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Excerpts from Conference Call by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations
June 3, 2001
The tragedy in Tel Aviv was terrible. It was a massacre of young
people and a cynical murder. We have a choice before us: either to
try and do our very best by political means to achieve a cease-fire
or to use our security capabilities to create a deterrent. Clearly
our preference is for cease-fire and peace, and not to show that we
are strong and able to handle the situation. If we choose the second
option, it would be a policy of contradiction.
If we retaliate immediately, I think many people in the world would
say: okay, now two parties are equal and we have to tell them not to
escalate. I believe that we acted wisely and courageously by showing
restraint and by giving the international community a chance to tell
Arafat the true story. In fact, Arafat had begun to preside over a
coalition of terror on the one hand and at the same time tried to
create an impression of negotiation. After a very long while, maybe
for the first time, America, Russia, and many other countries turned
to Arafat and told him to stop it and that he will be blamed. It was
effective.
The statement that Arafat issued has some good points. The first
thing that he said, in his own voice, in Arabic, is that he will make
an effort to stop the violence. He did not say that he ordered an end
to the violence and to the terror. He combined the texts of the
Jordanian-Egyptian proposal and the Mitchell Report. The combination
has two shortcomings:
- We submitted our comments to the Egyptians and the Jordanians;
they never responded. So it is a one-sided document led by three
parties - the Egyptians, the Jordanians, and the Palestinians -
without any reference to Israel whatsoever.
- We are very unhappy with the decision that calls for the
continuation of the intifada and the call to sever themselves from
Israel. We are not begging anybody to do us a favor and talk to us if
they don't want to talk.
Our policy is the following:
As far as Arafat's statement is concerned, we should judge it by the
situation on the ground, by facts on the record. There was no
shooting today, but the day is still not over and we are being very
careful. Clearly that test should take a little bit of time. We know
that Arafat gave orders to his commanders to stop shooting. We are
not sure that he gave them orders to arrest the people who are
responsible and also to try and prevent further acts. He says he
did so, but we shall check it again.
We accept the Mitchell Report in its totality and do not want to
change the words or the sequence. The Mitchell Report should remain
as is without additions, omissions or changes. If minor changes are
made, the report is open to major changes. This is for the time being
the best document for us, so we shall reject any attempt to change
it.
The attitudes of President Bush and Secretary Powell were extremely
positive, helpful, and understanding, and we look forward to working
together with them. We also received support from congressmen and
senators, which came in many forms.
We feel, again, that we need the solidarity of our people because the
test period is not over and many dangers still exist. We have to be
very cautious and work together and be aware that the situation may
change tomorrow. Se we call upon everyone to remain alert, unified,
and to face the situation, with the necessary serenity.
* * *
In response to questions, Foreign Minister Peres added:
* On what Israel wants from the Palestinians concerning the
cease-fire:
We look for signs of confiscation of weapons and basically the
prevention of further acts of terror. We need to prevent Palestinian
leaders from defending the murders. We feel it is crucial to have a
cessation of the incitement because individuals may take the
initiative to continue the violence. This can break the whole attempt
for peace.
* On the road to peace based on the four steps outlined by the
Mitchell Report:
1) Cease-fire: Israel has already announced a unilateral cease-fire
and is waiting for Arafat's cease-fire to be implemented on the
ground.
2) A cooling off period: We suggest that it last for at least 8
weeks. I believe the United States offered 6 weeks and the parties
should be able to live with that.
3) Confidence building measures: There is a list of measures we
have to take and there is a list of measures that the Palestinians
have to take. Our list of measures includes the issue of the
settlements. Our interpretation of the Mitchell Report is as follows:
not to establish new settlements; not to confiscate land for existing
settlements; to freeze building outside the area of the existing
settlements; the future of the settlements will be dealt with when we
start the political negotiations.
On the Palestinian side, they have to collect arms, to reduce the
police force and to make sure that peace will prevail. This should
occur in the third stage, six weeks after the announcement of the
cease-fire. The third stage should also include the cessation of
incitement, improvement of conditions in the territories, and the
redeployment of Israeli forces to the point that existed before the
Intifada started in September of last year.
4) The beginning of political negotiations: There were different
ideas, including negotiating an interim or a permanent solution. Our
proposal is:
- We are ready to negotiate with the aim of achieving a solution
based on 242 and 338, but the first item on the agenda should be the
implementation of the existing agreements. The two agreements signed
by both sides should be equally implemented. We feel that we have
invested too much effort in the definitions and not enough effort in
the implementation.
- As per the timetable, the Palestinians suggest that after six
months there should be a review of the negotiations and there should
be a one-year time limit for the negotiations. We are ready to put a
time limit, but we think that one year is too short. Our aims are to
take the Mitchell Report, as is, without changes and without any
acrobatics, and to use the cease-fire to lead us to a renewal of the
negotiations.
* On Chairman Arafat:
There is a struggle between Arafat and ourselves to win over the
international community. We think that in order to bring peace, it is
not enough that the two sides negotiate, but it is also necessary
that the United States, Europe, and Russia and other communities will
take a clear stand. In my judgment, Arafat can hardly continue his
way without the support of Europe, the US and Russia, and we want to
make it clear that this support is conditioned upon peace and not
upon violence. If we would declare that Arafat is a terrorist, I am
not sure that this would be sufficient. There is an organization of
non-aligned nations of 110 countries, which would immediately declare
him as a fighter for liberty. We don't want to do it and I don't
think that titles will help.
I think what we need now is to mobilize the international community
to stand against terror and to stand for the renewal of the
negotiations. Our aim is peace; we do not want to dominate other
people. We do not want to endanger other people. Our policy is
clearly self-defense on the one hand and achieving peace on the
other.
* On the mood of the people:
Our national unity government is facing many difficulties in this
crucial moment in Israeli history. The eyes of many Israelis are
filled with tears. We don't act with a pleasure or light-mindedness,
but with a responsibility for the future of our people. We are acting
together, right wing and left wing. We need to work together and keep
our differences for another day. By and large people understand what
we are doing and we enjoy wide support because we are united and
because people feel their views are represented in the Cabinet.
Although we are upset, we remain cool and rational.
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