Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee - Second Statement of the Government of Israel - March 20- 2001

The establishment of the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee was intended to mark the end of the violence. Its task was to be a retrospective assessment of what had happened, why it had happened and how to prevent its recurrence. Yasser Arafat gave a commitment to "take immediate, concrete measures to end the current confrontation". Israel relied on this commitment as the basis for its agreement to the establishment of the Committee.

The violence has not ended. On the contrary, Palestinian attacks against Israeli civilians and armed forces have escalated and become more murderous. The recent carnage on the streets of Netanya and south Tel Aviv attests to this. The present Statement is being submitted because Israel believes that the record of exchanges before the Committee should be complete and that the nature and content of the Palestinian submissions should not go unanswered.

There is an air of unreality to the Palestinian submissions. Palestinian attacks against Israelis are described as "demonstrations". The participants are described as "unarmed"; as "civilians". Palestinians are simply the passive victims of Israeli aggression. It is said that Israel should be more restrained in its response yet there is no indication of Palestinian willingness to bring an end to the violence. Israel is blamed for the economic costs of the conflict without any recognition that commerce and trade presupposes an edifice of peace. The Palestinians seem to believe that they can get everything. They want a right to attack, while denying Israel a right to defend. They call for Israeli restraint, but accept no limits themselves. They talk of a reestablishment of trust but fail to condemn the attacks. This is not the stuff of "historic reconciliations" spoken about in lofty terms by the Palestinian Minister of Information in his foreword to the principal Palestinian submission to the Committee. Israel would like peace. It has shown its willingness to talk seriously of the issues that divide the two sides. Talking of peace, however, requires an end to the violence. This is the commitment required of the Palestinian leadership and people; not simply in words, but in deeds as well.

A. Introduction

1. This Second Statement of the Government of Israel to the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee ("the Committee") addresses various issues raised by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation ("PLO") in its submissions to the Committee. Israel unequivocally rejects the allegations advanced by the Palestinian side. The picture they paint of a passive Palestinian population, innocent victims of Israeli aggression, is demonstrably false. It is a gross distortion of the events of recent months. The opening intonation of Yasser Abed Rabo in the Palestinian Second Submission of the necessity for the "open and honest acknowledgement of injustices" as a "precursor to historic reconciliations" quite clearly finds no reflection on the Palestinian side.

2. The distortion evident in the Palestinian submissions is sharply illustrated by the recent comments by Palestinian Minister of Communications, Imad Al-Falouji. Addressing a PLO rally at the Ein El-Halwe Refugee Camp near Sidon in Lebanon on 2 March 2001, Mr Al-Falouji declared that the confrontation with Israel had been planned following the failure of the Camp David Summit on 25 July 2000. The statement was reported by the Associated Press. It stands in explicit support of the view that the current violence is part of a planned agenda by the Palestinian leadership to create new facts on the ground.

3. The Palestinian submissions are notable for what they leave out. Nothing is said not a single word of Palestinian policies and practices over the past five-and-a-half months. Nothing is said about attacks on Israeli civilians, about the on-going incitement to hatred and violence, about the release of terrorist detainees, about the calculated exploitation of children, about the use of illegal weapons, about the destruction of Jewish Holy Sites. Nothing is said of the groundwork for violence laid by the Palestinian leadership in the period following the failure of the Camp David Summit on 25 July 2000. Nothing is said of the Palestinian undertakings in the various agreements concluded with Israel, of the persistent and documented violations of the security commitments assumed by the Palestinians as part of the exercise of building trust that must be at the core of any permanent settlement between the two sides. Above all, nothing is said about ending the violence. It is quite extraordinary that in four Palestinian submissions to the Committee there is not a single word about the ending of the bloodshed; about stopping the attacks. The omission is telling. The message is clear. It has even been expressed by senior Palestinian officials. Palestinian attacks against Israelis will not end until Israel accepts Palestinian demands.

4. There is a dangerous weariness solidifying in relations between Israel and the Palestinians. One of the central elements of the Sharm El-Sheikh statement by President Clinton on 17 October 2000 was that the violence was to end. There was a commitment "to take immediate, concrete measures to end the current confrontation". Israel sees no efforts by the Palestinian leadership towards this end. Quite to the contrary. The Palestinian leadership have instigated, orchestrated and directed the violence. It has used, and continues to use, terror and attrition as strategic tools. Since late September 2000, nearly 70 Israelis have been killed as a result of Palestinian attacks with around 900 more injured. To these figures must be added the 255 Israelis that were killed in terrorist attacks from the signing of the Declaration of Principles ("DOP") in September 1993 to the outbreak of the present violence. Countless more were injured in this period. If not for Israel's successful prevention of other planned terror attacks, the death and casualty toll would have been far higher. There is a growing cynicism in Israel over Palestinian protestations of good faith in the search for peace.

5. In the light of the Palestinian allegations against Israel concerning violence against civilians, indiscriminate shootings, assassinations, it is worth recalling the conduct of the Palestinians in this conflict, conduct characterised overwhelmingly by attacks on Israeli civilians and on soldiers distant from any involvement in the hostilities.

6. First, there are the targeted attacks on individual Israeli civilians. By way of example:
   • on 30 September 2000, Amos Machlouf, 30, from Gilo, Jerusalem, was found murdered in a ravine between Gilo and the Palestinian village of Beit Jala. He had been stabbed several times and appears to have been killed while tied up;

   • on 2 October 2000, Wichlav Zalsevsky, 24, an encyclopaedia salesman from Ashdod, was shot in the head and killed as he stopped at a garage in the West Bank for car repairs;

   • on 8 November 2000, Noa Dahan, 25, from Moshav Mivtahim in the Negev, was shot and killed in a roadside ambush by three Palestinian assailants while she travelled to work at the Rafiah border crossing into the Gaza Strip. Her job was to assist in the processing of Palestinian commercial shipments through the border terminal;

   • on 13 November 2000, Gabi Zaghouri, 36, a truck driver, was killed in a shooting attack in the Gaza Strip while driving his truck of agricultural produce to market;

   • on 21 November 2000, Itamar Yefet, 18, an agricultural worker, was killed in the Gaza Strip by a gunshot to the head while hitchhiking a ride to a settlement to volunteer for agricultural work;

   • on 21 December 2000, Eli Cohen, 29, a driving instructor in Jerusalem, was killed by automatic gunfire by Palestinian assailants in a roadside ambush as he drove home from work. His assailants fled towards Ramallah, an area under Palestinian security control;

   • on 14 January 2001, Ron Tzalah, 32, a farmer from Kfar Yam, was shot repeatedly while tending to his tomatoes and cucumbers. Two groups, one affiliated with Yasser Arafat's Fatah party, the other with Hamas, claimed responsibility;

   • on 17 January 2001, in a particularly horrific attack, 16 year old Ofir Rahum was lured to his death by a young Palestinian woman with whom he had corresponded on the internet and whom he thought of as a friend. He was shot more than 15 times by three Palestinian gunmen at a prearranged location near Ramallah to which she drove him;

   • on 25 January 2001, Akiva Pashkos, 45, from Jerusalem, the manager of a tissue factory, was fatally shot on his return from dropping off several Arab factory workers;

   • on 29 January 2001, Arye Hershkowitz, 55, an air-conditioning technician, was fatally shot en route to a repair job at Beit El on the West Bank by a group affiliated with Yasser Arafat's Fatah party known as Force 17;

   • on 1 February 2001, Lior Attiah, 23, was gunned down in an ambush in the West Bank while travelling with an Israeli Arab friend to collect his car taken two weeks previously to a Palestinian village for repairs;

   • on the same day, 1 February 2001, Dr Shmuel Gillis, 42, a senior haematologist at the Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem known for his care of Palestinians as well as Israelis, was killed in an attack by automatic weapons while travelling in his car near the Ayoub refugee camp in the West Bank.

7. Second, there are the wider, indiscriminate attacks on Israeli civilians, both by gunfire and by bombs. By way of example:
   • on 19 October 2000, Rabbi Binyamin Herling, 64, was killed by Fatah militia and Palestinian security forces who opened fire on a party of Israeli civilians on a field trip to Mount Ebal near Nablus;

   • on 2 November 2000, Ayelet Hashahar Levy, a 23 year old mother of a baby girl, was killed in a car bomb explosion near the Mahane Yehuda market in Jerusalem. The same attack also took the life of 33 year old Hanan Levy;

   • on 13 November 2000, Sarah Leisha, 42, a teacher and mother of five, was killed when the car in which she was travelling was attacked with automatic gunfire while travelling north of Ramallah. The attackers fled by car towards Ramallah, killing two more Israelis when they opened fire on a bus;

   • on 20 November 2000, Miriam Amitai, 35, a mother of four, and Gavriel Biton, 35, a father of six, were killed in a roadside bomb attack against a children's school bus in Kfar Darom. Three girls from the same family had to have limbs amputated in consequence of that attack;

   • on 22 November 2000, Shoshana Reis, 21, was killed when a powerful car bomb exploded in Hadera. Meir Bahrame, 35, was killed in the same explosion;

   • on 8 December 2000, Rina Dudovsky, 39, a teacher and mother of six, was killed when the van in which she was travelling was attacked by automatic gunfire. Eliyahu Ben-Ami, 41, the driver of the van, was killed in the same attack.

8. Third, there are the lynchings and executions, the barbaric murders of Israeli civilians and soldiers. Mention has already been made in Israel's First Statement of the lynching in Ramallah, on 12 October 2000, of the two Israeli reserve soldiers, 33 year old Yosef Avrahami and 33 year old Vadim Norzhich. By way of further example:
   • on 28 October 2000, the bullet-ridden and badly disfigured body of Marik Gavrilov, 25, was found in his burned-out car near Ramallah;

   • on 23 January 2001, Motti Dayan, 27, and Etgar Zeitouny, 34, restaurateurs from Tel Aviv, were abducted from a restaurant on the outskirts of Tulkarem where they had been dining with an Israeli Arab friend. As they were eating, gunmen arrived and dragged the three from the restaurant. The Israeli Arab was released. Motti Dayan and Etgar Zeitouny were taken by car towards the Nur Shams refugee camp. On the way, they were taken out into a field and summarily shot.

9. Fourth, there are the attacks on Israeli soldiers distant from any involvement in the hostilities. By way of example:
   • on 14 February 2001, in the deadliest attack on Israelis in four years, soldiers David Iluz, 21, Yasmin Karisi, 18, Rachel Levy, 19, Ofir Magidish, 20, Alexander Manevitz, 18, Kochava Polanski, 19, and Julie Weiner, 21, were killed when a Palestinian drove his bus into a crowned bus stop at Azor Junction, south of Tel Aviv. Simcha Shitrit, 30, a civilian, was killed in the same attack. Invited by journalists to comment on the carnage, Yasser Arafat dismissed the attack as a "traffic accident".

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10. Fifth, there are the murder of Israeli soldiers. By way of example:
    • on 10 November 2000, Shahar Vekret, 20, was fatally shot by a Palestinian sniper near Rachel's Tomb, a Jewish Holy Site under Israeli jurisdiction, on the outskirts of Bethlehem;

    • on 18 November 2000, Baruch Flum, 21, was shot and killed by a Palestinian Police officer in the Gaza Strip who had infiltrated the settlement of Kfar Darom. Sharon Shitoubi, 21, was also killed in the same attack. Their assailant, killed in the action, was subsequently eulogised and posthumously promoted by senior Palestinian political leaders;

    • on 28 December 2000, Gad Marasha, 30, and Yonatan Vermeulen, 29, were killed while trying to defuse a roadside bomb targeted against civilians. They died when a second bomb was detonated while they were trying to defuse the first.

11. This recitation does not list the many other instances of Israeli fatalities. Nor does it mention the significant numbers of Israeli civilians and troops injured as a result of Palestinian attacks. As was noted in Israel's First Statement, the targeting of passive Israeli civilians in their homes, while travelling or while otherwise engaged in civilian pursuits detached from the conflict is a fundamental point of distinction between the practices of the two sides in this conflict. Whereas Palestinians injured by Israeli action have by-and-large been actively involved in some manner in the confrontation with Israel and are thus in most cases inaccurately described as "civilians" Israeli civilians injured in the conflict have in the overwhelming majority of cases been targeted merely because they were Israelis.

12. This violence was supposed to stop. Israel sees nothing in either the words or the deeds of the Palestinian leadership over the past five-and-a-half months that has been directed towards achieving this end. Indeed, the Palestinian submissions to the Committee do not even acknowledge that these attacks against Israelis have occurred.

13. The loss of confidence of the Israeli population in the professed good faith of the Palestinian side in the peace process is fuelled by the words and actions of the Palestinian leadership both generally and in respect of the work of the Committee. Towards the end of January 2001, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators met in Taba and discussed a wide range of issues. The meeting ended in a spirit of hope with calls for rebuilding trust and re-establishing mutual confidence.

14. Trust. Mutual confidence. The very same week however, Yasser Arafat addressed the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. Whatever hopes the Israeli population might have had that IsraeliPalestinian relations were finally on the mend evaporated with his words. "The current Government of Israel", said Mr Arafat,

    "is waging war, for the last four months, a savage and barbaric war, as well as a blatant and fascist military aggression against our Palestinian people. In this aggression it is using internationally prohibited weapons and ammunitions that include in their construction depleted uranium."¹

15. The speech went on in similar terms. There is neither truth nor any search for historic reconciliation in this rhetoric. "Good faith, Dashed expectations", a phrase used by the Palestinians to describe their frustration with the peace process², reflects very well Israel's sense of the recent events.

16. Against this background, this Statement addresses various issues raised by the PLO in its submissions to the Committee. It does not purport to respond to every detail advanced by the Palestinian side. Such an exercise would require more specific detail in the Palestinian allegations than has so far been supplied. No meaningful response beyond a general denial can be given to generalised allegations.

17. This Statement also largely refrains from addressing the quite fundamental shortcomings in the legal analysis presented in the Palestinian submissions. As President Clinton noted in his letter to Senator Mitchell of 6 December 2000, the Committee is not a tribunal whose task it is to evaluate allegations of law³. It would not be well placed to do so. The veneer of law that is cited in support, for example, of the Palestinian allegations concerning the use of firearms⁴, or "assassinations"⁵, or attacks on children⁶, is no doubt an attempt to bolster the credibility of the allegations advanced. It is, however, fundamentally flawed. Critical issues, such as the status and applicability of the provisions cited, are not addressed. In no case is any attempt made to consider the provisions by reference to the specific conduct that they are said to prohibit. Indeed, no attempt is even made to address the meaning of the provisions relied upon. These elements are highlighted in greater detail below in a number of particularly serious cases simply to reinforce the shortcomings of the Palestinian approach. Beyond this, this Statement refrains from addressing issues of law.

18. The core of the peace process between Israel and the PLO is an end to violence. This was from the outset the essential requirement of an IsraeliPalestinian dialogue. Security, including an end to violence, remains a cornerstone of any continued negotiations.

19. As was described in detail in Israel's First Statement, at the start of the Oslo process, the PLO, representing the Palestinian people in their dealings with Israel, expressly renounced "the use of terrorism and other acts of violence", committed itself to "a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two sides", declared that "all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations" and assumed "responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators"⁷. The lengthy and difficult process that followed was designed to establish a degree of trust between the two sides while proceeding on the basis of an ever-widening area of effective Palestinian self-government within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

20. The past five-and-a-half months have seen a comprehensive violation of this Palestinian commitment to renounce the use of violence. Such trust as had built up between the two sides has been significantly eroded. Any residual hope that Israel had that the Palestinian leadership appreciated the quite fundamental nature of its commitment to the renunciation of violence has been further undermined by the approach taken by the Palestinian side in its submissions to the Committee.

21. There is a thread, implied but nonetheless clear, that runs throughout the Palestinian submissions. It is that Palestinian violence against Israel and Israelis is somehow explicable, understandable, legitimate. As already observed, it is striking that, throughout the four Palestinian submissions to the Committee, nothing is said about ending the violence. Palestinian grievances with Israel are addressed, going back to the perceived injustice of General Assembly Resolution 181 (1947), the partition resolution. Israeli conduct since 1967 receives attention. The slow move towards peace is addressed. But not a word is said about bringing an end to the violence. There is no mistaking the message. The violence is part of an orchestrated policy of the Palestinian leadership. It will not stop until Israel gives in to Palestinian demands.

22. This thread is all too clear from the recommendations advanced in the Palestinian Second Submission. There is nothing here about ending the violence. Israel must desist from using force against Palestinian civilians. Israel must cease closures and curfews. Israel must control weapons held by settlers. Israel must undertake further redeployments. There is nothing in the various submissions that, even implicitly, acknowledges that Palestinians have had any part in the events of the past five-and-a-half months other than as purely passive victims of Israeli action. There is an air of utter unreality to it all.

23. As was set out in detail in Israel's First Statement, the Palestinians are the originators of the events of the past months. The groundwork for the violence was laid in the period prior to 28 September 2000. The violence has been initiated, orchestrated and encouraged by the Palestinian leadership. Organised Palestinian militia the Fatah Tanzim, elements within the Palestinian Police and the official Palestinian security apparatus, as well as other factions have been the backbone of continuing armed attacks against Israelis. The violence has an overtly political dimension. As Israel emphasised in its First Statement, the ending of violence and forward movement in the peace process are Israel's principal aims. They are not, however, matters that Israel can achieve on its own. Regrettably, Israel sees no sign in the Palestinian submissions to the Committee that the Palestinian leadership is prepared to take the necessary first step of calling a halt to Palestinian attacks against Israelis for purposes of achieving the historic reconciliation about which Yasser Abed Rabo spoke.

24. The Palestinian submissions exhibit an economy with the truth a cavalier attitude towards seemingly innocuous points of detail, misquotations, spurious references to law, prejudicial but inaccurate allusions, a failure to address key issues. Individually these shortcomings are not perhaps of great importance. Taken together across the range of the Palestinian submissions, however, the intent is to create prejudice. The calculated distortion of fact is simply another weapon in the Palestinian armoury. Although this element does not require detailed attention, it warrants some comment.

25. By way of illustration of this element, the compilation of video clips attached to the Palestinian Second Submission is inaccurate in many respects. It opens, for example, with a written quotation taken from a radio interview by former Prime Minister Barak which suggests a disinclination towards restraint by Israel in response to Palestinian attacks⁸. A closer review of Mr Barak's statement in context, however, discloses exactly the opposite intent.⁹

26. The Palestinian video is also inaccurate in other respects. For example, the second clip purports to show "Israeli illegal use of violence".¹⁰ What it in fact shows is just the opposite. The initial frames show the use of rubber bullets evident from the modifications to the front of the weapon. It goes on to show the careful aiming of the weapon a point testifying to the care taken to avoid unnecessary casualties. It continues to show the use of teargas one of the few partially effective non-lethal means of containment available. It concludes by showing Israeli attempts to contain Palestinian violence without the use of weapons.

27. This attempt to create prejudice through the inaccurate usage of video imagery is true also of other clips on the Palestinian video. There is no context to any of the clips shown. The images purporting to show Israeli shelling for example of Beit Jala or Ramallah are in fact partial reflections of severe live fire exchanges between the two sides sparked off by Palestinian attacks against Israeli civilians or armed forces. The images therefore, through the use of selective footage, simply capture the intensity of the armed conflict that has raged over the past months.

28. Examples of apparently innocuous inaccuracies in the Palestinian written submissions with evident intent to create a broader prejudicial effect also abound. For example, the characterisation of Palestinian confrontations with Israel over recent months as "demonstrations" and of the "demonstrators" as "unarmed"¹¹ and "civilians"¹² is a gross distortion of recent events. Nowhere do the Palestinian submissions address the nature and scale of Palestinian attacks on Israelis, or even of the occurrence of such attacks at all. Nowhere do the submissions address the question of whether those Palestinians involved in clashes with Israeli troops are entitled to the protection that is properly to be afforded to civilians in times of armed conflict. This issue is addressed further below. For the present, Israel simply draws attention to the highly partial and distorted use of terminology by the Palestinian side as a means of creating prejudice. Israel sees no attempt by the Palestinians to shed light on the facts to uncover the reality of the current violence.

29. There are other issues too that should be highlighted. As Israel noted in its First Statement, it has no wish to downplay the scale of the casualties in the present conflict. There have been too many on both sides. Israel must nevertheless express some caution about the figures cited of Palestinian fatalities and injuries allegedly as a result of Israeli action.

30. Israel is not in a position to determine with any accuracy the exact numbers of Palestinians killed or injured in the present conflict. It does not have access to such information. As was noted in Israel's First Statement, almost 100% of the Palestinian population live in areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority. Israel is not therefore in a position to gather such information independently.

31. Israel is cautious about the accuracy of the Palestinian casualty statistics as it has hard, verifiable evidence of overstatement. The clearest example of this practice arose in the case of the death of Issam Judeh, a resident of the West Bank town of Um-Zafa. On the morning of 8 October 2000, his body was found on the roadside in the Um-Zafa region. It was transferred from there to hospital in Ramallah. A short while thereafter Palestinian television broadcast pictures of the body accompanied by a precise explanation of how the deceased had been murdered by Israeli settlers after being beaten by them.

32. Following an investigation into the matter, it emerged that, rather than having been killed by Israeli settlers, Issam Judeh had in fact been killed in a motor car accident. This was subsequently confirmed by eye-witness testimony. A detailed forensic report by the US-based organisation Physicians for Human Rights on 2 November 2000 confirmed this assessment. The medical report noted that "the controversial death of Palestinian Issam Judeh Mustafa Hamed was the result of trauma sustained in a motor vehicle roll-over."¹³

33. Another example is the case of the death of the 21 day old baby girl Hind Nadel Jemil Iben Kwidar on 4 November 2000. Following her death, it was reported that this was the result of an incident involving IDF forces. An investigation into the matter by the IDF Coordination and Liaison Headquarters subsequently revealed that the baby had been brought by the family to hospital apparently having died in an unexplained manner while at home asleep. Independent testimony is available to support this assessment.

34. In another case, the death by a bullet wound on 1 October 2000 of two-year-old Sara Adeb Elatim Hassan was attributed to Israeli settlers. From information reported to the Nablus Coordination and Liaison Headquarters the day after the incident, it is apparent that the child was killed in an accident involving her father as a result of a stray bullet from a Kalashnikov automatic assault rifle.

35. In a range of other cases, significant doubt has been cast on claims of Palestinian deaths and injuries as a result of Israeli action.

36. It should be emphasised that Israel does not raise these matters to downplay the level of casualties in the current violence. There have been too many casualties, amongst both Palestinians and Israelis. Israel is, however, concerned at the easy propensity towards inaccuracy, overstatement and omission by the Palestinian side in its submissions both to the Committee and to the world at large as a fundamental element in its campaign against Israel. Israel cautions against taking apparently factual allegations by the Palestinians at face value.

37. One other matter requires comment at this point. The passing and uncritical reference to various provisions of law in support of many of the Palestinian allegations against Israel, coupled with the incomplete reference to allegations of fact to which the provisions of law are said to relate, is calculated to paper over the weaknesses in these allegations. A close examination of the matter, however, paints a different picture. The issue is addressed below in the case of certain particularly notable cases. It may nevertheless be helpful to highlight one such aspect at this point.

38. The Palestinian Second Submission alleges that Israel has a policy of "assassinations". The use of the term is intended to be both emotive and prejudicial. The general allegation is not developed in the Second Submission apart from an allegation that Israeli helicopter gunships fired missiles at the car of Hussein Obaiyat as he "left a site from which Palestinian gunmen often fired on an Israeli Army post."¹⁴ The allegations of assassination were, however, subsequently developed in a further submission to the Committee. This cites various provisions of law said to support the Palestinian claims.

39. What is relevant for present purposes is that in this most emotive of subjects there is no attempt by the Palestinian side to critically apply the provisions of law cited in support of the allegations. Neither is there any attempt to relate the facts alleged to the assertions of law. This cavalier attitude is particularly unsatisfactory in that it is apparent simply on the face of the allegations that many of the cases quoted would not meet even the most basic threshold test of an "assassination", a term used in the law of armed conflict to describe the killing of the enemy by perfidious means such as in the course of feigned negotiations under a flag of truce or some other comparable action. An attack on an enemy combatant by a helicopter gunship or by tank fire in the course of an armed conflict would not in principle come within the scope of this term.

40. The purpose here in respect of this matter is simply to point out that the Palestinian submissions are not aimed at fact-finding. The intent is simply to create prejudice. Undeveloped allegations of law are mixed with unsubstantiated allegations of fact. This is coupled with the failure by the Palestinian side even to acknowledge that Palestinians have been involved in attacks against Israelis, attacks of intended lethal effect.

41. Israel is accused of the excessive use of force against Palestinian civilians.¹⁵ It is alleged that Israel is acting in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention in that it is acting against civilians protected by that Convention. It is alleged that Israel has failed to comply with the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials ("Law Enforcement Code") and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials ("Firearms Principles") in that Israeli forces are using firearms in response to demonstrations and stone throwing. It is alleged that Israel has failed to use alternative means to disperse demonstrations and that it has been too quick to resort to force. It is alleged that Israel has been using force indiscriminately.

42. The allegations trip easily off the page. Little attempt is made, however, to address the essential underlying issues of substance. They do not bear scrutiny.

43. The applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to events in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has been the subject of considerable debate over the years. The position is complicated by the status of these territories prior to the 1967 Middle East war. It is further complicated now by the reality of progressive Israeli redeployment from significant parts of the West Bank and virtually all of the Gaza Strip in favour of almost complete Palestinian civil competence and extensive, and in some cases complete, Palestinian security competence over these areas. Almost 100% of the Palestinian population of these areas now come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority. The Fourth Geneva Convention is, however, intended in large measure to address circumstances in which civilians are subject to enemy authority in times of armed conflict.

44. Issues relating to the applicability of the Convention notwithstanding, Israel has long made it clear that it applies the Convention on a de facto basis, affording such protection to the civilian population as is required by its terms. The law relating to the conduct of hostilities more generally also requires that civilians are immune from attack.

45. Those who take a direct part in hostilities forfeit the immunity that attaches to civilians. This point is clear. There is, however, no recognition of this principle in the Palestinian submissions. By way of elaboration of the basic proposition, the character and status of civilians in armed conflict is addressed in unambiguous terms in the Model Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict for Armed Forces of 1999, prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC Model Manual"), as follows:

    "Civilians are not permitted to take a direct part in hostilities and are immune from attack. If they take a direct part in hostilities they forfeit this immunity."¹⁶

46. "Taking a direct part in hostilities" is defined in the ICRC Model Manual as "engaging in hostile action against enemy armed forces".¹⁷ Civilians who take a direct part in hostilities become combatants and become the legitimate object of attack (subject to the relevant principles relating to such action).¹⁸ It is furthermore equally clear that "[p]ersons cannot acquire and divest themselves of combatant status at will. Once they have become combatants, they remain combatants until the close of hostilities ..."¹⁹

47. In addition to these accepted principles relating to civilians in times of armed conflict, it is also well established in the law of armed conflict that combatants are required to distinguish themselves from the civilian population.²⁰ The commentary to this provision in the ICRC Model Manual elaborates on this principle in the following terms:

    "Since combatants are entitled to engage in hostilities and are subject to attack they need to be distinguishable from the civilian population who are protected from attack. Members of the armed forces distinguish themselves by wearing military uniform...²¹

    Combatants who take part in hostilities without distinguishing themselves from civilians lose their combatant status ... That means that on capture they may be tried for the war crime of unlawfully taking part in hostilities ..."

48. As was discussed in detail in Israel's First Statement, the reality of the circumstances under consideration is that Israeli civilians and armed forces have come under violent attack, frequently involving a live fire dimension, by persons who do not wear uniforms or other distinguishing insignia. Often, these attacks are initiated from within crowded civilian areas. Often, they take place from behind or within groups of unarmed participants. The perpetrators of such attacks are acting in violation of accepted rules relating to the conduct of hostilities. They cannot claim to be civilians. They are not entitled to the protection afforded to civilians in time of armed conflict. Indeed, they may be prosecuted for the war crime of unlawfully taking part in hostilities.

49. In this regard, it is worth recalling the Statement by the US Central Command addressing the circumstances faced by UN peacekeeping troops in Somalia in 1993:

    "[The Somali] gunmen do not wear uniforms or distinctive insignia; they do not carry arms openly; they are not led by accountable military leadership; they are not subject to military discipline and they do not comply with international law. It is they who initiated the firefight and who bear ultimate responsibility for this tragic loss of life."²²

50. As noted in Israel's First Statement, the United Nations Military Spokesman at the time defended action by the UN forces in which "civilians" had been killed and injured in the following terms:

    "Everyone on the ground in the vicinity was a combatant, because they meant to do us harm."²³

51. Israel has been restrained in its response to Palestinian attacks. Israeli troops have acted in self-defence and in the defence of others. In doing so, they have responded to those who have initiated the attacks. The attacks have had lethal intent. There have been around 3,500 such attacks involving a live fire dimension against Israelis since the violence began involving automatic weapons, assault rifles, pistols, hand grenades, explosives and, most recently, mortars. Many more attacks have involved the use of molotov cocktails. This is an armed conflict. Those perpetrating the attacks against Israelis are not civilians. They cannot claim immunity from Israeli response.

52. In support of the Palestinian claim that Israel has used excessive force it is said that Israeli forces have acted in violation of the Law Enforcement Code and the Firearms Principles. The same allegation surfaces in other reports on the events in question. In no case, however, do the allegations go beyond the bare reference to these instruments. There is no examination of the relevance and application of these instruments to the events in question. No attempt is made to interpret the provisions cited in support of the allegations advanced. As with the easy willingness of the Palestinian side to invoke the Fourth Geneva Convention in support of its case, the reference to the Law Enforcement Code and the Firearms Principles is another of the serious shortcomings of law that run through the Palestinian submissions.

53. The Law Enforcement Code was adopted by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979. It is not a binding instrument. It grew out of a 1974 initiative of the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders which was asked to draw up a code of ethics for police and law enforcement agencies. It addresses situations of civilian policing. It has no application in the field of armed conflict in which the use of force is governed by a well developed and widely accepted body of law.

54. The Firearms Principles were adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders and welcomed by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 45/166 of 18 December 1990. It too is not a binding instrument. The principles were formulated to provide more detailed guidelines on the use of force and firearms in accordance with Article 3 of the Law Enforcement Code. They also set out guidelines for the policing of unlawful assemblies and persons in custody or detention. They do not address situations of armed conflict.

55. The Palestinian side also misjudges its reliance on these instruments for other reasons. Following the adoption of the Firearms Principles, the UN Economic and Social Council sought to obtain information from UN Members concerning the use and application of the both the Law Enforcement Code and the Firearms Principles. A detailed survey enquiring into government practices was thus prepared and sent out. Sixty-five States responded to that survey. Sixty-two of those responses are reproduced on the internet site of the United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network.²⁴ In virtually every case, the States responding indicated that, under their national laws, firearms could be used to disperse violent assemblies. In many cases, States went further than this. In every case in which a response was recorded, the State in question indicated that law enforcement officials were permitted to use firearms in self-defence, in the defence of others against the imminent threat of death, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime, or to affect an arrest.²⁵

56. The Law Enforcement Code and the Firearms Principles do not address the circumstances with which the Committee is concerned. Even were they to be applicable, however, they do not support the case for which they are advanced by the Palestinian side. The attacks on Israeli civilians and armed forces go far beyond any conception of what might be considered to be a violent assembly. They are characterised by the use of weapons. They are motivated by lethal intent. These is nothing in the instruments in question, or in the practice of States more generally, that would constrain the use of firearms by Israeli armed forces in self-defence and in the defence of others.

57. The Palestinian side alleges that Israel has failed to use non-lethal methods to respond to "demonstrations" and that it has failed to adopt a graduated approach to the use of force. This matter was addressed in detail in Israel's First Statement and there is no need to go over it again. Three points should, however, be emphasised. First, where possible ie, in circumstances in which Israeli troops have not been faced from the outset with lethal attacks Israel has in fact adopted graduated methods in an attempt to control the violence. This, indeed, is evident from the second clip on the Palestinian video referred to above which shows Israeli attempts to control violent assemblies without the use of weapons, by the use of tear gas and by the use of rubber bullets. Sadly, however, in a significant number of cases the violent assemblies in question involve live fire attacks by the Palestinians. In such cases, the use of graduated non-lethal methods of containment is ineffective.

58. Second, these violent assemblies are not "demonstrations". They involve live fire attacks of lethal intent against Israeli civilians and armed forces. There is not a single instance of such an attack having stopped short of its lethal objective in the absence of a resolute Israeli response. Were Israel not to respond effectively to these attacks, the scale of dead and injured on both sides would have escalated beyond all imagination.

59. Third, as was addressed in some detail in its First Statement, Israel has undertaken an extensive enquiry in an attempt to find effective non-lethal means for long distance containment of violent demonstrations. It has been unable to procure such means. The shortcomings of available, traditional non-lethal methods of containment in live fire situations was addressed in detail in Israel First Statement. Israel has had no effective alternatives available to it in its response to Palestinian attacks.

60. The Palestinian side alleges the indiscriminate use of force by Israeli troops. The allegations are not, however, particularised. It is difficult therefore to respond to them in any meaningful way. The issue nevertheless warrants some comment of a general nature.

61. As a preliminary matter, Palestinian conduct over the past five months should itself be recalled. As has already been noted, this conduct has been characterised by automatic gunfire, bomb and other attacks of lethal intent and effect on Israeli civilians and soldiers. These attacks have in large measure been indiscriminate the use of automatic weapons, bomb attacks in Israeli towns and cities, the carnage caused by a bus driven into a crowd of young people at a bus stop. They have not, however, just been indiscriminate. They have been designed to create terror.

62. The Palestinians who have undertaken these attacks have not operated within any framework of law. There has been no regard for the principles of conduct that the PLO now cites in its allegations against Israel. Where, it may be asked, are the Tanzim Rules of Engagement? What principles have constrained the use of force by Palestinian Police and other members of the Palestinian security apparatus in their attacks on Israeli civilians? There is a base hypocrisy to the Palestinian allegations against Israel concerning the indiscriminate use of force. It is propaganda of the worst kind. It is wilfully blind to the conduct that is at the very core of the campaign of violence that Palestinians have been pursuing against Israelis over the past five-and-a-half months.

63. On the issue of Israel's use of force, as was noted in Israel's First Statement,²⁶ as a matter of general practice, due to their sensitive nature, Rules of Engagement ("ROEs") are not published. The reason for this is that detailed knowledge of the ROEs under which a force is operating is likely to give an opposing force a significant advantage. ROEs are implemented through detailed instructions to officers and soldiers in the field, including through the use of training exercises. Commanding officers are under an obligation to ensure that the troops under their command have a clear understanding of the relevant ROE.

64. As a general practice, the use of weapons by Israeli armed forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is governed by ROEs based on principles applicable to normal policing operations. These provide as a general principle that weapons are only to be used as a last resort in the face of a life-threatening situation that could not be effectively addressed without the use of weapons. Other situations in which weapons may be used accompanied by clear instructions relating to the graduated use of force relate to circumstances in which there is a real and immediate perception of threat.

65. Following the outbreak of the current violence, some modification of the standard ROEs became necessary to address the significant increase in the threat faced by Israeli civilians and troops from Palestinian attacks. The principal modification to the ROE related to circumstances in which given the nature of the violence that had already taken place a real and immediate threat could reasonably be appreciated. Graduated responses to evolving situations were addressed in detail. Indiscriminate firing was not permitted.

66. The ROEs applicable to the conduct of Israeli armed forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are measured and detailed. They establish a carefully considered and reasonable framework for meeting the threat faced by Israeli civilians and armed forces. They are punctiliously consistent with the relevant applicable law. There is no policy of indiscriminate or excessive use of force. As was noted in Israel's First Statement, the IDF and the Israeli political establishment do not condone and will not overlook excessive and unreasonable use of force by its troops.

67. The PLO alleges that Israel has a policy of "assassinations". The allegation is made in passing in the Palestinian Second Submission.²⁷ It is addressed further in the Palestinian Assassinations Paper of 12 January 2001. Various other documents produced by the Palestinian side which have no doubt found, or will find, their way to the Committee touch upon this matter further. Elements of these allegations have already been addressed in the preceding paragraphs. The issue nevertheless calls for further comment.

68. As with its references to the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Law Enforcement Code and the Firearms Principles, the PLO endeavours to give its allegations of assassinations credibility by citing various provisions of law notably Articles 27, 32 and 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 51, 75 and 85 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977 ("Geneva Protocol I), and Article 23(b) of the 1907 Hague Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land ("Hague Regulations"). It does not, however, address the interpretation of these provisions or their application to the factual circumstances alleged. These shortcomings are fundamental.

69. The subject of "assassinations" is controversial within the law of armed conflict. Some argue that there is no bar on "assassinations" per se. Others argue that, while the law may at one point have prohibited "assassinations", the nature of the threat posed by terrorist activities justifies the targeting of such individuals in covert operations and that the law has evolved to permit such action. Others still, and this is probably where majority opinion coalesces, argue that the relevant issue is not whether a particular act is characterised as an "assassination" or as some other type of action but whether the attack comes within the bounds of permissible military action under the law of armed conflict. In particular, it is argued that the question of whether the targeting of any given individual is permissible will depend on whether that individual is a combatant and the methods and means of the attack.

70. Before addressing this issue further, it will be useful to recall a number of basic and uncontroversial principles relating to the conduct of hostilities:
    • first, all combat activity must be justified on military grounds. Combat activity which is not militarily necessary is prohibited;²⁸

    • second, attacks must not be indiscriminate and must be proportionate to the military objective to be achieved;²⁹

    • third, a distinction must be made between combatants and non-combatants. Combatants are permitted to take a direct part in hostilities; non-combatants are not. Combatants may be attacked. Non-combatants are protected from attack but lose their protection if they take part in hostilities;³⁰

    • fourth, civilians who take a direct part in hostilities including engaging in hostile action against enemy forces forfeit their immunity from attack;³¹

    • fifth, persons cannot acquire and divest themselves of combatant status at will. Once they have become combatants, they remain combatants until the close of hostilities;³²

    • sixth, combatants are required to distinguish themselves from the civilian population. Combatants who do not so distinguish themselves may be tried for the war crime of unlawfully taking a direct part in hostilities.³³ Combatants who do not distinguish themselves from the civilian population remain the legitimate target of attack.

71. Within this framework, there is further elaboration on what is permissible by way of military action in pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Thus, even if a person, object or location is the legitimate target of attack, the means and method of that attack must come within the bounds of legally permissible action.

72. The targeting of individual enemy combatants is permitted. The matter is addressed in the ICRC Model Manual in the following terms:

    "There is nothing in law to prevent the attacking of an enemy individual provided he is a combatant, the attack is carried out by combatants, who distinguish themselves as such, or at least carry their weapons openly, and it is not done perfidiously."³⁴

73. As this makes clear, the targeting of individual enemy combatants ie, those who take a direct part in hostilities is permissible. Such action also accords with the basic principle that military activity must not be indiscriminate. The targeting of an individual combatant using permissible means is thus lawful.

74. How does this apply to the facts as alleged in the Palestinian submissions? A number of general observations are warranted.

75. First, persons who take, or have taken, a direct part in the hostilities are, by reference to accepted principles of the law of armed conflict, to be considered as combatants. They remain combatants until such time as the hostilities come to an end. They cannot acquire and divest themselves of combatant status at will. While Israel makes no comment here on the specific Palestinian allegations of Israeli action, it may be observed that the targeting of individual Palestinian combatants would come within the scope of permissible means of response to on-going Palestinian attacks.

76. Second, as a matter of general proposition, Israel has only targeted those Palestinians who, because they have taken a direct part in the hostilities through the active planning and perpetration of attacks of intended lethal effect against Israelis, are properly to be regarded as combatants.

77. Third, on the question of the method and means of attack, it is evident, simply on the basis of the facts as alleged in the Palestinian submissions, that many of the cases cited would not in principle come within the scope of acts prohibited by the law of armed conflict. This applies notably to allegations of attacks by Israeli helicopter gunships, fire from Israeli tanks, or actions involving exchanges of fire between Israeli troops and Palestinian militia.

78. Fourth, as a matter of general proposition, Israel rejects the allegation that it has a policy of "assassinations" of Palestinians. Whatever action Israel has taken has been taken firmly within the bounds of the relevant and accepted principles relating to the conduct of hostilities.

79. Fifth, it ought also to be observed that those Palestinians who take, or have taken, a direct part in hostilities in circumstances in which they do not distinguish, or have not distinguished, themselves from the civilian population, have themselves acted in violation of the law of armed conflict and may be tried for the war crime of unlawfully taking a direct part in the hostilities.

80. For completeness, it should also be observed that none of the various provisions of law cited in the Palestinian submissions in support of their allegations on this matter prohibit the targeting of individual combatants using permissible methods and means of attack.³⁵

81. A central element of the Palestinian allegations against Israel focuses on the settlements. It is also alleged that Israeli settlers have undertaken acts of violence against Palestinians. A number of observations on these matters are warranted.

82. Israel understands that the Palestinian side objects to the settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Without prejudice to the formal status of the settlements, Israel accepts that the settlements are an outstanding issue on which there will have to be agreement as part of any permanent status resolution between the two sides. This point was acknowledged and agreed upon in the Declaration of Principles of 13 September 1993 as well as in other agreements between the two sides. There has in fact been a good deal of discussion on the question of settlements between the two sides in the various negotiations towards a permanent status agreement.

83. As part of the Oslo process, the Palestinian side committed itself to an end to violence and declared "that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations".³⁶ This included negotiation on the issue of the settlements. It runs counter to the very basis on which Israel has engaged in negotiations with the Palestinians for the Palestinians now to turn round and attempt to advance this issue as a reason justifying the violence. There was to have been an end to violence. That was the basis of the negotiations.

84. The issue of alleged unlawful action by Israeli settlers against Palestinians was addressed in Israel's First Statement to the Committee. Israel there stated as follows:

    "All such allegations are investigated. Israel will have no truck with criminal activity on the part of its nationals. In a number of cases to date, suspects have been remanded in custody pending trial."³⁷

85. This statement holds true.

86. There have been allegations of violence by Israeli settlers against Palestinians. These include allegations of stone throwing, shooting, assault, the cutting down of trees and the killing of livestock. It should be emphasised that all such complaints are investigated. Where there is evidence to support an indictment, charges are brought. In a number of such cases, proceedings are pending. Others are still under investigation. In a number of cases, those accused have been remanded in custody pending trial.

87. For completeness, it should be mentioned that the Israeli police are currently investigating a number of complaints of unlawful activity by Israeli settlers against Palestinians that have been lodged by IDF soldiers. Israel will not tolerate criminal activity on the part of its nationals. It is committed to taking such measures as are necessary to bring such activity to a halt.

88. The Palestinian side alleges substantial economic losses "due to Israeli aggression". The allegations focus on four elements: restrictions on the movement of persons; restrictions on the movement of goods; the destruction of property; and the alleged retention of revenue due to the Palestinian Authority. These losses are put at around US$750 million for the last quarter of 2000.³⁸ The Palestinian side has separately alleged that Israel has "been practising a pattern of assault against the Palestinian population and the Palestinian environment" in the form of the destruction of orchards and attacks on Palestinian farmers.³⁹ These matters call for comment.

89. There is no doubt that the current violence has had significant economic costs. These costs are not one-sided. Israel estimates, for example, that the cost of the violence to the Israeli economy in the last quarter of 2000 was around US$1.2 billion. This was a consequence of losses in revenue from exports to the Palestinian territories, a decrease in activity in certain industrial sectors such as construction, a collapse in tourism, a downturn in investment and more general negative effects from the violence leading to a decrease in private consumption. Estimates of continuing losses to the Israeli economy through 2001 are put at around US$150 million per month. These losses take no account of the additional, increased costs to Israel's security budget as a result of the confrontation.

90. As regards Palestinian economic losses, a number of observations may be made. First, Israel has no interest in damaging the Palestinian economy. Indeed, the opposite is true. Economic cooperation and the development of the Palestinian economy are widely perceived in Israel as factors which would be likely to contribute to regional stability and the advancement of peace. With this in mind, Israel has in fact taken extensive economic measures in recent years with a view to assisting economic development in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

91. Second, this notwithstanding, it must be emphasised that Palestinians do not have a right to work in Israel or to automatic benefits from the significant level of economic integration of the two economies. The benefits of economic integration are the fruits of a peaceful interaction between Israelis and Palestinians. This cannot be expected to survive the kind of confrontation that the Palestinians have been waging on Israeli society over the past five months. Indeed, it is hardly surprising, particularly in the face of attacks such as the bus attack at the Azor Junction south of Tel Aviv which left eight people dead and many others injured,⁴⁰ that one of the casualties of the continued violence has been economic cooperation between the two sides.

92. Third, it must also be stressed that Israel has not taken measures that have had an economic impact simply for the sake of taking such measures or for reasons of harming the Palestinian economy. The measures that have been taken have been taken for reasons of security. Thus, for example, the closure of the Palestinian territories was taken in order to prevent, or at least minimise the risks of, terrorist attacks. It is apparent, for example, that the bomb attacks over recent months in Israeli cities and towns, such Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Hadera and Netanya, have been the work of Palestinian terrorists based in areas under the control of the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian leadership has made no attempt to control this activity and bring it to an end.

93. In similar vein, the restriction on Israelis travelling to Palestinian areas, including commercial operators, has been taken to forestall the possibility of attacks, including the lynching, of those civilians. The abduction and execution of Motti Dayan and Etgar Zeitouny from a restaurant in Tulkarem on 23 January 2001 (noted in paragraph 8 above) is an example of the type of action that periodic restrictions on movements between Israel and the Palestinian territories have been an attempt to prevent.

94. It should also be noted that, in a number of cases, Palestinian attacks, whether by intention or otherwise, have themselves directly resulted in collateral economic consequences. For example, as was noted in paragraph 6 above, the attack on and murder of Noa Dahan on 8 November 2000 impacted both directly and indirectly on the passage of goods to the Gaza Strip as she was responsible for assisting in the processing of commercial shipments through the Rafiah border terminal. Her death, as well as the broader concentration of violence around the Rafiah terminal, necessitated the closure of the terminal at various times.

95. Fourth, it should also be emphasised that Israel has taken no measures that would restrict or impede the flow of food or humanitarian supplies to the Palestinian areas, even to the extent of facilitating the transfer of such supplies through unofficial channels. Israel has similarly assisted with the evacuation of Palestinian sick and wounded, whether to treatment in Israel or elsewhere.

96. Fifth, as regards the transfer of revenue to the Palestinian Authority, the violence of the past five months has caused some inevitable delays in the processing of revenue payments to the Palestinian Authority. This, as with other matters of IsraeliPalestinian cooperation, is governed by detailed provisions in the agreements concluded between the two sides. It is fanciful to expect that these arrangements, alone out of all the commitments assumed in these agreements, could remain unaffected by the events of recent months. In any event, the relevant authorities are currently processing the material concerning the transfer of revenue for the period January-February 2001. Revenue from earlier periods has been transferred.

97. Sixth, as regards the allegations concerning the destruction of property, these have not been developed in any detail in the Palestinian submissions and it is accordingly impossible to respond to them in any meaningful way. It should be noted, however, that, as a matter of uniform policy, whatever action Israel has taken has been taken for reasons of security.

98. A final observation is warranted. There is something both bizarre and distasteful about the Palestinian allegations of economic damage in the context of their submissions as a whole. As has already been commented upon, nowhere in the Palestinian submissions is there even a hint of willingness on the part of the Palestinian leadership to take the steps necessary to bring an end to the violence. There is equally no evident acceptance that Palestinian attacks on Israelis are a significant component in the current conflict. Yet amidst all this the Palestinians nevertheless claim the benefits of peace. This claim is both stunning in its temerity and a source of dismay as it suggests a complete and utter lack of appreciation on the part of the Palestinian leadership of the building blocks that are necessary for peace. Economic development and normal commercial interaction are the products of peaceful interaction between people. They require a basic level of trust that the man who drives the bus will not without warning turn his vehicle into a killing machine. The Palestinian leadership is faced with an historic choice. It can take steps to bring the violence to an end, and seek to capitalise on the benefits of peace, or it can abdicate its responsibility for ensuring security and preside over the continuing economic decline that is the inevitable consequence of conflict.

99. The Palestinian allegations concerning environmental damage can be dealt with briefly. The allegations concern the destruction of trees and attacks on farmers. In its publications elsewhere, the Palestinian side has also levelled wider, and wilder, allegations of environmental damage against Israel.

100. As regards the allegations concerning the destruction of trees or other agricultural property, such action as Israel has taken by, for example, the clearing trees or roadside vegetation has been motivated by reasons of security on grounds that the areas in question have been the site of attacks against Israelis with the trees or vegetation in question providing cover for the attackers. The measures in question have not been punitive. Israel has only acted in circumstances in which there has been an attack necessitating a response and where alternative options have not been available.

101. As regards allegations of attacks on Palestinian farmers by Israeli settlers, where complaints of such activity are made, or where such attacks are otherwise evident, they are thoroughly investigated. Where there is evidence to support charges, charges will be laid. As has already been stated, Israel will not tolerate unlawful activity against Palestinians by Israeli nationals.

102. On the question of environmental cooperation more generally, it should be noted that, as part of the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of 28 September 1995,⁴¹ several joint committees were established to address such matters. These were not only confidence building measures designed to facilitate the development of trust between the two sides but were also matters of significant practical importance as the two sides share many elements of a common environment. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the establishment of these joint committees, the Palestinian side has rejected cooperation in this area with significant unfortunate environmental consequences for both sides. As these matters have only been alluded to in passing in the Palestinian submissions, they do not require further attention in the context of the present Statement. Israel simply notes therefore that the Palestinian Authority has systematically failed to adopt a responsible attitude to the sound environmental management of the areas under its jurisdiction in such matters as the disposal of toxic waste, the treatment of sewage, etc with significant long-term consequences for all the peoples of the region.

103. There are a number of other allegations raised by the Palestinian side under the heading of collective punishment measures said to be in violation of Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. These allegations, which in many cases simply paraphrase unsubstantiated observations made in reports published by other organisations, refer to a number of alleged practices demolition of homes, laying siege to Palestinian centres, indiscriminate shooting, shelling, mass arrests, etc. A number of observations on these allegations are warranted.

104. First, Israel repeats that it has not taken action against Palestinians except for reasons of security to avert or respond to attacks against Israeli civilians or armed forces. Second, there is a confusion, no doubt intended, in the Palestinian allegations under this heading in that they address, by reference to Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, allegations of collective punishment against "protected persons" in this case civilians as well as allegations concerning other action such as the shelling of strategic targets. As has already been observed, however, those who take a direct part in hostilities, are not immune from attack. The same is true of objects or locations that, for reasons of military necessity, are legitimate targets of attack. Such objects or locations include

     "not only things of a military nature such as tanks and military aircraft but also things of a civilian nature which make an effective contribution to military action ...

     A civilian building becomes a military objective if it is used for military purposes, for example, if an office block is used as a military headquarters or a house is used as a sniper post or a barn is used to park military vehicles under cover."⁴²

105. Third, in a number of cases the subject-matter of the Palestinian allegations has been raised in proceedings before Israeli courts. The lawfulness of an order to close a number of schools was, for example, raised in Petition No. 8286/00, League for Human Rights in Israel v. IDF Forces Commander in the West Bank before the High Court of Justice. In this case, the Court concluded, taking relevant provisions of international law into account, that the order closing the schools was justified on security grounds.

106. In another case, Petition No. 76/01, Afuna v. Minister of Defence and the West Bank Military Commander concerning the intended removal of a number of the Petitioner's olive trees bordering a road, the High Court of Justice dismissed the Petition. From the observations of one of the Judges in the case, it is evident that the Court considered that the removal of the trees on grounds of military necessity was permissible in the circumstances. A number of other cases on related questions are pending.

107. In this regard, it should be noted that the Israeli Supreme Court and High Court of Justice has an established reputation of fairness and balance in the protection of human rights. There is also a practice of legal assistance by both Israeli and Palestinian NGOs testing Israeli policies and practices in this field before the courts. Decisions of the courts bind the Government. The decisions of the High Court of Justice referred to above cannot therefore be taken as partisan support for IDF practices.

108. Fourth, the Palestinian allegations in respect of these submissions are littered with errors of fact. For example, it is simply factually incorrect to allege that "Israel has cut off electricity and water to a number of Palestinian towns at various intervals including Bethlehem, Tulkarem, and Seilat".⁴³ What is accurate is that electricity installations and installations of the joint water infrastructure have been damaged by Palestinian action on around 20 separate occasions since the outbreak of violence. So, for example, on 4 October 2000, an electricity transformer near Rachel's Tomb on the outskirts of Bethlehem was damaged by Palestinian gunfire causing an electricity blackout in part of Bethlehem. Similarly, on 15 October 2000, electricity was again cut off to Bethlehem as a result of Palestinian action damaging a high-voltage electricity pylon in the area of Hosen-Batir. There is no basis at all to the allegations of Israeli action affecting supplies of water or electricity to Palestinian areas.

109. Another example of factual inaccuracy concerns the use of so-called dum-dum bullets.⁴⁴ Israel does not use dum-dum bullets. Palestinian allegations to this effect have been expressly rejected by forensic pathologists who have examined injuries said to have been caused by such projectiles.⁴⁵ The motivation behind the allegation is clear dum-dum bullets are generally regarded as unlawful. Allegations of the use of such projectiles by Israel is therefore both emotive and prejudicial. The only casualty in this case, however, is truth.

110. More recently, in similar vein, there have been allegations of the use by Israel of depleted uranium and of nerve gas. Israel does not use depleted uranium. It does not use nerve gas. These allegations are unequivocally false. They are made in the absence of any foundation of fact simply to create prejudice.

111. For the avoidance of doubt, in respect of all of the allegations advanced by the Palestinians under the heading of collective punishments, Israel has either not acted in the manner alleged at all or, where it has taken action, it has done so for reasons of security within the parameters of permissible action under the law of armed conflict.

112. A number of observations have already been made in the preceding sections regarding substantive elements of the recommendations made in the Palestinian Second Submission. There is little more that needs to be added here. For completeness, however, it is worth reiterating that the Palestinian recommendations are notable for the absence of anything addressing an end to the violence and indications of willingness on the part of the Palestinian side to call a halt to the attacks on Israeli civilians and armed forces. The Palestinian recommendations utterly ignore the reality of the conflict. They also ignore all reference to the commitments assumed by the Palestinian side under the agreements with Israel concluded since September 1993. There is nothing in the Palestinian recommendations that provides a credible platform on which to build a pathway back to the negotiations.

113. Israel reiterates what it said in its First Statement. The fundamental precondition in the re-creation of trust between the two sides is that previously agreed arrangements between them must be upheld. This includes in particular those elements in the agreements that concern security. Given the events of the past five-and-a-half months, Israel considers it essential that the Palestinian side reaffirm - by both word and deed - its previously stated and documented commitment to renounce the use of violence in its relations with Israel. Beyond this, Israel rejects the proposed Palestinian recommendations. In particular, Israel rejects Palestinian proposals designed to internationalise the conflict through the establishment of an international force.

114. The Sharm El-Sheikh Summit of 16-17 October 2000 was supposed to begin the process of re-establishing trust between the two sides. It was supposed to bring an end to the violence. There was a commitment to this effect. The task of the Committee that was established as part of this package was to examine "the events of the past several weeks and how to prevent their recurrence". It was intended to be a retrospective assessment of what had happened, why it had happened and how to prevent its recurrence.

115. The violence has not ended. No attempt has been made by the Palestinian leadership to call a halt to the attacks on Israeli civilians and armed forces. On the contrary, the attacks have been growing in both scale and intensity. Recent attacks have involved the use of mortars in addition to the weapons previously employed by the Palestinians - machine guns, assault rifles, pistols, hand grenades, explosives, molotov cocktails.

116. Israel's First Statement concluded with a plea - for an end to the violence; for the exercise by the Palestinian leadership of their responsibility to this effect. Things have moved on. Israeli civilians and armed forces continue to be targeted. The incitement continues. The Palestinian leadership continues to instigate and be complicit in the acts of its gunmen. If there is to be any progress towards peace, it must bring these gunmen under control.

Appendix