April 5, 2002
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Palestinian General Security
General Intelligence
West Bank Districts Directorate
Tulkarm District
To Head of General Intelligence/Northern Districts [Note: meaning
Tawfik Tirawi]
Greetings,
Subject: The General Situation Among Armed Fatah Personnel in the
District [Tulkarm]
1. The number of armed Fatah men in Tulkarm and in its refugee camp
ranges between 15-20.
2. Most of them [the arms bearers] have M-16 assault rifles,
privately owned by each, except for three rifles that the Tanzim took
part in their purchase. Additionally contributions were raised and
financial aid obtained from the honorable President [Arafat] to
complete their cost [purchasing expenses].
3. The armed comrades are divided into two squads:
a. The part that is not willing to operate outside Area A. Their
number is just over ten. Their activity comprises firing from inside
Area A at the DCO, firing at areas where the occupation forces are
concentrated, and [firing] during rallies and national celebrations
[of the Palestinians in the Tulkarm area].
b. The active part whose activity is carried out outside Area A.
These operate on bypass roads and even in the depth of Israel, as
happened recently in Hadera [note: a lethal attack on 17 January
perpetrated by a terrorist with an explosive belt and a rifle at a
Bat-Mitzva party in Hadera; 6 Israeli civilians were killed and 25
injured in the attack].
4. The armed comrades have no clear address and no single person can
be turned to for a solution [of their problems] and for keeping track
of issues regarding their affairs. The [armed] men can be divided
into three squads as follows:
a. The Ziad Da'as squad [this squad]: includes Bilal Abu Amsha; Hatem
Josi; Tareq al-Zael and other [arms bearers]. This squad carried out
high quality successful attacks. The last [attack] in this framework
was the coordination and planning of the operation in Hadera to
avenge the death of the martyr Ra'ad Karmi. It would be fair to say
that this squad is the most disciplined, and its men understand the
general situation. Its men are very close to us [i.e. to the General
Intelligence] and maintain with us continuous coordination and
contact.
b. The Mansour Sharim squad [note: he is a senior activist in a Fatah
cell in Tulkarm, and linked to numerous terrorist attacks]:-
1) It contains Tarek al-Hundakji; Majid Jarad; Nimer Abu Rabi; Iyad
Nasser; Sami Sabah, Iyad al-Jarad [Abu Samad] and others.
2) This squad, by means of repeated contacts with Marwan Barghuti, is
attempting to obtain Marwan Barghuti's approval to appoint Mansour
Sharim as head of the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in the Tulkarm
district. Additionally, this squad operates with the aid of Nasser
Awis, a resident of Balata refugee camp, who is closely connected to
it [note: known as a senior Fatah activist in Nablus, one of the
directors of terrorism of Fatah/Tanzim in Tulkarm].
3) This squad is considered very remote from the decisions of the
Fatah, the PA and the security apparatuses. This, since Naif al Jarad
is among the commanders of the "Democratic Front", and since Imad
al-Jarad served in the past in the military intelligence, was
dismissed from it, and it is known that he does not like the PA and
its security apparatuses. In addition, he [Imad al-Jarad] is working
together with several Fatah activists to replace the Tanzim
secretariat represented by comrade Abu Faruk [note: meaning Fa'ak
Kanaan, secretary general of the Tanzim in Tulkarm].
4) This squad does include a large number of undesirables. However,
we would like to emphasize that Mansour Sharim carried out several
successful operations together with the martyr Jamil Atwan, the
martyr Al-Karmi and comrade Muhamed Abu Rabi. Mansour Sharim is a
person who could be controlled and with whom understandings can be
reached, if it were not for the [bad] influence on him of the Al
Jarad family, of Marwan Barghuti and Nasser Awis by means of the ties
maintained between them. The above emphasize to him the total
disconnection of the security apparatuses from the organizational
activities.
c. The squad identified with Abd Al Wahab [nicknamed] "Hafez" [note:
known as a Tanzim activist, head of a squad that operates in
Tulkarm]. Among its men are Masalame Thabet, who has become a
rejected and disliked person; Muhamad Shahade Al Abed; Az Al Atar;
Hani Awisa and Faiz Jaber. Hafez's failure to maintain total control
of the armed bearers and unite them into one entity derives from his
inability to control their activities. Some of his men opened a
communications channel with Marwan Barghuti, others with Nasser Awis
from Nablus, and others with Ahmed Al Franci, Barghuti's escort
[note: meaning Ahmed Al Barghuti, nicknamed "Al Franci", known to be
Barghuti's personnel aid]. Some received bank transfers without this
being known to others. "Hafez" is not interested in the needs of the
arms bearers. It is important to note that the allocation of the
financial resources and ammunition is carried out unfairly. Some of
the arms bearers claim that "Hafez" distributes [money and
ammunition] only to those who fire from Area A. On the other hand, he
neglects those who carry out high quality attacks [i.e. operations
inside Israel]. The chasm between "Hafez" and some of those armed men
[of Fatah] has widened to the extent that they [the arms bearers]
used to depart to carry out operations without notifying Hafez about
them in advance. Recently, these matters have come to a head, so that
when the martyr Murad Abu Al Asel blew himself up on two Israeli
intelligence officers the "Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades" claimed
responsibility for the attack against "Hafez's" will, who requested
them not to take responsibility for the operation.
5. Recently the Preventive Security Apparatus [headed by Jibril
Rajoub] started to deal with the issue of the arms bearers by means
of Akrama Thabet, who serves in the GHQ of the Preventive Security in
Ramallah. He [Akrama] carried out several arrangements and
coordinations between Hafez and Col. Jibril Rajoub, who recently
arranged that one of the wealthy people cover the expenses of Ra'ad
al Karmi's family - his pregnant wife and his daughter.
6. Between the arms bearers [of Fatah] and the security apparatuses
in the district [Tulkarm] several problems arose. The approach of the
arms bearers, when those problems arose was one of defiance and law
breaking. Among some of the security apparatuses this gave rise to a
negative attitude regarding the armed persons of the Fatah. In some
cases this reached a complete breakdown of relations [between the
security apparatuses and] the armed persons and lack of [joint] work
with them. All this at a time when the concept developed whereby the
arms bearers of the Fatah constitute first and foremost a staff and
support for the Palestinian Authority and its security apparatuses.
The strange thing in this context is that the arms bearers stand
unified vis-a-vis any problem [arising] with the security
apparatuses. Additionally, all turn to brother Hafez in order to urge
him to manage matters. However, after a solution is found for the
problem [created with the security apparatuses], the arms bearers
return to the factions prevailing in their midst.
7. Among the armed squads there are many parasites and people with
narrow interests who suddenly appeared in their ranks. It is of note
that these did not carry out a single quality operation, while at the
same time they took an active part in any problem that arose with the
security apparatuses. Additionally, the fact that they bear arms and
wander around with them in the streets has become an aim in itself
and this is in order to escape their social, organizational and
psychological crises. These people have become a financial onus on
the organization, since they demand financial allocations, ammunition
needs and so on.
8. We believe, on the basis of our experience with our arms bearing
brothers that none of the three squads mentioned is not accepting the
leadership and responsibility of any of those persons. Marwan
Barghuti had a significant role in their situation reaching this
level since [Barghuti] assured everybody who contacted him, that the
responsibility of the brigades [the "Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades"] in
Tulkarm will be his if he works and proves that he worthy of it. The
recent activities [of the arms bearers] was conducted in this trend.
9. Amongst the Fatah arms bearers are comrades who stand out in their
activity, their affiliation to Fatah, and their understanding of the
political situation and what is required in each political stage. In
addition, the approach of the security apparatuses and their workers
is positive, and their personal daily behavior in the street and
amongst the people is characterized by friendship, honor and a
positive approach, without creating problems.
10. The Tanzim secretariat [in Tulkarm] provides, through Abu
Farouq], sums of money which are taken from the Tanzim budget and
from the emergency budget for the allocations to the arms bearers
[note: the "emergency" budget - the intention is apparently to the
budget transferred by the PA leadership through the emergency
committee headed by Hikham Bilawi]. On a number of occasions, severe
financial disagreements arose between Abu Farouq and "Hafez" due to
the minimal sum allocated to the Tanzim arms bearers. Abu Farouq
emphasized on a few occasions that he is interested [to pay] only in
special cases to a number of persons who are credited with
participation in the struggle and who carried out quality activities,
and will not [pay] all arms bearers.
11. Proposals and recommendations:
a. The quality personnel amongst the arms bearers should be selected
and assembled under one umbrella [and in the framework] of one group
in order to train them for future activity. They should be given
special attention from the material, morale and organizational
aspects. These main arms bearers include Ziad Da'as, Bilal Abu Amsha,
Tareq Khandakji, Hashem, Kana'an, Tareq Al Za'el and Mansour Sharim.
b. It is necessary to remove some of the parasites who mixed in with
the arms bearers and those who did not fire one projectile at
Israelis, in order to discard their financial burden and the problems
which they cause.
c. Contacts should be made with the commanders of the organizations
regarding cooperation so that the handling of the issue of the arms
bearers in Tulkarm will be carried out vis-a-vis one man, and that
there should not be simultaneous contacts and coordination with a
number elements [amongst the arms bearers].
d. If the candidate to assume the responsibility regarding the arms
bearers in indeed the comrade "Hafez", he must remove the parasites
among them, since their behavior will have a detrimental affect on
him. In addition, he must draw closer and closer to the prominent
figures amongst the arms bearers so that they will not have to seek
other sources of supplies, support and cover, as is taking place at
present in Tulkarm.
12. For your information.
Head of the [General] Intelligence in the Tulkarm
District
Hamdi Al Darduch
Signature