as it is and if there is no reduction in the level of violence and there is no real attempt to stop terrorism, then I guess we will have to reassess the situation and to see whether we can proceed unilaterally while the other side doesn't do anything. But I guess it is too early to estimate and to give predictions about that.

Q: (inaudible)

Gen. Eiland: Hopefully we might need less and less American involvement in the situation and if we really come to a situation as it was until nine months ago then we will not need the steady presence of the Americans.

Q: You seem very optimistic, which is the very opposite attitude from all the comments from all the Israelis and the Palestinians have. Why is it that, there must be some good reason for that?

Gen. Eiland: I didn't say I was optimistic. This is the impression; maybe it is not the right impression. I said that contrary to other attempts in the past, this attempt is more serious, it was made in a more professional or more patient way. So if there is a chance to bridge the gaps between both sides as far as security matters are concerned, this is the opportunity. So there is a better basis now than in the past. But it doesn't mean that I am optimistic about that. I mentioned that both sides have to rebuild the trust between them.

After 24 hours we are not satisfied with the Palestinian efforts and the results as we can see them on the ground, but we understand that if we don't use all our effort and if we don't show a real goodwill, then there will be no chance to succeed, so we decided to take any possible measures in order to succeed. As far as we are concerned, we will do anything that is needed so that this initiative will finally be successful.